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Abstract 
Expectancy-value theory applied to examinee motivation suggests examinees’ perceived 
value of a test indirectly affects test performance via examinee effort. This empirically 
supported indirect effect, however, is often modeled using importance and effort scores 
measured after test completion, which does not align with their theoretically specified 
temporal order. Retrospectively measured importance and effort scores may be 
influenced by examinees’ test performance, impacting the estimate of the indirect effect. 
To investigate the effect of timing of measurement, first-year college students were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions where (1) importance and effort were 
measured retrospectively; (2) importance was measured prospectively; and (3) 
importance and effort were measured prospectively. Additionally, importance and effort 
were measured retrospectively in conditions two and three to determine if the rank-order 
and average importance and effort scores change from before to after the test. The 
indirect effect was invariant across conditions, indicating no effect of behavioral 
commitment on retrospective importance and effort scores. Although the unstandardized 
indirect effect using prospective and retrospective importance and effort scores was 
invariant across conditions, the standardized indirect effect was smaller in the prospective 
condition. Thus, testing practitioners should be cautious when interpreting and making 
decisions based on the standardized indirect effect. Average latent retrospective effort 
scores were lower than prospective effort scores via cross-sectional analyses. Moreover, 
examinees completing both importance and effort measures reported lower retrospective 
effort than prospective effort. This decrease in effort was not related to test performance, 
indicating change in effort is not influenced by test performance. However, given 
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examinees tend to decrease ratings of effort after experiencing the test, results from 
techniques such as motivation filtering will differ depending on when motivation is 
measured. Importantly, examinees primed by engaging in prospective ratings of 
motivation had higher average levels of test performance than examinees that did not 
provide prospective ratings. Although the increase in test performance was small, 
priming may provide a cheap intervention aimed at increasing test performance.  
 
 
 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
Examinees assessed in low-stakes testing contexts have nothing to gain or lose as 
a result of their test performance. Accordingly, the effort put forth by examinees on a test 
with no personal consequences may be low or may be high. In contrast, examinees in 
high-stakes testing contexts such as certification and admission have something to gain or 
lose as a result of their performance; thus, they tend to put forth enough effort to 
demonstrate their ability. Discrepancy in expended effort in low- versus high-stakes 
testing contexts suggests inferences made from test scores across these testing contexts 
may not be of equal validity (Cole & Osterlind, 2008; Sundre & Kitsantas, 2004; Sungur, 
2007; Wise & Smith, 2016; Wolf & Smith, 1995).  
The prevalence of low-stakes testing internationally (e.g., institutional 
accountability assessment, National Assessment on Educational Progress, Program for 
International Student Assessment, Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study) has prompted research investigating examinee behavior and affect during low-
stakes testing. Researchers have empirically established that test scores are a function of 
both examinee ability and expended effort (O’Neil, Sugrue, & Baker, 1995/1996; Wise, 
2006; Wise & DeMars, 2005; Wise & Kong, 2005; Wolf & Smith, 1995). More 
specifically, examinee effort impacts the validity of inferences from test scores (e.g., 
Wise & Smith, 2016), value-added scores (e.g., Finney, Sundre, Swain, & Williams, 
2016), and international comparisons of ability (e.g., Eklöf, Pavešič, & Grønmo, 2014). 
Consequently, professional organizations that focus on testing and measurement issues 
stipulate that practitioners collect examinee effort data and interpret test scores in light of 
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examinee effort. The Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing assert, “In 
evaluation or accountability settings, test results should be used in conjunction with 
information from other sources when the use of the additional information contributes to 
the validity of the overall interpretation” (AERA, APA, & NCME, 2014, p. 213). Given 
the relevance and attention to examinee effort in low-stakes testing contexts, it is not only 
important to measure effort, but to investigate how and when to measure effort.  
Measurement of Examinee Effort: Background of Problem Addressed by Study  
 A common method of measuring examinee motivation in low-stakes testing 
contexts is via examinee self-report (Wise & Smith, 2016).1 A widely used self-report 
measure of examinee motivation is the Student Opinion Scale (SOS; Finney, Mathers, & 
Myers, 2016; Thelk, Sundre, Horst, & Finney, 2009). Based on expectancy-value (EV) 
theory (Eccles et al., 1983), the SOS consists of two subscales: perceived test importance 
(e.g., “Doing well on this test was important to me”) and expended effort (e.g., “I gave 
my best effort on this test”). The importance and effort subscales are operationalizations 
of the task value and motivation components of EV theory, respectively.  
                                                          
1 Response time effort (RTE) is another method employed to measure effort (Wise & Kong, 
2005). RTE is operationalized as the time interval between visualization of an item and selection 
of a response to the item. Conceptually, examinees either expend the effort necessary to select the 
most appropriate response, labeled solution behavior, or do not expend the effort necessary and 
randomly select a response, labeled rapid-guessing behavior. For example, if an examinee 
responds to an item in less time than possible, given the length of time necessary to read and 
respond to the item, then the examinee’s response would be classified as rapid-guessing behavior. 
Examinee RTE is then calculated by the ratio of items where the examinee exhibited solution 
behavior to the total number of items. A disadvantage to RTE is it presumably only identifies 
examinees expending the lowest levels of effort. Because item responses are scored one for 
solution behavior and zero for rapid-guessing behavior, it is likely that little effort is expended on 
some item responses scored as solution behavior. For example, if the time an examinee takes to 
respond to an item qualifies as solution behavior, but the examinee truly exerts little effort, the 
behavior will be incorrectly recorded as solution behavior. In short, variability in effort is 
artificially reduced as a result of the dichotomously scored response-level behavior and, in turn, 
incorrect classifications of behavior can result (DeMars, Bashkov, & Socha, 2013).  
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 Expectancy-value theory. Motivation, as it pertains to testing, refers to the 
persistence, or expended effort, an examinee puts forth toward the task of completing a 
test. As originally conceptualized, EV theory posits that motivation is primarily a 
function of the interaction between expectancy of success on a task and the value of that 
task (Atkinson, 1957). An important characteristic of Atkinson’s conceptualization of EV 
theory is it applies to tasks that are prescribed, where the individual has no choice 
whether to engage in the task or not, but only has a choice as to the level of engagement 
in the task. For this reason, EV theory seems especially applicable to low-stakes testing 
contexts where examinees only choose the level of effort to expend given their 
expectancy and value associated with the test.  
A revision of Atkinson’s EV theory extended and further developed the 
expectancy and value components and their respective interrelationships (Eccles et al., 
1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992, 2000, 2002). Expectancy of success on a task refers to an 
individual’s judgment of the likelihood of personal success on the task (Eccles et al., 
1983). Implicit within the expectancy component are perceptions of personal 
competence, locus of control, and task difficulty. That is, individuals with higher levels 
of expectancy of success likely perceive themselves to be relatively more competent and 
more in control, and perceive the task to be less difficult (i.e., more attainable). Eccles 
and colleagues conceptualized EV theory’s value component as four distinct elements: 
attainment, intrinsic, utility, and cost. Attainment value is defined by the importance of 
doing well on a task. Intrinsic value is defined as the enjoyment one gets from doing the 
task. Utility value refers to how accomplishing the task may be useful to the individual. 
Cost refers to the negative aspects of engaging in a task such as time devoted to the task 
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and cognitive and affective demand. Whereas higher levels of attainment, intrinsic, and 
utility value are associated with higher levels of motivation, cost is inversely related to 
motivation (Eccles et al., 1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992). An important departure from 
Atkinson’s EV theory was that Eccles and colleagues made no mention of the interaction 
between the value and expectancy components. Further, they suggested a positive, 
instead of negative, relationship between expectancy and value.  
The theoretically suggested pattern of interrelationships between expectancy, 
value, motivation, and performance is consistent with mediation. Expectancy of success 
on a task and task value are theorized to affect task performance via an individual’s 
motivation (see Figure 1). Empirically, research in the domain of academic achievement 
has demonstrated the indirect effects of expectancy of success and task value on 
performance via motivation (e.g., Plante, O’Keefe, & Théorêt, 2013). 
EV theory applied to examinee motivation. Adapting EV theory to low-stakes 
testing contexts, researchers have operationalized task value as perceived test importance 
and motivation as examinee effort. Accordingly, researchers posit that perceived test 
importance affects examinee effort which affects test performance (Wise & DeMars, 
2005; Wolf & Smith, 1995). When a test is of little consequence to examinees, they may 
perceive the test to be of little importance (i.e., attainment value), perceive little 
enjoyment from the test (i.e., intrinsic value), perceive the test to be useless (i.e., utility 
value), and realize the cognitive and affective demand necessary to complete the test (i.e., 
cost; Cole, Bergin, & Whittaker, 2008; Wise & DeMars, 2005). An examinee attributing 
little value to the test will not be inclined to expend the effort necessary to demonstrate 
true ability, resulting in an attenuated ability estimate (see Figure 1). 
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The aforementioned example did not mention expectancy of success. Expectancy 
of success is not often modeled in empirical studies of motivation in low-stakes testing 
contexts. One argument for focusing on perceived value and not expectancy during low-
stakes testing centers on examinees’ conceptualization of success. Expectancy refers to 
examinees’ perceived likelihood of success on a test; however, the definition of success 
on low-stakes tests is unclear. Examinees do not typically receive test scores, let alone 
interpretive feedback about their performance; thus, it is difficult to comprehend what 
success means to examinees in low-stakes testing contexts (Cole et al., 2008). Moreover, 
given perceptions of competence and task difficulty are subsumed within expectancy of 
success, it may be difficult for examinees to consider these characteristics when they 
have no experience with the test. Examinees completing a high-stakes test are aware of 
the content and difficulty of the test and have prepared appropriately. Examinees 
completing a low-stakes test are often unaware of the content and difficulty and have not 
explicitly prepared for the test. Accordingly, it may be difficult for examinees to form 
accurate perceptions of expectancy of success on low-stakes tests. 
Another reason expectancy is not often measured or modeled may be due to 
expectancy not being easily manipulated by testing practitioners, whereas task value 
could potentially be manipulated. For example, to increase the validity of low-stakes test 
scores, researchers and test practitioners have investigated methods of increasing 
examinee effort by trying to manipulate perceived test importance via financial incentives 
(Baumert & Demmrich, 2001; O’Neil, Abedi, Miyoshi, & Mastergeorge, 2005) and via 
test instructions (Baumert & Demmrich, 2001; Bensley et al., 2016; Finney, Sundre et al., 
2016; Hawthorne, Bol, Pribesh, & Suh, 2015; Kornhauser, Minahan, Siedlecki, & 
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Steedle, 2014; Liu, Bridgeman, & Adler, 2012; Liu, Rios, & Borden, 2015; Mathers, 
Finney, & Myers, 2016; Myers, Finney, & Mathers, 2016; Wise, 2004). In contrast, it 
would be difficult for researchers or test practitioners to manipulate examinees’ 
expectancy of success on a test within the confines of a testing session. Expectancy will 
not be evaluated in the current study. The indirect effect of perceived importance on test 
performance via examinee effort will be the focus of the current study. 
Researchers using cross-sectional research designs have empirically demonstrated 
the indirect effect of perceived importance on test performance via expended effort (e.g., 
Cole et al., 2008). Moreover, this indirect effect has generalized across age groups and 
countries: ninth-grade students in Germany (e.g., Penk & Schipolowski, 2015), first-year 
college students in the U.S. (e.g., Mathers et al., 2016; Myers et al., 2016; Zilberberg et 
al., 2014), and upper-class college students in the U.S. (e.g., Cole et al., 2008; Mathers et 
al., 2016; Myers et al., 2016). In addition, the indirect effect has been demonstrated when 
examinees complete tests of different knowledge domains, such as quantitative and 
scientific reasoning (Mathers et al., 2016; Myers et al., 2016; Penk & Schipolowski, 
2015; Zilberberg et al., 2014), mathematics, science, language, and social studies (Cole et 
al., 2008). The indirect effect has been demonstrated across test instruction conditions 
(i.e., examinees told: their test scores would be used for accountability mandates, they 
would receive performance feedback, or faculty would see their personal test scores) 
intended to increase the personal relevance of the test to the examinee (Mathers et al., 
2016; Myers et al., 2016). Finally, the indirect effect has been demonstrated when 
controlling for gender and prior knowledge (Cole et al., 2008; Mathers et al., 2016; 
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Zilberberg et al., 2014), conscientiousness (Myers et al., 2016), test anxiety (Mathers et 
al., 2016; Penk & Schipolowski, 2015), and expectancy (Penk & Schipolowski, 2015).  
Given the number of studies demonstrating the indirect effect of perceived 
importance on test performance via examinee effort, it is important to consider the 
practical significance of the indirect effect. The standardized indirect effect is the product 
of the standardized direct effect of importance on effort and the standardized direct effect 
of effort on performance. Crude guidelines are .01, .09, and .25 standard deviations for 
small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively (Kenny, 2016; Kenny & Judd, 2014). 
In general, the magnitude of the indirect effect has been stable and practically meaningful 
across different tests. Specifically, the indirect effect was .20, .26, .27, and .19 for 
English, mathematics, science, and social studies tests, respectively (Cole et al., 2008). 
The indirect effect has been medium to large in magnitude across test instruction 
conditions. More specifically, when controlling for gender, prior knowledge, and test 
anxiety, the indirect effect was .13, .10, and .10 for first-year students who were told their 
test scores would be used for accountability mandates, who were told they would receive 
feedback, and who were told faculty would see their personal test scores conditions, 
respectively (Mathers et al, 2016). When controlling for conscientiousness, the indirect 
effect was .20, .29, and .32 for first-year students and .34, .29, and .29 for upper-class 
students who were told their test scores would be used for accountability mandates, who 
were told they would receive feedback, and who were told faculty would see their 
personal test scores, respectively (Myers et al., 2016). Moreover, in studies that did not 
manipulate test instructions, but simply told examinees their scores would be used for 
accountability, the indirect effect was medium to large in magnitude after controlling for 
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gender and prior knowledge (.09, Zilberberg et al., 2014) and test anxiety and expectancy 
(.24, Penk & Schipolowski, 2015).  
Statement of the Problem Addressed by Current Study 
The studies estimating the indirect effect of importance on performance via effort 
have focused little to no attention on the assumption of temporal precedence of value, 
effort, and performance. Recall, EV theory applied to low-stakes testing posits perceived 
importance precedes and influences expended effort, which in turn precedes and 
influences test performance (Wise & DeMars, 2005; Wolf & Smith, 1995). With the 
exception of Penk and Schipolowski (2015), previous studies modeling the indirect effect 
have assessed perceived importance and expended effort retrospectively, after test 
completion, despite the theoretical specification of value and motivation occurring before 
task performance (see the retrospective model in Figure 2 for an illustration). Given this 
theorized temporal precedence of variables, researchers are making an assumption that 
retrospectively measured perceived importance and examinee effort scores are the same 
as prospectively measured importance and effort scores (Cole & Maxwell, 2003).  
With respect to importance, researchers and testing practitioners could easily 
employ the same measure of importance before or after completion of the test (e.g., “I am 
not concerned about the score I receive on this test”). However, importance scores 
collected retrospectively may actually reflect self-protective attributions of performance 
(Dong, Stupinsky, & Berry, 2013; Perry, Stupinsky, Daniels, & Haynes, 2008; Weiner, 
1985, 2000). For example, after a rigorous test, examinees may incorrectly attribute the 
cause of their poor performance to low levels of perceived importance (e.g., “I did not 
care about the test”). Thus, retrospective self-reported levels of importance may be 
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invalid because these scores may reflect post-test attributions of test performance rather 
than true perceptions of importance.  
With respect to examinee effort, it is not as easy to employ the same measure of 
effort before and after test completion (“I will give my best effort on this test” vs. “I gave 
my best effort on this test”). Examinees’ retrospective responses reflect expended effort, 
whereas examinees prospective responses reflect intended effort. Expended effort scores 
are, presumably, examinees’ reflections of their exhibited behavior while completing the 
test. However, expended effort scores may also be reflections of self-protective post-test 
attributions instead of actual expended effort (Dong et al., 2013; Perry et al., 2008; 
Weiner, 1985, 2000). In fact, researchers have found that students tend to attribute effort 
as the primary cause of test (Dong et al., 2013) and academic course (Perry et al., 2008) 
performance, over test difficulty, ability, and learning/test strategy. Prospectively 
measuring importance and effort may eliminate contamination of these scores. 
Moreover, measuring importance and effort prospectively may affect test 
performance via priming mechanisms. Researchers investigating behavioral commitment 
have found that priming students by asking them to report their intended level of 
performance prior to a task can affect task performance (Carver & Scheier, 2000; 
Higgins, 1997). Behavioral commitment is conceptualized as individuals’ tendency to 
carry out a behavior to avoid the dissonance between their stated behavioral intentions 
and exhibited behavior. Research has shown a large effect of stated behavioral intentions 
on academic-related behavior and achievement (Manstead & van Eekelen, 1998; Sheeran, 
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Orbell, & Trafimow, 1999). If examinees’ report their intended effort before the test, they 
may, in turn, exhibit effort reflective of their intended effort throughout the test.2  
In sum, EV theory and previous research on motivation in low-stakes testing 
contexts specify perceived importance influences examinee effort, which influences test 
performance. However, researchers tend to violate the temporal precedence assumption 
of mediation by modeling this indirect effect using data collected out of temporal order. 
The timing of measurement of perceived importance and examinee effort relative to test 
completion may influence the validity of the inferences made from importance and effort 
scores. No previous research has examined the consequences of measuring perceived 
importance and examinee effort after test completion rather than prior to test completion, 
which follows the temporal order specified by EV theory.  
Significance of the Current Study 
This study will not be able to determine whether prospectively or retrospectively 
measured scores are more valid. However, it will help determine if inferences made from 
perceived importance scores, examinee effort scores, and test scores differ depending on 
when importance and effort are measured relative to test completion.  
With respect to importance and effort scores, if both importance and effort scores 
are similar before and after test completion, then the timing of measurement may have no 
effect on the interpretation of importance and effort scores. However, if importance and 
                                                          
2 Behavioral commitment is just one priming mechanism. Stereotype threat is another well-
studied priming mechanism, yet less relevant to this study. Researchers investigating stereotype 
threat have shown that examinees identifying as Black tend to underperform on verbal tests after 
being asked to indicate their ethnicity immediately prior to beginning the test (Steele & Aronson, 
1995). Examinees identifying as female tend to underperform on mathematics tests after being 
asked to indicate their gender immediately prior to beginning the test (Gresky, Eyck, Lord, & 
McIntyre, 2005).  
11 
 
 
    
 
effort scores are different from before to after test completion—likely due to self-
protective attributions (e.g., Weiner, 2000) or behavioral commitment (Carver & Scheier, 
2000; Higgins, 1997)—then the timing of measurement may have implications on the 
interpretation of importance and effort scores. Moreover, procedures such as motivation 
filtering used to account for attenuated test scores due to low motivation (Swerdzewski, 
Harmes, & Finney, 2011) may result in different findings depending on when importance 
and effort are measured.  
With respect to test performance scores, asking examinees to report their 
perceived importance and intended effort before the test may influence test performance 
due to behavioral commitment (e.g., Perry et al., 2008). Consequently, test scores may be 
more reflective of examinee ability and may not be contaminated by construct irrelevant 
variance due to low effort (Haladyna & Downing, 2004). Assuming the low-stakes nature 
of the test is biasing test scores downward, the priming may result in, on average, higher 
test scores than without priming. If so, the simple act of engaging in prospective ratings 
of importance and effort would be an effective (and “cheap”) motivation intervention.  
With respect to relationships between perceived importance, examinee effort, and 
test performance, if the relationships differ depending on when importance and effort are 
measured relative to test completion, then interpretation and implications of the indirect 
effect may differ. For example, motivation interventions aimed at manipulating effort via 
importance may be differentially effective (e.g., Finney, Sundre et al., 2016; Liu et al., 
2015). More specifically, if the indirect effect is nil or small when importance and effort 
are measured before the test, then interventions created to increase importance would be 
useless with respect to increasing test performance.  
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Purpose of the Current Study 
The purpose of the current study is to empirically examine the potential 
differential effects of measuring perceived importance and examinee effort before and 
after test completion. To help parse out these potential effects, I will examine if the 
indirect effect of importance on performance via effort differs when variables are 
measured in alignment with the theoretically specified temporal order of occurrence 
versus when variables are measured according to typical practice of measuring 
importance and effort after test completion in low-stakes testing. Uncovering differences 
in the relationships between importance, effort, and test scores does not indicate if the 
timing of measurement influences the magnitude of importance, effort, and test scores; 
hence, I will examine if average levels of importance, effort, and performance differ 
when importance and effort are measured prospectively versus retrospectively. 
To accomplish this, first-year students were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions during a university-wide, institutional accountability testing session (see 
Figure 2 for illustrations of conditions, theorized models, and example items). In the 
retrospective condition, data were collected consistent with most previous studies of the 
indirect effect of perceived importance on test performance: perceived importance and 
expended effort were measured after test completion. In the combined condition, which 
combines prospective importance and retrospective effort, perceived importance data 
were collected before the test and were collected again with expended effort after test 
completion. In the prospective condition, both perceived importance and effort data were 
collected before the test and again after test completion.  
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Research Questions 
Comparing retrospective motivation scores across conditions. Research 
questions one and two focus on retrospective perceived importance and examinee 
expended effort scores across conditions that manipulated the presence and absence of 
behavioral priming (see Table 2). Does asking examinees to engage in rating their 
perceived importance and intended effort before test completion influence retrospective 
perceived importance and expended effort scores? To answer these questions, I will 
model cross-sectional retrospective importance and effort scores across conditions to 
examine possible effects of behavioral commitment on average levels of importance, 
effort, and test performance and their interrelationships. 
Research question 1. On average, do examinees report different levels of 
retrospectively measured perceived test importance and examinee expended effort across 
measurement conditions? Examinees may attribute the cause of their test performance to 
low levels of retrospectively measured importance and effort (e.g., Perry et al., 2008). 
However, priming examinees by asking them to engage in rating their importance and 
effort before test completion may increase subsequent average test scores (e.g., Carver & 
Scheier, 2000). Accordingly, behavioral commitment may mitigate the effects of 
attributional bias on retrospective importance and effort scores in the prospective 
condition. Consequently, I expect average levels of retrospectively measured perceived 
importance and examinee effort scores will be higher in the prospective condition than 
the retrospective and combined conditions. 
Research question 2. Given the typical practice of estimating the indirect effect 
of perceived test importance on test performance via examinee effort using retrospective 
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importance and effort scores (e.g., Zilberberg et al., 2014), this question focuses solely on 
retrospective importance and effort scores. Is the indirect effect of retrospective perceived 
importance on test performance via retrospective examinee effort affected by asking 
examinees to rate their perceived importance and intended effort before test completion? 
The indirect effect of retrospective importance on performance via retrospective effort 
estimated in the retrospective condition of Figure 2 will be compared to the indirect 
effects estimated using retrospective importance and effort scores from the combined and 
prospective conditions (see Table 2). The equivalence, or lack thereof, of the indirect 
effect across the three conditions will be assessed using a multiple-condition path model 
(i.e., moderated mediation model). Given retrospective importance and effort are 
modeled in all three conditions, any difference in the magnitude of the indirect effect will 
be due to the presence or absence of examinees simply engaging in prospective ratings.  
I expect the completely mediated model of importance on performance via effort 
will fit the data across the three conditions. Mediation would be suggested if correlations 
between retrospective importance and retrospective effort and between retrospective 
effort and performance are larger than the correlation between retrospective importance 
and performance. Given adequate model-data fit across conditions, I will estimate the 
magnitude of the indirect effect for each condition.  
Examinees may attribute the cause of their test performance to low levels of 
importance and effort (e.g., Perry et al., 2008). Thus, the relationship between test 
performance and retrospective importance and effort scores may be strong due to 
retrospective scores being post-test attributions of test performance. However, asking 
examinees in the prospective condition to rate their perceived importance and intended 
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effort before the test may result in behavioral commitment. That is, if students engage in 
effort according to their ratings of intended effort, their test scores may better reflect their 
true ability and thus behavioral commitment may mitigate the effect of attributional bias 
on retrospective importance and effort scores. In sum, removing the effect of attributional 
bias on retrospective importance and effort scores in the prospective condition may 
attenuate the relationship between test performance and retrospective importance and 
effort scores. As a result, the relationship between test performance and retrospective 
effort may be weaker in the prospective condition than in the retrospective condition. 
Accordingly, I expect the magnitude of the indirect effect of retrospective importance on 
performance via retrospective effort will be smaller in the prospective condition than in 
the retrospective condition. Although these results are not able to confirm the influence of 
attributional bias on retrospective importance and effort scores, they would indicate if 
behavioral commitment via priming buffers the possibly inflated indirect effect that may 
be a result of attributional bias. 
Comparing prospective and retrospective motivation scores across 
conditions.  
Research question 3. Do examinees reporting retrospective perceived importance 
and expended effort have lower scores, on average, than examinees reporting prospective 
importance and intended effort for the same test? In contrast to comparing average levels 
of retrospective perceived importance and expended effort (research question 1), here I 
will compare average retrospective importance and effort scores from the retrospective 
condition, average prospective importance and retrospective effort scores from the 
combined condition, and average prospective importance and effort scores from the 
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prospective condition (see Figure 2). Given examinees, on average, tend to perform 
poorly on the test administered in the current study (Finney, Sundre et al., 2016), I expect 
average prospective importance and effort scores from the prospective condition will be 
higher than retrospective importance and effort scores from the retrospective condition 
due to retrospective importance and effort scores being self-protective attributions of test 
performance. Research question one will indicate if behavioral commitment mitigates the 
effect of attributional bias on importance and effort scores. In other words, does simply 
engaging in prospective ratings of importance and effort influence retrospective ratings of 
importance and effort. This comparison will indicate if examinees report different levels 
of prospective importance and effort than retrospective importance and effort.  
Research question 4. Does the theoretically and empirically suggested indirect 
effect of perceived test importance on test performance via examinee effort differ 
depending on if examinees report importance and effort prospectively versus 
retrospectively? In the retrospective condition, the indirect effect of retrospective 
importance on performance via retrospective effort will be estimated, aligning with the 
typical practice. In the combined condition, the indirect effect of prospective importance 
on performance via retrospective effort will be estimated. In the prospective condition, 
the indirect effect of prospective importance on performance via prospective effort will 
be estimated, aligning with the hypothesized temporal order of occurrence (see Figure 2).  
Similar to research question two, the equivalence of the indirect effects of 
importance on performance via effort across the three conditions will be assessed via 
moderated mediation analysis. I expect the completely mediated model of importance on 
performance via effort will fit the data across the three conditions. Research question two 
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will indicate if the indirect effect estimated from retrospective importance and effort 
scores is influenced by merely asking examinees to engage in prospective ratings of 
importance and effort, whereas this comparison will indicate if the indirect effect depends 
on when importance and effort are measured (prospective vs. retrospective).  
Whereas modeling retrospective importance and effort scores (research question 
2) may help parse out potential effects of behavioral commitment due to priming, this 
question may help determine the effect of attributional bias and behavioral commitment 
on the indirect effect. The indirect effect when modeling retrospective importance and 
effort scores in the retrospective condition will be free from any influence of priming; 
thus, no possibility of behavioral commitment. However, these scores may reflect post-
test attributions of test performance rather than true perceptions of importance and effort. 
The indirect effect when modeling prospective importance and effort scores in the 
prospective condition will be free from any contamination due to attributional bias, but 
may be influenced by behavioral commitment.  
Attributional bias may serve as a self-protective mechanism to a greater degree 
for examinees who perform poorly on the test than for examinees who perform well 
(Pekrun et al., 2004). Imagine an examinee performs poorly on a test and attributes the 
cause of their poor performance to low effort and thus decreases their effort rating from 
before to after the test. Another examinee performs well on the test, has no reason to self-
protect, and rates their effort equivalently before and after the test. Consequently, one 
would expect a larger range of scores and more variability in retrospective effort scores 
than prospective scores. However, the unstandardized relationships from importance to 
effort and effort to performance may change negligibly. As a result, the unstandardized 
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indirect effect may be essentially equivalent across conditions, but the standardized 
indirect effect in the prospective condition would be smaller in magnitude—due to less 
variability in effort scores—than the indirect effect in the retrospective condition. 
Similarly, one would expect higher correlations between importance, effort, and 
performance in the retrospective condition than in the prospective condition.  
An important implication of the expected results suggests the mediated model (I 
E  P) is misspecified. That is, if retrospective importance and effort scores are 
contaminated by attributional bias, then test performance is the common cause of both 
importance and effort (P  I, P  E). Research question six may be able to further 
explicate the effect of attributional bias on retrospective importance and effort scores.  
Changes in importance and effort scores. Unlike the above research questions 
which focus on differences in average importance and effort scores or indirect effects of 
importance on performance via effort across testing conditions, research questions five 
and six focus on changes in importance and effort across time (see Table 2). Using 
longitudinal data from the prospective condition, I will compare examinees’ 
prospectively measured perceived importance and intended effort scores to their 
retrospectively measured importance and expended effort scores (research question 5). I 
will also assess if this change is related to test performance (research question 6).  
Research question 5. Do examinees completing both prospective and 
retrospective measures report different levels of prospective perceived importance and 
examinee effort, on average, than retrospective importance and effort? That is, do self-
reported importance and effort scores change as a result of examinees’ experience with 
the test? Examinees may exhibit behavior aligning with their behavioral intentions (e.g., 
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Carver & Scheier). If this were true, I would expect prospective and retrospective 
importance and effort scores to be equivalent. However, examinees may make post-test 
attributions (e.g., low expended effort, disinterest in test) to explain their test performance 
(e.g., Perry et al., 2008). Whereas this effect may be nil for examinees who perform 
relatively well, examinees who perform poorly may be more susceptible to the effect of 
attributional bias (Perry et al., 2008). Given the rigor of the quantitative and scientific 
reasoning test, many examinees may perform poorly and may attribute the cause of their 
poor performance to low expended effort. Thus, I expect average levels of retrospective 
importance and effort scores will be lower than average levels of prospective scores (i.e., 
there will be a decrease in reported importance and effort from before to after the test).  
Research question 6. Are perceived importance and examinee effort change 
scores (difference between prospective and retrospective importance and effort) related to 
performance on the quantitative and scientific reasoning test? That is, is the main effect 
estimated in research question five actually moderated by test performance? Attributional 
bias may serve as a self-protective mechanism to a greater degree for examinees who 
perform poorly on the test than for examinees who perform well (Pekrun et al., 2004). I 
expect larger decrease in importance and effort scores for examinees who perform 
relatively poorly than for the examinees who perform relatively well. These results would 
suggest examinees make post-test attributions to explain their (poor) test performance 
(e.g., Perry et al., 2008).  
Test performance differences: Research question 7. Does test performance 
differ, on average, as a function of measurement condition? Using cross-sectional data to 
answer this question, I will compare average levels of test scores across three conditions. 
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Given students tend to exhibit behavior in accordance with their behavioral intentions 
(Carver & Scheier, 2000; Higgins, 1997), I expect average test scores will be higher in 
the prospective condition than test scores from the other conditions. Accordingly, test 
scores may be more reflective of examinees’ ability after engaging in rating perceived 
test importance and intended effort prior to test completion. In turn, engaging in 
prospective ratings would then serve as a powerful yet resource-light test-taking 
motivation intervention.  
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Chapter II 
Review of the Literature 
Scientists aspire to gain a deeper understanding of their research domain by 
determining why or how one variable affects another variable (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 
2004; Judd & Kenny, 1981b). That is, regardless if observational, quasi-experimental, or 
experimental research designs are used, cause and effect inferences are the fundamental 
objective of many scientists. Nonetheless, inferences from scores gathered using 
particular research designs or measurement approaches may not be equally valid.  
This chapter reviews two concepts related to the validity of inferences made from 
scores and statistical analyses. First, I will discuss the concept of mediation and how 
mediation hypotheses can be tested statistically. Second, I will discuss retrospective and 
prospective measurement, how type of measurement can influence response patterns, and 
the implications of retrospective versus prospective measurement.  
Mediation 
Scientists began explaining relationships between variables in terms of a simple 
two-variable stimulus-response or cause and effect model, Woodworth (1928) then 
expanded this simple model by describing psychological phenomena as a process, or 
sequence of events. Instead of the stimulus-response model, he suggested that a cause 
may be the effect of a previous cause. For example, a stimulus such as a loud noise may 
stimulate an organism, which processes the stimulus, subsequently causing a response. 
This conceptualization of some organism, or intermediary, being responsible for 
the link between a stimulus and a response, now known as mediation, has since become a 
popular model for explaining behavior. Mediation refers to a process in which an 
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intervening variable, or mediator, helps explain how a predictor transmits its effect to a 
criterion (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). Said another way, a 
predictor (X) causes an effect in a mediator (Z) which causes an effect in a criterion (Y). 
The mediator functions as both the criterion of the predictor (X) and the predictor of the 
criterion (Y). For example, the theory of planned behavior suggests attitudes and norms 
(predictors) affect behavioral intentions (mediator) which in turn affect behavior 
(criterion; Azjen, 1991). Mass communications researchers suggest political mass media 
(predictor) affects voter likelihood (mediator) which affects voting behavior (criterion; 
McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2002). Cognitive psychologists suggest age (predictor) 
affects executive functioning (mediator) which affects cognitive functioning (criterion; 
Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 2003). Prevention researchers posit that smoking 
interventions (predictor) affect attitudes toward smoking (mediator) which affect 
smoking behavior (criterion; Worden & Flynn, 2002). Educational researchers suggest 
the relationship between identification as a racial minority (predictor) and test 
performance (criterion) is mediated by anxiety (Osborne, 2001). Educational 
psychologists suggest the effect of achievement emotions (predictor) on academic 
performance (criterion) is mediated by students’ motivation (Pekrun, Goetz, Frenzel, 
Barchfeld, & Perry, 2011). Accordingly, mediators (e.g., voter likelihood, attitudes 
toward smoking, anxiety) help explain why or how predictors (e.g., political media, 
smoking intervention, racial differences) affect criterions (e.g., voting behavior, smoking 
behavior, test performance).  
Considering the language used in the previous examples, a theoretical mediation 
model is inherently causal in nature, as reflected by the directional pattern of 
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relationships specified by the theorized model (Rose, Holmbeck, Coakley, & Franks, 
2004), not unlike most research hypotheses. Regardless of the experimental design or 
data analytic technique, causal inferences necessitate a program of research. We do not 
know the underlying true mechanism that causes variables to be related; we can only 
hypothesize the mechanism based on theory and provide empirical evidence that supports 
or refutes the theory. Fortunately, theories about the mechanism imply certain patterns of 
relationships in data. If we observe those patterns of relationships in data, then there is 
empirical evidence that the theory is plausible. However, empirical evidence does not 
confirm theories; it simply fails to disconfirm theories. In sum, despite the theory and 
language used to communicate mediation hypotheses, which is causal nature (e.g., 
smoking interventions affect smoking behavior via attitudes toward smoking), causal 
inferences are only justified from empirical research under certain methodological 
conditions and necessitate replication. 
Importance of Mediation  
 Elucidation of the interrelations among variables by testing, integrating, and 
refuting theories suggestive of mediation processes allows for more informed causal 
inferences (James & Brett, 1984; see Table 1 for a quantitative, visual, and narrative 
comparison of third variable functions). Consequently, this clearer understanding 
accommodates applied research in the areas of prevention, intervention, and treatment 
(MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Rose et al., 2004). Instead of developing 
interventions intended to solely target and manipulate the criterion, interventions can be 
designed to target single or multiple mediators in a causal chain, thereby making the 
intervention more effective (Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, & Kupfer, 2001).  
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For example, communications researchers investigating mass media have 
established the relationship between political mass media (X) and voting behavior (Y) is 
mediated by voter attitudes (Z; McLeod et al., 2002). Subsequent research in this domain 
found political news (X) affects political engagement (Y) two ways: (1) indirectly through 
online political discussion (Z1) and (2) indirectly through interpersonal political 
discussion (Z2) and political knowledge (Z3; see Figure 3 for an illustration of this 
multiple mediator example; Jung, Kim, & Zúñiga, 2011). These results imply that future 
interventions to encourage voting behavior should be aimed at manipulating political 
media, which will influence both online and interpersonal political discussion. Thus, 
development of effective interventions can be facilitated by determining what variables 
(Z) transmit the effect of X on Y. By strengthening the effect of the intervention on the 
mediating variables, one can strengthen the effect of X on Y.  
An example of mediation in a drug prevention program helps highlight the utility 
in examining indirect effects. Researchers evaluated the effect of participating in a drug 
prevention program (dichotomous X) on drug use (Y) via patients' perceived friend’s 
reactions to drug use (Z; MacKinnon et al., 1991). The drug prevention program (X) 
influenced how patients perceived their friends would react to their drug use (Z). 
Subsequently, patients’ perceptions about how their friends would react discouraged 
patients’ drug use (Y). Importantly, the researchers provided evidence of why a patient 
decreased their drug use, and by designing interventions to manipulate perceived friend’s 
reactions to drug use (Z), researchers were able to decrease drug use.  
This concept of mediation has implications for the current study. Testing 
practitioners may not be able to directly manipulate examinee effort. However, 
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practitioners may be able to design interventions that influence a predictor of effort such 
as perceived test importance which will, in turn, influence effort and test performance. 
Complete and partial mediation. There is a clear distinction both theoretically 
and statistically between complete and partial mediation. With respect to both complete 
and partial mediation, the total effect (c) of a predictor (X) on a criterion (Y) can be 
decomposed into two effects: indirect effect via the mediator (Z) and direct effect. 
Potentially, the predictor can affect the criterion in two ways: an indirect effect (ab) from 
the predictor (X) to the criterion (Y) through the mediator (Z) and a direct effect (c’) from 
the predictor to the criterion (see Figure 4 for an illustration).  
Diagram 1. Illustration of Complete Mediation (top) and Partial Mediation (bottom) 
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Complete mediation refers to the phenomenon where the indirect effect of the 
predictor on the criterion through the mediator (ab) fully accounts for the total effect of 
the predictor on the criterion (c; see row 1 of Table 1). Consequently, because the full 
effect of X on Y is through Z, the direct effect of X on Y (c’) is nil. In contrast, partial 
mediation refers to the phenomenon where the indirect effect of the predictor on the 
criterion through the mediator (ab) partially accounts for the total effect of the predictor 
on the criterion (c; see row 2 of Table 1). Consequently, because only part of the effect of 
X on Y is through Z, the direct effect of X on Y (c’) must be nonzero. That is, X directly 
affects Y and indirectly affects Y through Z (see Figure 5 for an illustration of complete 
and partial mediation). To help distinguish between complete mediation and partial 
mediation, an example of complete mediation follows. The effect of parents’ medical 
care responsibilities (X) on parents’ quality of life (Y) is completely mediated by family 
environment (Z; Crespo, Carona, Silva, Canavarro, & Dattilio, 2011). The total effect of 
medical responsibilities (X) on quality of life (Y) is due to the influence of medical 
responsibilities (X) on family environment (Z; as responsibilities increase, environment 
gets worse) which directly influences quality of life (Y; as environment gets worse, 
quality of life gets worse). There is no direct effect of medical responsibilities (X) on 
quality of life (Y) given the direct effect of family environment (Z) on quality of life (Y). 
Thus, attention could be directed to bolster the family environment to lessen the impact 
of medical care responsibilities on parents’ quality of life. Another example of complete 
mediation involves the effect of a drug intervention (X) on adult substance abuse (Y) via 
delayed substance use as an adolescent (Z; Spoth, Trudeau, Guyll, Shin, & Redmond, 
2009). Participation in a drug intervention program tends to delay participants’ substance 
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use as an adolescent, which tends to mitigate substance abuse as an adult. The two 
previous examples illustrate how knowledge of mediated relationships can facilitate 
development of effective interventions. The first example illustrates how one can focus 
on trying to manipulate the mediator (family environment) via an intervention because it 
is not feasible to manipulate parents’ medical care responsibilities. The second example 
illustrates manipulation of the predictor (drug intervention program) that will influence 
the mediator (delayed substance abuse) and, in turn, the criterion (adult substance abuse). 
In contrast, partial mediation exists when the predictor (X) has both an effect on 
the criterion (Y) directly and indirectly through the mediator (Z). For example, the effect 
of examinees’ ethnicity (X) on test performance (Y) is partially mediated by anxiety (Z; 
Osborne, 2001). The total effect of examinees’ ethnicity (X; self-identification as a 
minority group member) on test performance (Y) is due to the influence of examinees’ 
ethnicity (X) on anxiety (Z) which influences test performance (Y; i.e., indirect effect) and 
the influence of examinee ethnicity directly on test performance (Y). Notice anxiety 
partially explains the relationship between examinees’ ethnicity and test performance. As 
another example of partial mediation, the effect of state anxiety (X) on quantitative 
reasoning performance (Y) is partially mediated by verbal working memory (Z). Thus, 
state anxiety (X) has a direct effect on quantitative reasoning (Y) not accounted for by 
working memory (Z; Owens, Stevenson, Norgate, & Hadwin, 2008).  
The conceptual explanation of the direct effect of X on Y (c’) in partial mediation 
models can prove difficult to generate. The direct effect of examinee ethnicity (X) on test 
performance (Y) is likely due to unmeasured mediators (variables affected by ethnicity, 
which in turn affect test performance). Perhaps examinee effort (Z2) should have been 
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measured and modeled; thus, it may be that the effect of examinee ethnicity (X) on test 
performance (Y) is mediated by examinee anxiety (Z1) and mediated by examinee effort 
(Z2). By not assessing examinee effort (Z2), the direct effect of examinee ethnicity (X) on 
test performance (Y) is needed to account for the relationship between ethnicity (X) and 
test performance (Y) not explained by examinee anxiety (Z1). Partial mediation may also 
be a result of a poorly measured mediator. If the mediator is not measured well, the X-Z 
and Z-Y path coefficients may be attenuated due to measurement error. Accordingly, the 
indirect effect will be attenuated. As a result, a direct path between X and Y is needed to 
account for the observed correlation between X and Y. In short, a poorly measured 
mediator is essentially not represented in the model (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
To further illustrate mediation, I will refer to the three variables from this research 
study: perceived test importance (X), examinee effort (Z), and test performance (Y). The 
literature on test taking suggests perceived importance of a test is positively related to test 
performance (e.g., Cole et al., 2008; Finney, Sundre et al., 2016; Zilberberg et al., 2014). 
Moreover, examinee effort may help explain how or why perceived importance and test 
performance are related. That is, examinees high in perceived importance tend to be high 
in examinee effort, relative to examinees low in perceived importance. Examinees high in 
examinee effort tend to have high test performance, relative to examinees low in 
examinee effort. These empirical relationships may be explained theoretically (Eccles et 
al., 1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992, 2000, 2002): examinees’ perceived importance 
positively affects test performance indirectly via its positive effect on examinee effort 
(i.e., perceived importance  examinee effort  test performance). If the effect of 
perceived importance on test performance were completely transmitted through examinee 
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effort, this effect would be considered complete mediation. Conceptually, complete 
mediation is interpreted as perceived importance causes test performance only through 
effort. Thus, importance has no relationship with performance that cannot be accounted 
for by examinee effort. Said another way, examinee effort explains how and why 
perceived importance is related to test performance.  
In contrast, perhaps examinee effort only accounted for part of the effect of 
perceived importance on test performance. Although perceived importance may directly 
cause test performance, more proximal variables such as examinee effort or test anxiety 
are more likely to directly cause test performance. A more likely possibility of why 
importance would have a direct effect on performance, in addition to the indirect effect 
via effort, is because of model misspecification. Perhaps an omitted or unmeasured 
variable such as test anxiety can partially explain why importance is related to 
performance. That is, it is possible the effect of perceived importance on test performance 
is completely mediated by both examinee effort (I  E  P) and test anxiety (I  A  
P). Although this theory would specify complete mediation, failure to model test anxiety 
as a mediator between importance and performance necessitates a nonzero direct effect 
from importance to performance to account for the total relationship between perceived 
importance and test performance (i.e., a partial mediation). One would theorize a 
completely mediated model (indirect effect of X on Y via Z and no direct effect of X on Y) 
if they believed that Z completely explains how and why X causes Z. In contrast, it is hard 
to conceptualize when one would theorize a partially mediated process (indirect effect of 
X on Y via Z and direct effect of X and Y). It is more likely that partial mediation is 
30 
 
 
    
 
empirically supported post hoc, after the theorized completely mediated model is rejected 
due to model misspecification (e.g., omitted mediator) or measurement error.  
Third Variables 
 Clearly, going beyond two-variable experiments enables scientists to better 
understand how and why a predictor and a criterion are related. Mediation is just one way 
to explicate the relationship between two variables. Third variables can be specified to 
represent theories reflecting other mechanisms as well such as suppression, moderation, 
and confounding (see Table 1 for examples of third variables and example hypotheses). 
Although third variables can present certain challenges in interpretation and estimation, 
well-established theory and proper specification of third variables is essential when 
designing experiments and testing competing models to support or refute existing 
theories. The following section will present the different functions a third variable can 
take on with respect to the relationship between predictors and criterions. I will discuss 
these different functions the third variable, examinee effort, can take on with respect to 
perceived importance and test performance. 
Suppressor. A suppressor variable is special case of intervening variable where, 
when compared to a bivariate X-Y relationship, estimation of a model with a suppressor 
results in the regression weight of the predictor (X) on the criterion (Y) increasing in 
magnitude and/or a change in the sign (Conger, 1974; Kline, 2010; MacKinnon, Krull, & 
Lockwood, 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). In the classical case of suppression, the 
bivariate X-Y relationship is nil (i.e., ryx = .00 or c = .00); however, when the suppressor 
(Z) is added into the model predicting the criterion (Y), the effect of X on Y increases in 
magnitude after controlling for Z (c’ = -.16). In classical suppression, a suppressor is not 
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identified by its regression weight; a variable is a suppressor if the regression weights for 
other variables increase or change signs. 
Diagram 2. Illustration of Classical Suppression 
Consider a hypothetical example (see Diagram 2 above) provided by McFatter 
(1979) where assembly line workers’ intelligence (X) and number of errors made on an 
assembly line (Y) are measured. Intuitively, one would hypothesize intelligence is 
negatively related to number of errors. However, if only intelligence and number of 
errors are measured, the bivariate relationship is nil (e.g., c = .00). Suppose researchers 
decided to measure workers’ boredom (Z; suppressor) as well. More intelligent workers 
tend to be more bored when working on an assembly line (a = .40), increased boredom 
tends to be associated with more errors (b = .40). Thus the indirect effect of intelligence 
on number of errors becomes nonzero (ab = .16) and positive, as originally hypothesized. 
Notice decomposition of the total effect (c = .00) results in a negative direct effect (c’ = -
.16) and an equal in magnitude, but opposite sign indirect effect (ab = .16). 
Consequently, because the total effect is equal to the sum of the indirect and direct 
effects, the total effect is nil. Thus, misspecification of the model by not including 
boredom would result in a failure to accurately portray the components resulting in the nil 
relationship between intelligence and number of errors on an assembly line.  
32 
 
 
    
 
Whereas classical suppression presumes a nil bivariate X-Y relationship (rxy), 
negative suppression presumes all bivariate relationships (rxy, rxz, and rzy) are positive. 
However, when the suppressor is added, one of the regression coefficients is in the 
opposite direction of its bivariate correlation (Conger, 1974; Kline, 2010; Pandey & 
Elliot, 2010). As with classical suppression, when the suppressor is added into the model, 
the total effect is decomposed into nonzero direct (c’) and indirect (ab) effects. An  
Diagram 3. Illustration of Negative Suppression 
example given by Kline (2010) of negative suppression follows (see Diagram 3 above). 
Psychotherapy (X) and prior suicide attempts (Y) are, surprisingly, positively related (rxy 
= .20); thus, it might be interpreted that psychotherapy is harmful. The bivariate 
correlations between psychotherapy (X) and depression (Z), and depression (Z) and 
suicide attempts (Y) are both positive. When estimating path coefficients, the 
psychotherapy (X) and depression (Z) path coefficient (a = .71), and the depression (Z) 
and suicide attempts (Y) path coefficient (b = .71) are positive. However, by modeling 
depression (suppressor), the path coefficient between psychotherapy (X) and suicide 
attempts (Y; controlling for depression) is negative (c’ = -.30), as one might expect.    
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Notice these suppression effects can be conceptualized as mediation effects: the 
effect of X on Y is mediated by Z (see rows 1, 2, and 3 of Table 1 for comparisons of 
suppression and mediation). When a suppressor functions as a mediator, the mediation 
effect is often termed as inconsistent mediation in contrast to consistent mediation where 
the signs of the direct and indirect effects are both the same (MacKinnon et al, 2007, 
2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Importantly, when classical or negative suppression is the 
underlying mechanism, the direct effect of X on Y will be underestimated when the 
suppressor is not modeled, further illustrating the importance of understanding theory and 
specifying models accordingly. In sum, addition of a suppressor (Z) variable into a model 
increases or changes the direct effect between the predictor (X) and the criterion (Y). 
Covariate. Another function of a third variable is when the third variable (Z) is 
related to the criterion (Y), has a negligible relationship with the predictor (X), and does 
not interact with the predictor with respect to the effect of the predictor on the criterion. 
In this situation, the third variable is referred to as a covariate (MacKinnon, 2008). 
Including a covariate adds predictive utility to the model over and above the predictor(s). 
Because the predictor and the covariate are ideally negligibly related, controlling for the 
effect of the covariate on the criterion does not substantially change the relationship 
between the predictor(s) and the criterion. Said another way, adding a third variable—
covariate—to the model will have little to no effect on the predictor to criterion 
relationship, but will add to the prediction of the criterion.  
For example, although difficult to imagine, that perceived test importance and 
examinee effort are negligibly related, yet both have strong, positive relationships with 
test performance. Accordingly, including the covariate, examinee effort, to a model that 
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includes the predictor, perceived importance, adds to the accuracy of predicting test 
performance, but does not substantially change the regression coefficient associated with 
predicting test performance from test importance (see row 4 of Table 1 for an illustration 
of a path model that includes a covariate). Thus, assuming X and Z are negligibly related, 
failure to model covariates does not result in substantially biased estimates of the X-Y 
relationship, yet decreases the prediction of Y. 
Confounder. Unlike a covariate that adds to the prediction of a criterion in a 
model and has a negligible effect on the X-Y relationship, or how a suppressor can result 
in increased magnitude of the direct effect between X and Y, confounders account for part 
(or all) of the relationship between the predictor (X) and the criterion (Y); thereby 
reducing the effect of X on Y. In the extreme case, when partialling the effects of a 
complete confounding variable from the predictor and criterion relationship, the (partial) 
relationship between the predictor and the criterion (c’) is nil. In this case, the predictor 
and criterion are said to have a spurious relationship.  
Diagram 4. Illustration of Confounder 
Returning to the psychotherapy (X), depression (Z), and suicide attempts (Y) 
example above. It may be that engaging in psychotherapy and suicide attempts is a 
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function of level of depression. After controlling for depression, the positive relationship 
between psychotherapy and suicide attempts is nil.   
With respect to the current study, perhaps examinees perceive tests to be of more 
importance (X) because they expend relatively higher levels of effort (Z). Moreover, 
examinees perform better on tests (Y) because they expend relatively higher levels of 
effort on the test (Z). Thus, the bivariate relationship between importance and test 
performance can be explained by effort (i.e., importance and performance are spuriously 
related due to effort; once this common cause is controlled, their partial correlation is nil). 
Confounders and completely mediated effects are equivalent in accounting for the X-Y 
relationship (see rows 1 and 5 of Table 1 for a comparison of confounding and complete 
mediation). Thus, although conceptually they represent different theories for the variable 
interrelations, confounders and mediators cannot be distinguished statistically—both will 
have the same pattern of interrelationships.  
Moderator. If the effect of a predictor (X) on a criterion (Y) depends, or is 
conditional, on a third variable (Z), that third variable is considered a moderator (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). Similar to mediators, moderators may be trait-like attributes (e.g., 
personality), experimentally manipulated variables (e.g., treatment vs. control), or 
background variables (e.g., gender, socioeconomic status, school attended; Wu & Zumbo, 
2008). When discussing moderation, the term interaction effect is often used. The 
predictor (X) and the third variable (Z) interact in the way they affect the criterion (Y). If 
the strength of the relationship between the predictor and the criterion depends on the 
level of third variable, then the effect of the predictor on the criterion is moderated by the 
third variable (see Figure 6 for examples of ordinal and disordinal moderation). 
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If the effect of perceived importance on test performance is conditional on the 
students’ level of examinee effort, the relationship between perceived importance and 
performance is moderated by examinee effort. Given this example, one would likely 
hypothesize an ordinal interaction where, at high levels of examinee effort, there is no 
relationship between perceived importance and test performance, but at lower levels of 
effort, the relationship between importance and test performance is positive. Not only can 
the strength of the relationship between X and Y differ across levels of Z, the sign of the 
relationship may be affected by the moderator as well (Baron & Kenny, 1986; James & 
Brett, 1984). If the sign of the relationship changes, one would likely hypothesize a 
disordinal interaction. For example, although difficult to imagine, that at high levels of 
effort, the relationship between importance and test performance is negative, but at low 
levels of effort the relationship between importance and performance is positive. In the 
current study, one may hypothesize an interaction between importance and effort if 
previous studies suggested inconsistent relationships between importance or effort and 
performance. However, studies have demonstrated the effect of importance on 
performance does not depend on effort (Mathers et al., 2016; Myers et al., 2016).  
It is critical to understand the distinction between moderators and other third 
variables such as mediators, especially in the development of intervention and prevention 
programs. Consider the ordinal interaction between importance and effort described 
above. Now consider an intervention designed to increase test importance for the 
examinees. Conceptually, test performance is not affected by importance for those 
examinees with high levels of examinee effort (moderator). In contrast, test performance 
is positively affected by importance for those examinees with lower levels of examinee 
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effort. Thus, the intervention would be useless for examinees expending higher levels of 
effort, but may be effective for examinees expending lower levels of effort.  
Differences between third variable hypotheses and correlation patterns. To 
further clarify the different functions of a third variable, I will provide a brief overview of 
third variable hypotheses and expected pattern of relationships between X, Z, and Y. Does 
X cause Y indirectly via Z? Empirically, if complete mediation were plausible, one would 
expect the correlation between X and Y to be smaller than the correlations between X and 
Z or Z and Y, because the X-Y relationship is entirely a function of the indirect effect of X 
on Y via Z. For example, imagine the effect of X on Z is .40, the effect of Z on Y is .40, 
and the bivariate X-Y relationship is .16. The product of the X-Z and Z-Y relationships 
equals the indirect effect (X on Y via Z) of .16. Thus, the indirect effect (.16) fully 
accounts for the observed X-Y relationship of .16 (i.e., complete mediation). In contrast, 
imagine the effect of X on Z is .40, the effect of Z on Y is .30, and the bivariate X-Y 
relationship is .36. The product of the X-Z and Z-Y relationships equals the indirect effect 
(X on Y via Z) of .12. Partial mediation would be suggested because indirect effect (.12) 
does not fully account for the bivariate X-Y relationship (.36). A direct path equal to .24 
(i.e., .36 - .12 = .24) is necessary to fully account for the X-Y relationship (see Figure 5).  
Is X more predictive of Y when Z is modeled? Empirically, if suppression were 
plausible, one would expect a particular pattern of intercorrelations between X, Z, and Y. 
Similar to mediation, the correlation between X and Y would be smaller than the 
correlations between X and Z or Z and Y, because the X-Y relationship is entirely a 
function of the indirect effect of X on Y via Z. Imagine positive correlations between X 
and Z and Z and Y and a correlation between X and Y of zero. However, when estimating 
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the model, one of the path coefficients between a predictor and the criterion becomes 
larger in absolute value than its respective bivariate correlation. Thus, X or Z may become 
more predictive of Y when in the presence of the suppressor (see Figure 7).   
After controlling for Z, is X related to Y? Empirically, if a covariate were 
plausible, one would expect a particular pattern of intercorrelations between X, Z, and Y. 
For example, imagine the correlation between X and Y is .50, the correlation between Z 
and Y is .30, and the correlation between X and Z is .02. The semi-partial correlation 
between X and Y controlling for Z (.49) would be negligibly smaller than the bivariate X-
Y correlation (.50). Similarly, the semi-partial correlation between Z and Y controlling for 
X (.29) would be negligibly smaller than the bivariate Z-Y correlation (.40). Further, the 
X-Y relationship should be similar at all levels of Z. The magnitude of the X-Y partial 
correlation would decrease as the magnitude of the X-Z correlation increased. An 
important distinction between a mediator and a covariate is temporal precedence. That is, 
a mediator must occur in time and space between X and Y, whereas a covariate can occur 
before or at the same time as X.  
Is the observed relationship between X and Y spurious due to both variables being 
caused by Z? Empirically, if confounding were plausible, one would expect a particular 
pattern of intercorrelations between X, Z, and Y. Despite confounders and mediators 
being conceptually different, both confounders and mediators can partially or completely 
account for the X-Y relationship equivalently. Thus, one would expect the same pattern of 
correlations between X, Z, and Y when Z is a mediator and when Z is a confounder. A 
distinction between mediators and moderators is a mediator occurs within a causal 
sequence of variables (X  Z  Y), whereas no assumption of temporal precedence of a 
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confounder is made (MacKinnon et al., 2000). In sum, when Z is a confounder, instead of 
the arrow (i.e., direction of causation) pointing from X to Z, when Z is a confounder, the 
arrow points from Z to X. Thus, specification of confounders and mediators is largely 
dependent on the theoretical rationale describing the relationships (see Figure 8).  
Does the effect of X on Y depend on Z? Empirically, if moderation were plausible, 
one would expect a particular pattern of intercorrelations between X, Z, and Y. For 
example, imagine at one level of Z the path coefficient between X and Y is .40, the path 
coefficient between Z and Y is .20, and the correlation between X and Z is .20. Now 
imagine at another level of Z the path coefficient between X and Y is .25, the path 
coefficient between Z and Y is .20, and the correlation between X and Z is .20. Thus, the 
X-Y relationship changes across levels of Z. A further distinction between mediators and 
moderators is a moderator occurs before or at the same time as X.  
Summary. Although third variables are conceptually very different (Table 1 
provides a concise summary of these third variables), it is sometimes difficult or 
impossible to differentiate between third variables empirically. Accordingly, the 
importance of a strong theoretical framework cannot be understated. As you will see in 
the following section, in addition to theory, characteristics of the research design can also 
help differentiate mediators from other third variables. Further, a fundamental 
differentiation to point out is covariates, moderators, and confounders are all positioned 
as predictors (Z) occurring at the same time, or sometimes before, the predictor of interest 
(X). In contrast, because mediators are effects of the predictor and causes of the criterion, 
they function as intermediaries occurring between the predictor and criterion.  
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Statistical Estimation to Support Mediation 
Statistical estimation cannot confirm mediation hypotheses, but it can provide 
evidence to support or reject mediation hypotheses. Mediation is best inferred when using 
a combination of theory suggesting a mediation process, causal-chain research design, 
and statistical evidence replicated over a several studies (Little, Card, Bovaird, Preacher, 
& Crandall, 2009; Shrout & Bolger, 2002; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). In the 
following section, I present some of the more common methods of estimating mediation. 
Although the concept of causal chains of variables (MacCorquodale & Meehl, 1948; 
Woodsworth, 1928) and path analysis (Wright, 1923) has been around for several 
decades, not until recently has statistically modeling mediation become popular (e.g., 
MacKinnon, 2008). A multitude of techniques to statistically estimate mediation have 
been proposed across several disciplines (for a review, see Preacher, 2015), albeit the 
most popular in the literature is the causal-steps approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & 
Kenny, 1981a, 1981b; Kenny Kashy, & Bolger, 1998).  
Causal-steps approach. The following four steps represent the Baron and Kenny 
approach or “causal-steps approach” (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981a; 
1981b; Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). As thoroughly covered in the section above, 
inferences of mediation heavily rely on the theoretical arguments supporting mediation 
and not entirely on statistical estimation and testing. The following section will present 
the steps of statistically estimating and testing mediation via the multi-step, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, causal-steps approach with presentation of formulas to assist 
the reader in understanding the concepts. See Figure 4 for an illustration of the path 
coefficients being estimated in the following steps. 
41 
 
 
    
 
Step 1: The criterion (Y) is regressed on the predictor (X) to determine if a 
statistically and practically significant X-Y relationship exists to be mediated. Note that e 
represents the residual of Y.  
Y = 0 + yxX + e    (1) 
Step 2: The mediator (Z) is regressed on the predictor (X) to determine if a 
potential mediator exists. Note that e represents the residual of Z. Statistical significance 
of the zx path coefficient suggests Z is a plausible mediator between X and Y.  
Z = 0 + zxX + e    (2) 
Step 3: The criterion (Y) is regressed on mediator (Z) controlling for the predictor 
(X) to determine if a relationship (yz.x) exists between the mediator and the criterion 
above and beyond what the predictor (X) accounts for. Statistical significance of the yz.x 
path coefficient suggests the mediation hypothesis is plausible. Whereas nonsignificance 
of the yz.x path coefficient suggest that the relationships between the mediator (Z) and 
the criterion (Y) is spurious due to the predictor (X). 
Y = 0 + yx.zX + yz.xZ + e   (3) 
 Step 4: The criterion (Y) is regressed on the predictor (X), controlling for the 
mediator (Z; estimated in step three). If the zx, yz.x, and yx.z path coefficients from the 
first three steps are statistically and practically significant, partial mediation is plausible. 
That is, if the yx.z path coefficient is significantly different from zero, part of the effect of 
the predictor on the criterion is indirect and part of the effect is direct. Whereas 
nonsignificance of the yx.z path coefficient suggests complete mediation. If the yx.z path 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero, the total effect of X on Y is indirectly 
through Z. As such, given a statistically significant yx.z path coefficient controlling for Z 
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in step four, we reject the null hypothesis of complete mediation (i.e., path coefficient c’ 
equals zero) and conclude partial mediation. In contrast, given a nonsignificant yx.z path 
coefficient controlling for Z, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of complete mediation 
and, by default, conclude complete mediation.  
At this point, it is important to point out one caveat to consider when 
hypothesizing and estimating mediation. A well-established, empirically supported, and 
statistically and practically significant bivariate relationship between the predictor on the 
criterion has been considered necessary by many researchers (Kraemer, Kiernan, Essex, 
& Kupfer, 2008; Little et al., 2009; Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Rose et al., 2004; Shrout & 
Bolger, 2002). However, consideration must be given with respect to suppression 
(MacKinnon et al., 2000), attenuation of bivariate relationship (X-Y) when multiple 
mediated paths are present (Hayes, 2009), and the distance in time and space between X 
and Y (Kenny et al., 1998; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). That is, if X and Y are close in time 
and space (i.e., proximal mediation), one would expect a significant bivariate relationship 
between X and Y. In contrast, as X gets further away from Y in time and space (i.e., distal 
mediation), the relationship between X and Y may be attenuated by other factors. 
Consequently, many researchers no longer require a significant bivariate relationship 
between X and Y (Kenny et al., 1998; MacKinnon et al., 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  
 Structural equation modeling model-data fit approach. Although there may be 
differences in estimation, specification, and testing of mediation via the causal-steps and 
structural equation modeling (SEM) approaches, both result in similar findings. In fact, if 
OLS estimation is used and we assume variables are measured without error, the path 
coefficient estimates from both approaches, assuming partial mediation, will be 
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essentially identical (Bollen & Stine, 1990). Major advantages of estimating mediation 
via SEM over OLS regression are the ability to formally test the completely mediated 
model and model error-free latent variables, which results in less biased estimates of 
direct and indirect effects (James, Mulaik, & Brett, 2006). In addition, the SEM approach 
is able to model multiple mediators, moderators, and covariates. 
Contrary to the causal-steps approach, the SEM approach assumes the more 
parsimonious complete mediation as the baseline model (James et al., 2006). The causal-
steps approach is only able to estimate partially mediated models. SEM allows for 
specification of either complete or partial mediation models. As a result, the Z-Y 
parameter will be similar for both the causal-steps and SEM approaches when partial 
mediation models are estimated; however, the Z-Y parameter will be different in SEM 
when complete mediation models are estimated. Note if a simple three-variable partial 
mediation model is hypothesized, the model has no degrees of freedom; consequently, it 
is not falsifiable in an SEM or regression framework (James et al., 2006). 
 Complete Mediation. If a completely mediated model is hypothesized, the SEM 
approach requires estimation of two path coefficients. The direct effect of the predictor 
(X) on the mediator (formula 2) and the direct effect of the mediator (Z) on the criterion 
(Y) shown below. 
Y = 0 + yzZ + e    (4) 
Notice, when complete mediation is hypothesized, the SEM framework has a distinct 
advantage over OLS regression in that SEMs are able to constrain the X-Y path to zero 
therefore the Z-Y path coefficient controlling for X is not estimated (formula 3). Modeling 
mediation hypotheses via SEM allows for statistical tests of complete mediation. Because 
44 
 
 
    
 
the X-Y path is constrained to zero, the complete mediation model has one degree of 
freedom and a global goodness-of-fit test can be used to determine how well the model 
fits the data. The goodness-of-fit of the complete mediation model is essentially assessed 
by comparing the SEM model-reproduced X-Y correlation (formula 5 shown below) to 
the observed X-Y correlation. If the two correlations are not significantly different, as 
determined by goodness-of-fit indices, the completely mediated model is said to fit the 
data. That is, the entire effect of the predictor on the criterion is via the mediator.  
Partial Mediation. If SEM is used to estimate a partial mediation model, the 
parameter estimates are similar to those estimated via the causal-steps approach. The X-Z 
(yx; formula 2), the Z-Y controlling for X (yz.x), and the X-Y controlling for Z (yx.z; 
formula 3) path coefficients are simultaneously estimated when estimating the model via 
the SEM approach. Partial mediation is supported if all three path coefficients are 
statistically significant. However, because the model has no degrees of freedom (i.e., just 
identified model), global goodness-of-fit tests are not possible and thus the partial 
mediation model is not falsifiable.  
Estimation of indirect effect. When complete mediation is estimated, the indirect 
effect of the predictor on the criterion via the mediator is computed as the product of the 
X-Z path coefficient (zx) and the Z-Y path (yz) coefficient (zxyz or equivalently, ab), 
where r̂ represents the SEM model-reproduced correlation: 
r̂xy = zxyz     (5) 
When partial mediation is estimated, the indirect effect is computed as the product of the 
X-Z path coefficient (zx) and the Z-Y path coefficient controlling for X (yz.x; zxyz.x).  
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Note, for the causal-steps approach, computation of the indirect effect is only 
possible from a partially mediated model. As a result, if the underlying mechanism is 
truly completely mediated, estimating the indirect effect via the SEM approach will 
produce more accurate estimates of the indirect effect. For example, if the SEM 
standardized path coefficient between perceived importance and examinee effort is .40 
(effort importance) and the SEM standardized path coefficient between examinee effort and 
test performance is .40 (performance effort), the standardized indirect effect would equal .16. 
This indirect effect would be interpreted as for every standard deviation unit change in 
the predictor, the criterion would change by .16 standard deviation units. The value .16 
also represents the model-implied correlation between perceived importance and test 
performance. If the observed correlation between perceived importance and test 
performance was not significantly different than .16, a direct path from perceived 
importance to test performance would not be necessary to account for the relationship 
between perceived importance and test performance. However, holding all else constant, 
if the observed correlation between perceived importance and test performance was .36, a 
direct path would need to be modeled to reproduce the relationship between perceived 
importance and test performance (i.e., partial mediation). See Figure 5 for an illustration 
of this example of complete versus partial mediation.  
Tests of the indirect effect. Neither the causal-steps approach nor the SEM 
approach explicitly test the statistical and practical significance of the indirect effect (ab). 
The causal-steps approach tests the a, b, c, and c’ path coefficient estimates for statistical 
significance (see Figure 5). The SEM approach tests the a and b paths for complete 
mediation models, and a, b, and c’ path coefficients for partially mediated models. Thus, 
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other analyses are needed to test the statistical significance of the indirect effect 
(MacKinnon et al., 2002). Considering the sampling distributions of the parameter 
estimates a, b, c, and c’ are normally distributed (i.e., based on the central limit theorem), 
the use of standard errors to compute confidence intervals and statistical significance tests 
are straightforward and do not pose complications in a regression or SEM framework 
(Bollen & Stine, 1990). However, as discussed below, the product term (i.e., ab) is not 
always normally distributed (Bollen & Stine, 1990).  
 Sobel test. The most popular method to construct confidence intervals and test the 
indirect effect for statistical significance via a z-test is referred to as the Sobel test (Sobel, 
1982). Sobel computed a standard error of the ab parameter (sab) based on the 
multivariate-delta method, which assumes a multivariate asymptotic normal distribution 
of the ab parameter. In the following formula, 𝑠𝑎
2 and 𝑠𝑏
2 represent the squared standard 
errors of the a and b parameters, respectively.  
𝑠𝑎𝑏 =  √𝑎2𝑠𝑏
2 + 𝑏2𝑠𝑎2     (6) 
Although the standard error proposed by Sobel in formula six is the most commonly 
used, the formula for the exact standard error derived by the multivariate-delta method 
can be used. Notice the only difference between the formulas is the addition of the a and 
b parameter variances. 
𝑠𝑎𝑏 =  √𝑎2𝑠𝑏
2 + 𝑏2𝑠𝑎2 + 𝑠𝑎2𝑠𝑏
2    (7)  
The standard errors estimated by formula six and seven have been shown to approximate 
the population parameter in large samples (MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993; MacKinnon et 
al., 2002; Stone & Sobel, 1990). However, the exact standard error (formula 7) tends to 
perform slightly better (MacKinnon, Warsi, & Dwyer, 1995). The product of the path 
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coefficients (ab) is then divided by its estimated standard error (sab) and compared to a 
normal distribution (MacKinnon et al., 2002; Sobel, 1982). Significant results from the 
Sobel test (ab/sab) indicate a significant indirect effect.  
However, accuracy of the test is contingent on how well the sampling distribution 
of ab approximates a normal distribution. Unfortunately, several studies have found the 
distribution of ab to be asymmetrical (Lockwood & MacKinnon, 1998; MacKinnon et al., 
2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002), which poses problems in statistical significance testing 
and when constructing confidence intervals (Bollen & Stine, 1990; MacKinnon et al., 
1995). Specifically, if ab is positive, the distribution tends to be positively skewed and 
vice versa (Bollen & Stine, 1990; MacKinnon et al., 2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). 
Thus, the Sobel test results in symmetric confidence intervals being constructed around 
the ab point estimate, when, in fact, the ab distribution is often asymmetrically 
distributed. Consequently, because of the (typically) positive skew, the confidence 
interval hangs to the left near zero. Thus, detecting a statistically significant indirect 
effect is underpowered, especially in smaller samples (MacKinnon et al., 2002; Preacher, 
Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). This non-normal distribution of ab does not tend to result in 
biased point estimates of ab or its standard error.  
Bootstrap Resampling. On account of the typically non-normal distribution of the 
population indirect effect (ab) and the resulting underpowered performance of the Sobel 
test, bootstrap resampling has emerged as a viable alternative to the Sobel test (Bollen & 
Stine, 1990; Little et al., 2009; MacKinnon et al., 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). 
Advantages of bootstrap resampling methods are that no assumptions are made with 
respect to shape of the sampling distribution of ab. Furthermore, bootstrapping can 
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accommodate more complex mediation models, where most methods are more relevant to 
single-mediator designs. Bootstrapping is a way of empirically estimating parameters, 
standard errors, and confidence intervals with nonparametric distributions.  
Generally speaking, bootstrapping treats the observed data as if it were a 
population distribution where k independent samples of size N are drawn with 
replacement from the observed data, the model is fit to the independent samples, and 
parameter estimates (e.g., ab) are calculated for each sample. Conceptually, the bootstrap 
sample is to the original sample what the original sample is to the population; thus, 
mimicking the traditional sampling process. The mean and standard deviation of the 
resultant cumulative distribution of the ab estimates become the point estimate of the 
indirect effect (ab) and its standard error (sab). The confidence interval is then constructed 
from the distribution. Because the bootstrapped distribution is an unknown distribution, 
and usually asymmetric (Lockwood & MacKinnon, 1998; Shrout & Bolger, 2002), the 
percentile confidence interval method is often used. The percentile method orders the 
bootstrapped ab estimates from low to high. The confidence interval’s lower and upper 
bounds are then determined by the parameter estimates corresponding with the /2 and 1-
/2 percentiles (e.g., .05/2 = .025 and 1-.05/2 = .975). Thus, assuming a 95% confidence 
interval, the first 2.5% of the ab parameter estimates make up the values in the lower tail 
left of the lower bound, the middle 95% of the estimates make up the 95% confidence 
interval, and the highest 2.5% of the ab parameter estimates make up the values in the 
upper tail to the right of the upper bound. A statistically significant indirect effect is said 
to be present when this confidence interval does not contain zero as a plausible value.  
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The percentile confidence intervals generated from the bootstrap results tend to be 
asymmetrical (matching the underlying ab distribution) with good power and Type I error 
control (Bollen & Stine, 1990). Subsequent studies have found the percentile confidence 
interval method has performed well with good power and Type I error in simulation 
studies (MacKinnon et al., 2004; Valente, Gonzalez, Miočević, & MacKinnon, 2015; 
Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  
A slight variation of the percentile confidence interval method is the bias-
corrected bootstrap method. However, recommendations on which of the two methods to 
use has been mixed. High power and excessive Type I error with the bias-corrected 
bootstrap method has been reported (Biesanz, Falk, & Savalei, 2010; Fritz & MacKinnon, 
2007; Fritz, Taylor, & MacKinnon, 2012). Other researchers have reported the bias-
corrected bootstrap method has reasonable Type I error control and slightly better power 
than the percentile bootstrap method (e.g., Cheung, 2007; Cheung & Lau, 2008; Hayes & 
Scharkow, 2013). Yet some researchers have reported higher Type I error control and 
reasonable power from the percentile bootstrap method (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013; 
MacKinnon et al., 2004; Valente et al., 2015). 
Distribution of the product. In response to the underpowered Sobel test and 
computationally-intensive bootstrap resampling approach, the distribution of the product 
approach was introduced as an analytical method of testing the indirect effect 
(MacKinnon et al., 2002; MacKinnon, Fritz, Williams, & Lockwood, 2007; Tofighi & 
MacKinnon, 2011). This method assumes the parameters a and b are normally 
distributed, an assumption that usually holds (Falk & Biesanz, 2015). However, as 
pointed out earlier, the distribution of the product of ab is not usually normally 
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distributed. Specifically, if the mediation null hypothesis is true (H0: a = b = 0), the ab 
distribution is symmetrically distributed with excess kurtosis, but when the null is false (a 
≠ 0 and/or b ≠ 0), ab is asymmetrically distributed with excess kurtosis (MacKinnon et 
al., 2002). Consequently, the symmetry of the confidence interval will change as the 
values of a and b change.  
To analytically construct asymmetric confidence intervals, the distribution of the 
product method uses the product of the standardized path coefficients (za = a/σa and zb = 
b/σb). Then critical values of the product of the standardized path coefficients (zazb) are 
obtained from tables provided by Meeker, Cornwell, and Aroian (1981). These critical 
values (CV) were derived from the theorized distribution of the product of two normally 
distributed standardized variables (Meeker et al., 1981; see MacKinnon et al., 2002 for 
details). Using the exact multivariate-delta standard error of ab (formula 7), computation 
of the confidence interval then proceeds along the lines of computing a conventional 
confidence interval, with the exception of different critical values for upper and lower 
bounds. Formulas for the upper and lower bounds for the asymmetric confidence 
intervals are illustrated by the formulas below (MacKinnon et al., 2004). 
CILower Bound = ab + lower CV * sab   (8) 
CIUpper Bound = ab + upper CV * sab   (9) 
 A limitation to the tables provided by Meeker and colleagues (1981) is the CVs are 
provided in 0.40 increments and only for a Type I error rate of .05. To facilitate easier 
and more accurate construction of confidence intervals (i.e., no rounding) and to allow 
for other Type I error rates, the PRODCLIN program was developed (MacKinnon, Fritz, 
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et al., 2007). Subsequently, the PRODCLIN program has been implemented into the 
RMediation package for use in R (R Core Team, 2016; Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2011).  
A statistically significant indirect effect is said to be present when distribution of 
the product generated confidence interval does not contain zero as a plausible ab 
parameter value. Researchers suggest the distribution of the product asymmetric 
confidence interval method generally performs better than conventional confidence 
intervals via the Sobel test and percentile and bias-corrected bootstrap methods (Falk & 
Biesanz, 2015; Fritz et al., 2012; MacKinnon et al., 2002; MacKinnon et al., 2004; 
Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2011; Valente et al., 2015).  
 Monte Carlo. Monte Carlo has some advantages over other methods. Like 
bootstrap resampling, Monte Carlo makes no assumptions of the distribution of the 
parameter (ab). However, unlike bootstrapping, it can be used with summary statistics 
(raw data is not needed), it is faster than bootstrapping, and can be used with multilevel 
models (Preacher & Selig, 2012; Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2016). 
Generally speaking, instead of fitting the model to the data k times, as done in 
bootstrap resampling, Monte Carlo estimation generates specific sample statistics based 
on the observed data parameter estimates. Using the observed parameter estimates a, b, 
sa, and sb as means and standard deviations, respectively, k (typically 1000 to 5000) pairs 
of a and b sample statistics are generated, the product of the pairs (ab) are computed, and 
the (typically 1000 to 5000) products form a distribution of ab. Confidence intervals are 
then constructed similar to how the bootstrap percentile confidence intervals were 
formed. That is, the confidence interval’s lower and upper bounds are determined by the 
parameter estimates corresponding with the /2 and 1-/2 percentiles. Thus, assuming a 
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95% confidence interval, the parameter estimates corresponding to the 2.5 percentile and 
the 97.5 percentile represent the lower and upper bounds.  
 Simulation studies have shown the Monte Carlo method performs very well and 
essentially equivalently to the distribution of the product with respect to power and Type 
I error control (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013, MacKinnon et al., 2004; Preacher & Selig, 
2012; Valente et al., 2015). Although the bias-corrected bootstrap resampling method had 
more power, the Monte Carlo method had a better balance of Type I error control and 
power (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013; Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2016).   
Summary of tests of indirect effects. Numerous methods of estimating and testing 
the indirect effect for statistical significance have been developed since the seminal 
causal-steps approach was introduced by Baron and Kenny (1986). New methods such as 
permutation testing (e.g., Taylor & MacKinnon, 2012), Bayesian Markov chain Monte 
Carlo (e.g., Biesanz et al., 2010; Yaun & MacKinnon, 2009), and posterior p-value show 
great promise (e.g., Biesanz et al., 2010; Falk & Biesanz, 2016), but have not been widely 
accepted in applied research as of yet. Further, methods such as multilevel modeling 
(e.g., Pituch, & Stapleton, 2011; Preacher, Zyphur, Zhang, 2010), and longitudinal 
modeling (e.g., Cheong, MacKinnon, & Khoo, 2003; Maxwell & Cole, 2007) have been 
specifically designed for more complex mediation models and research designs.  
Nonetheless, the estimation methods presented are among the most popular in 
applied and basic literature. Despite the similarity in performance of many of the methods 
discussed, the methods best able to balance Type I error control and power across nearly 
all studies were the percentile bootstrap resampling, distribution of the product, and 
Monte Carlo estimation techniques. However, out of the methods discussed, the 
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distribution of the product method seems to be slightly favored (Hayes & Scharkow, 
2013; Preacher & Selig, 2012). Furthermore, Tofighi and MacKinnon (2011) noted 
empirical methods (e.g., bootstrapping) should not be used when analytic solutions of 
testing the indirect effect are readily available (e.g., PRODCLIN: MacKinnon, Fritz, et 
al., 2007; RMediation: Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2011).     
Research Design Characteristics to Differentiate Third Variables 
 As previously discussed, mediation is a theoretical specification of causal 
relationships rather than simply a data-analytic technique or statistical model. To make 
appropriate causal conclusions, a scientist must consider the validity evidence supported 
by the research design. Although validity of inferences is often thought of as a 
dichotomous decision (valid vs. not valid), one must recognize the validity of causal 
inferences lies on a continuum depending on several characteristics such as research 
design, sampling, measurement, and statistical analyses (Cook & Campbell, 1979; 
Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Characteristics of research design most commonly 
discussed in mediation literature that lend to increased validity evidence or valid 
inferences are randomization, manipulation, and temporal precedence (Iacobucci, 
Saldanha, & Deng, 2007; MacKinnon et al., 2000; Spencer et al., 2005). The following 
paragraphs will discuss experimental design (i.e., random assignment and manipulation 
of variables) and temporal precedence in the context of mediation.  
Experimental design. Research studies often randomly assign participants to 
treatment and control conditions with the intent of manipulating the criterion variable via 
the influence of the experimentally manipulated predictor. Because mediation specifies 
two causal effects (X  Z and Z  Y), experimental studies of mediation require both 
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experimental manipulation of the predictor, independent from the mediator, and 
experimental manipulation of the mediator, independent from the predictor (Shrout & 
Bolger, 2002). Several researchers have proposed experimental designs such as causal-
chain strategy that more readily enable mediation inferences (Smith, 1982; Spencer et al., 
2005; Stone-Romero & Rosopa, 2008). Causal-chain designs randomize both X and Z; 
thus, two separate studies or groups must be used. The first study evaluates the effect of X 
on Z by experimentally manipulating X. Followed by a second study that evaluates the 
effect of Z on Y by experimentally manipulating Z (Smith, 1982). For obvious reasons, 
these designs are only applicable when the predictor and mediator variables are easily 
experimentally manipulable. Although predictors are often manipulable, mediators are 
not frequently able to be experimentally manipulated in isolation (Spencer et al., 2005).  
 Classic experimental design. The most common experiment is performed where 
examinees are randomly assigned to control and intervention groups (X) with the intent of 
manipulating the mediator (Z). Because the mediator is related to the criterion, the 
criterion will be manipulated as well. Accordingly, the predictor, mediator, and criterion 
are all measured and mediation is estimated. Given adequate research design, the 
researcher is able to make causal inferences with respect to the effect of the predictor on 
the mediator (e.g., no confounders, no omitted variables, temporal precedence). However, 
the relationship between the mediator and the criterion is only correlational; thus, no 
causal inferences are justified. That is, the effect of the mediator on the criterion is prone 
to the effects of confounding variables and temporal order of occurrence.  
 Causal-chain design. A more robust experimental design to make causal 
inferences requires two separate experiments (Spencer et al., 2005). In the first 
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experiment, examinees are randomly assigned to control and intervention groups 
(experimentally manipulated X) with the intent of influencing the mediator (Z). The 
predictor and mediator are then measured. In the second experiment, a different group of 
examinees is randomly assigned to control and intervention groups (experimentally 
manipulated Z) with the intent of influencing the criterion (Y). The mediator and the 
criterion are then measured. Combining the data from both experiments, mediation is 
estimated. Given adequate research design, the researcher is able to make causal 
inferences with respect to the effect of the predictor on the mediator and the mediator on 
the criterion (e.g., no confounders, no omitted variables, temporal precedence). 
As you can see, experimental design to strengthen mediation inferences is an 
arduous task, but, when properly executed, evidence of causal order of variables and 
unbiased estimation of the indirect effect are possible. Mediation is often examined when 
participants are not able to be randomly assigned to levels of either the predictor or the 
mediator (Frazier et al., 2004; Kraemer, Wilson, Fairburn, & Agras, 2002; Rose et al., 
2004); thus, researchers should employ other design characteristics such as temporal 
precedence to strengthen mediation inferences.  
Temporal precedence. A critical assumption of mediation is temporal 
precedence. Temporal precedence is defined as a variable (X) that occurs in time before 
another variable (Y; Shadish et al., 2002). Oftentimes, temporal precedence is referred to 
as the order of measurement (Iacobucci et al., 2007; Wu & Zumbo, 2008). That is, the 
predictor is measured first, followed by the mediator, and finally the criterion. A point of 
emphasis with respect to temporal precedence is simply measuring the predictor before 
the mediator and the mediator before the criterion is not sufficient when making an 
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inference of causal ordering of events. It is the temporal relationships of the underlying 
constructs that is most important (James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982). That is, the predictor 
(X) must occur prior to the mediator (Z) in time and space and the mediator (Z) must 
occur prior to the criterion (Y) in time and space. This temporal precedence may be better 
illustrated by an example. With respect to this study, an examinee must have some 
inherent level of perceived test importance (predictor) before the individual exerts effort 
(mediator) on the test. Further, the examinee must exert effort (mediator) before 
answering each test item (criterion). Thus, perceived importance (X) precedes expended 
effort (Z) which precedes test performance (Y) in time and space.  
Although measuring these constructs in order of occurrence strengthens mediation 
inferences, critical assumptions of temporal precedence must be made. Namely, temporal 
order of measurement must align with the theoretical framework. Consider the following 
extreme example hypothesizing the effect of SES (X) on physical health (Y) is mediated 
by ability to cope with stress (Z; Matthews, Gallo, & Taylor, 2010). If physical health (Y) 
is measured before ability to cope with stress (Z) and SES (X), one should not infer from 
the estimated relationship between physical health (Y) and SES (X) that physical health 
(Y) causes SES (X). Clearly, an inference that physical health (Y) causes SES (X) does not 
align with theory regardless of when the variables were measured. Accordingly, there are 
times when the nature of the variable itself (e.g., trait-like characteristics, demographics) 
may dictate whether measurement of the variable out of temporal order is plausible.  
In the absence of sufficiently rigorous research design (e.g., random assignment to 
X and Z), “the researcher bears the burden of arguing the ordered relationship on logical 
or theoretical grounds” (Iacobucci et al., 2007, p. 140). Even then, the conclusions made 
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from analyses conducted on theoretically ordered variables may be untenable. Despite the 
importance of temporal precedence in the absence of randomization or manipulation of X 
and Z, researchers conducting observational mediation studies seldom collect data 
aligning with temporal order of occurrence (Iacobucci et al., 2007).  
Summary. The validity of inferences from test scores about mediated processes is 
enhanced with reliable measurement, experimental design, temporal precedence, and 
theoretical framework suggestive of mediation. An increasing lack of these measurement 
and design characteristics contributes to lack of validity of inferences from scores about 
mediation processes. Although theory and design are necessary for mediation hypotheses, 
data-analytic techniques are necessary to test these hypotheses.  
Assumptions of Mediation  
There are several assumptions, both statistical and methodological, when 
mediation inferences are desired. As with any ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, 
assumptions of linearity of the X-Z, X-Y, and Z-Y relationships, normality of residuals, 
homoscedasticity of residuals, and independence of residuals must be met if OLS 
estimation is employed (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). If maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimation is employed when estimating the model parameters via SEM, then the 
assumptions of linearity of the X-Z, X-Y, and Z-Y relationships, multivariate normality of 
continuous variables, and homoscedasticity of residuals must be met.  
Measurement error. An assumption when estimating mediation by means of 
OLS regression is the predictors are assumed to be measured without error. Predictors 
measured with error result in biased unstandardized path coefficients. Criterions 
measured with error result in biased standardized path coefficients and decreased 
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statistical power (Cohen et al., 2003). Because variables studied in the social sciences are 
prone to measurement error (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Cohen et al., 2003), this assumption 
is not often met. In single-mediator mediation analyses, measurement error in the 
mediator results in underestimates of the effect of the predictor on the mediator (Hoyle & 
Kenny, 1999; Judd & Kenny, 1981a), the mediator on the criterion (Baron & Kenny, 
1986; Hoyle & Kenny, 1999), and tends to overestimate the effect of the predictor on the 
criterion (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Consequently, the indirect effect tends to be 
underestimated and thus making it more difficult to detect.  
 Although meeting the assumption of error free measurement is not likely, 
remedies do exist. The first and most obvious approach is to measure X, Z, and Y reliably. 
When highly reliable scores cannot be produced, SEM can be employed to correct for the 
biasing effects of measurement error. Two approaches to modeling latent variable SEMs 
that correct for measurement error are use of multiple indicators of each of X, Z, and Y 
(MacKinnon, 2008) or use of reliability-corrected single-indicator models (Cheung & 
Lau, 2015; Cole & Preacher, 2014). 
Model misspecification. The specification of third variables as mediators, 
moderators, covariates, confounders, or suppressors is a statistical and methodological 
concern. Considering statistical mediation analyses are little more than intercorrelations 
among observed variables and are not often experimentally manipulated, mediation 
models can easily and unknowingly be prone to misspecification.  
Order and direction. With respect to misspecification, one of the most obvious 
and fundamental assumptions made when making mediation inferences is temporal 
precedence. That is, the basic conceptual mediation model posits that X causes Z, which 
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causes Y (X  Z  Y). However, without a properly specified model based on theory, the 
order and direction of interrelationships between variables could be misspecified. For 
example, the difference between a completely mediated effect (X  Z  Y) and a 
confounded effect (X  Z  Y) is simply the direction of one arrow and cannot be 
discerned by statistical analyses alone (MacKinnon et al., 2000; Thoemmes, 2015). 
Similarly, the ordering of the predictor and criterion variables (Y  Z  X) results in 
equivalent model-data fit. Given the example used throughout this chapter (i.e., 
importance  effort  performance), depending on theory, it may be plausible that 
examinee effort causes both perceived importance and test performance (i.e., importance 
 effort  performance). Alternatively, it may be plausible that test performance causes 
reported effort, which causes reported perceived importance (i.e., performance  effort 
 importance). Thus, in the absence of a theory specifying a pattern of relationships 
consistent with mediation, statistical analyses alone cannot differentiate between these 
statistically equivalent, but conceptually distinct examples.  
Several researchers have addressed this issue of equivalent models (Hershberger, 
2006; MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, Fabrigar, 1993; Raykov & Penev, 1999). That is, 
for any specified model, alternate models that differ in causal order and causal directions 
may exist with identical model-data fit (Cole & Maxwell, 2003; Hershberger, 2006; 
Kenny et al., 1998; Little et al., 2009; Raykov & Marcoulides, 2001). Thus, differences in 
chi-square values, fit indices, p-values, and correlation residuals cannot distinguish 
between equivalent models (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2001). Despite the equivalence in 
model-data fit, equivalent models often result in different substantive interpretations. 
Consequently, equivalent models can be cause for concern when estimating models from 
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observational research, as statistical estimation cannot supplant sound theoretical 
foundations and empirical research when specifying models.  
Omitted variables. Model misspecification resulting from missing and often 
unmeasured variables is referred to as omitted variables. When modeling data from 
observational research, unmeasured variables pose significant problems to interpretation 
of analyses. This problem of omitted variables can be doubly challenging with a 
mediation hypothesis as opposed to a more conventional hypothesis (i.e., X  Y) because 
of the two effects being estimated. That is, an omitted third variable could account for the 
relationship between X and Z and/or the relationship between Z and Y. For example, in 
the example where perceived importance  examinee effort  test performance, perhaps 
we should have also measured examinee ability. Academic ability may have a significant 
positive relationship with importance, effort, and performance. Thus, the omission of 
ability positively biases the path coefficients because the omitted variable may account 
for the relationship(s) between X and Z and/or Z and Y.  
 The dilemma of omitted variables can often be remedied by use of experimental 
research designs. Randomization of participants into interventions (X) provides control 
over extraneous sources of variability, mitigating the effects of confounding variables. 
However, randomly assigning participants to the intervention (X) only mitigates the 
effects of omitted variables with respect to the X to Z relationship. Because it is rarely 
possible to randomly assign participants to levels of the mediator, the Z to Y relationship 
is especially susceptible to omitted variables (e.g., confounders, moderators; Pek & 
Hoyle, 2016). Furthermore, mediation is often used in research where manipulation or 
randomization of X may not be feasible or even possible (i.e., observational and quasi-
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experimental research). Efforts to understand the bias of confounders using statistical 
methods have been proposed in situations when mediators are unable to be manipulated 
(e.g., sensitivity analyses: Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 2010; MacKinnon & Pirlott, 2015). 
Regardless, in situations where participants are not randomly assigned to levels of X or Z, 
sound theory and replication studies with different manipulations and controlling for 
different variables provide strongest evidence of mediated relationships (Holland, 1988; 
James & Brett 1984; MacKinnon, Coxe, & Baraldi, 2012; McDonald, 1997).  
Functional form. Another assumption is the correct specification of functional 
form. Functional form refers to the correct mathematical form of the relationships 
between variables. For example, mediation models typically assume the X-Z, Z-Y, and X-
Y relationships are linear. Of course, any of these relationships may actually be nonlinear 
which should be assessed and modeled appropriately. If necessary polynomial terms 
(e.g., quadric, cubic) are not included in the model, this is an issue of omitted variables 
and thus the same consequences are observed.  
  Moreover, mediation assumes the relationship of X  Z  Y is both linear and 
additive (Fairchild & MacKinnon, 2009; Holland, 1988; Judd & Kenny, 1981; 
MacKinnon et al., 2007).3  An interaction (non-additive effect) is said to exist if the effect 
of Z on Y depends on the level of X or the effect of X on Y depends on the level of Z. For 
example, it is plausible that the effect of examinee effort on test performance depends on 
the level of examinees’ perceived importance. If this moderated effect exists, it should be 
                                                          
3 Of note, methods of mediation including an interaction term have been proposed (e.g., 
MacArthur approach, Kraemer et al., 2001); however, these methods are not nearly as popular as 
more traditional approaches. 
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modeled and not assumed to be nil. Fortunately, the X-Z interaction term can be easily 
tested and if significant, this effect, not an indirect effect, should be plotted and probed.  
Current Measurement of Motivation  
 Throughout this chapter, I provided a discussion of what mediation is, why it is 
important to theory and application, and how to provide evidence of mediation. In the 
remaining portion of this chapter, I discuss the potential issues and implications of 
prospective and retrospective measurement of perceived importance and examinee effort.  
 As you recall from the introduction, motivation is operationalized by the SOS as 
two factors of examinees’ perceived test importance and perceived expended effort. As 
such, according to EV theory, perceived test importance affects low-stakes test 
performance via the mediator, examinees’ perceived expended effort (I  E  P). 
Herein lies the potential obstacle in inferring an indirect effect of perceived importance 
on test performance via examinee effort. An assumption of mediation is temporal 
precedence of the underlying phenomenon. EV theory suggests temporal precedence in 
that perceived importance (i.e., value) affects examinee effort (i.e., motivation) which 
affects test performance (Cole, 2007; Cole et al., 2008; Finney, Sundre, et al., 2016; 
Mathers et al., 2016; Myers et al., 2016; Penk & Schipolowski, 2015; Zilberberg et al., 
2014). However, previous research modeling this indirect effect has regularly measured 
both importance and effort retrospectively after the students have already completed the 
test (i.e., P  I, P  E; Cole, 2007; Cole et al., 2008; Finney et al., 2016; Mathers et al., 
2016; Myers et al., 2016; Zilberberg et al., 2014). Although temporal precedence is not 
necessarily violated by measuring the constructs out of order, this practice leads to 
questions regarding the implications of prospective versus retrospective measurement of 
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perceived importance and examinee effort; thus, prompting the current study. 
Nonetheless, existing theory and study in the domain of retrospective and prospective 
measurement of noncognitive constructs helps shed light on the potential implications of 
the measurement of perceived importance and examinee effort. 
Retrospective and Prospective Measurement 
Self-report assessments are by far the most popular method of measuring affective 
examinee characteristics. In contrast to more objective measures such as RTE or galvanic 
skin response for anxiety, examinees’ subjective self-reports have considerable potential 
of becoming contaminated by sources irrelevant to the construct of interest (i.e., 
construct-irrelevant variance). Inherent with all self-report measures are potential sources 
of contamination such as subtle wording idiosyncrasies, inaccurate perception of self, 
rating scales, social desirability, and acquiescence (Schwarz, 1999; Shadish et al., 2002). 
When the measure is completed relative to test completion is another potential source of 
contamination (Hill & Betz, 2005). Researchers have demonstrated examinees’ self-
reports of performance-related emotions such as anxiety and anger change as a function 
of when the variables are measured relative to test completion (Folkman & Lazarus, 
1985; Goetz, Preckel, Pekrun & Hall, 2007). 
Retrospective measurement. Measuring test performance-related variables after 
examinees complete a test is termed retrospective measurement. When researchers use 
retrospective measurement methodology, they may be interested in examinees’ test 
anxiety or expended effort during the test. Or, perhaps they are gathering information 
such as perceived importance after the test and using it as a proxy for examinees’ pre-test 
levels of perceived importance. For example, consider the examinees from the example 
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throughout this chapter. After completing the test, examinees then complete a self-report 
scale measuring their expended effort on the test. Clearly, an examinee expended a 
certain level of effort completing the test. Examinees reflect back on the effort they 
expended and respond to effort items accordingly.  
Prospective measurement. In contrast, measuring test performance-related 
variables before examinees complete a test is termed prospective measurement. When 
researchers use prospective measurement methodology, they may be interested in 
examinees’ current interest in an academic subject, perceived ability, anxiety, or self-
efficacy (e.g., Freund & Holling, 2011). Prospective measurement is commonly used in 
academic settings such as classrooms where long-term academic achievement is the 
criterion (e.g., Hong & Peng, 2008). Prospective measurement can also be used in testing 
contexts. For example, consider the examinees from the example throughout this chapter. 
Prior to completing the test, examinees complete a self-report scale measuring their 
intended effort on the test. An examinee likely intends to expend a certain level of effort 
throughout the test. Examinees consider the effort they intend to expend and respond to 
effort items accordingly (Higgins, 1997).  
Type of Measurement Influences Item Response Patterns 
Prospective and retrospective measurement may result in examinees responding 
differently to self-report measures or the test. First, I discuss some potential effects a test 
can have on retrospective self-report measures. Second, I discuss potential effects the 
prospective self-report measures can have on test performance.  
Attributional bias. Attributions are used by individuals to explain causes of their 
behaviors and outcomes (Weiner, 1985, 2000). For example, individuals may attribute 
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success or failure on a task to their ability, effort, or luck. When asked to self-reflect on a 
previous behavior, attitude, or belief, ones’ retrospective perception of their previous 
state may be contaminated by attributions of their performance on a task (Mezulis, 
Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Perry et al., 2008). For example, Avery did not 
perform very well on a statistics test. Subsequently, Avery attributed the cause of her 
poor performance to not trying hard on the test. Her retrospective self-report of not trying 
hard was a function of her poor test performance. Although not explicitly referring to 
retrospective measurement, the following excerpt from C. Lloyd Morgan’s autobiography 
sums up one’s ability to self-reflect on past attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors: 
Herein lies a difficulty in any autobiographical sketch which purports to deal with 
one's mental development. It is a story of oneself in the past, read in the light of 
one's present self. There is much supplementary inference—often erroneous 
inference—wherein ‘must have been’ masquerades as ‘was so.’ (Morgan, 1932, p. 
237-238) 
That is, individuals’ retrospectively measured self-reports may be functions of their 
selective attention and perceptions of reality.   
Researchers have argued this attributional bias may be a result of individuals 
attempting to present themselves favorably to others (Arkin, Appelman, & Burger, 1980; 
Weary, 1979). However, results from a study comparing attributions between a group 
believing their test results were private and a group believing their test results were public 
indicated no differences in attributions (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982). 
Thus, self-serving attributional bias may be individuals’ perceptions of the cause of their 
behavior. Researchers have proposed attributional bias may be a self-serving bias that 
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functions as a self-protective mechanism (Pekrun et al., 2004; Perry et al., 2008; 
Thompson, 1996). This phenomenon is self-serving in that individuals systematically 
distort their self-reported beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors to augment their self-esteem. 
This phenomenon is a bias because it is not random variability in self-reports, but 
differential attributions for poor versus good performance. Said another way, examinees 
who perform relatively poorly may attribute their performance to lack of ability or effort. 
In contrast, examinees who perform well have no reason to respond inaccurately.  
Importantly, results from studies in academic settings indicate expended effort 
tends to be the most common attribution individuals report to explain task performance 
(Cheng & Chiou, 2010; Dong et al, 2013; Perry et al., 2008; Weiner, 1985). Personal 
factors such as anxiety, ability, and test-taking strategy, and situational factors such as 
test difficulty, quality of professor, and luck are common attributes used to explain 
academic performance (Cheng & Chiou, 2010; Perry, et al., 2008; Smith, Snyder, & 
Handelsman, 1982). In applied testing contexts, attributional bias has been posited as a 
source of systematic error when academic performance-related variables were 
retrospectively measured (Eklöf, 2007; Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Hill & Betz, 2005; 
Zilberberg et al., 2014).  
Behavioral commitment. Behavioral commitment has been defined as “those 
consequences of the initial pursuit of a line of action which constrain the actor to 
continue that line of action” (Johnson, 1973, p. 397). In other words, once individuals 
commit to a behavior, they feel a necessity to remain committed to that behavior to avoid 
discrepancy between their behavioral intentions and their behavior (Carver & Scheier, 
2000; Higgins, 1997). For example, Avery says she is going to try hard on her statistics 
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test; therefore, Avery is committed to a behavior (trying hard) that she must complete. 
Individuals may feel more obligated to commit to a behavior when bystanders are aware 
of their commitment; thus, individuals feel some normative expectations to remain 
committed to their behavior. If Avery told her teacher she was going to try hard on the 
statistics test, she may feel as if she has to remain committed because her teacher expects 
her to try hard. Alternatively, individuals’ may remain committed to a behavior because 
of their personal attitudes and beliefs. For example, Avery decides to remain committed 
to trying hard on the statistics test because she enjoys statistics. Thus, individuals intend 
to remain committed to a behavior to avoid conflict between their actual behavior and 
their attitudes, beliefs, and normative expectations (Carver & Scheier, 2000; Gollwitzer, 
1993; Higgins, 1997; Schwartz & Tessler, 1972).  
Goal setting is thought of as the process where individuals establish a goal based 
on consideration of their interests, attitudes, and beliefs (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999; Higgins, 
1997). Goals can be conceptualized as individuals’ expected level of performance toward 
an outcome (Garland, 1985; Gollwitzer, 1999). For example, Avery implicitly or 
explicitly states, “I intend to put forth put forth considerable effort on the statistics test.” 
Next, individuals translate their intended goals into goal-directed behavior to achieve 
their expected level of performance (Boekaerts, 2002; Gollwitzer, 1993). Thus, Avery’s 
behavioral intention specifies a course of action necessary to attain her goal of putting 
forth considerable effort on the statistics test. Further, goals are said to influence behavior 
indirectly via individuals’ motivation (Boekaerts, 2002; Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002; 
Schunk, 1995). Given motivation can be defined as a process where behavior is initiated 
and sustained (Schunk, Pintrich, & Meece, 2008), behavioral intentions (i.e., goals) 
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influence individuals to expend and sustain the effort necessary to perform a task. This 
indirect effect of goal intentions on behavior via motivation has been demonstrated in 
academic classroom settings (Lee, Lee, & Bong, 2014). Several researchers have 
demonstrated behavioral intentions to be highly predictive of individuals’ future behavior 
and task performance (e.g., Azjen, 1991; Boekaerts, 2002; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; 
Tanaka & Yamauchi, 2001; Vassiou, Mouratidis, Andreou, & Kafetsios, 2016). In sum, 
individuals’ attitudes and beliefs influence goal intentions, which influence motivation, 
which influence behavior.  
 Pulling together these concepts and applying to a low-stakes texting contexts, 
prior to starting a test, examinees first complete a measure assessing their perceived test 
importance and intended effort on a test. Examinees will respond to the perceived 
importance items according to their attitudes, beliefs, and normative expectations about 
the test. As follows, examinees consider their perceptions of test importance when 
responding to the intended effort items. Intended effort may be conceptualized as 
examinees’ behavioral intentions for completing the test (Boekaerts, 2002). 
Consequently, examinees engage in test-taking behavior that aligns with their specified 
behavioral intentions (Haggard & Clark, 2003; Johansson, Hall, Sikström, & Olsson, 
2005). If this were reality, then self-reported intended effort and expended effort would 
be essentially equivalent. In short, examinees who tend to report higher levels of intended 
effort are more likely to expend higher levels of effort throughout the test.  
Experience limitation. An important consideration when prospectively 
measuring task performance-related variables is an individual’s experience with the task 
(e.g., cognitive demand, enjoyment of the task). When a construct or behavior is 
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measured prospectively without providing individuals with relevant information about 
the task, an individual’s conceptualization of the task may be limited due to inexperience 
with the task. By measuring constructs retrospectively, individuals’ experience with the 
task will provide for less ambiguity and, consequently, a more accurate conceptualization 
of the task (Aiken & West, 1990; Boekaerts, 2002; Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Freund & 
Holling, 2011). Moreover, after experiencing the task, examinees should have a better 
conceptualization of the range of the construct’s lower and upper bounds (Howard, 
Dailey, & Gulanick, 1979).   
Consider the example used throughout this chapter. If examinees were 
administered the perceived test importance measure prior to the test (e.g., “This is an 
important test to me”), it may be difficult for examinees to conceptualize their level of 
perceived test importance without having any knowledge of the test. As a result, the 
accuracy of self-reported perceived importance would seemingly increase with 
examinees’ test experience. This experience limitation may be especially problematic in 
low-stakes, institutional accountability testing where examinees are often unaware of the 
construct to be assessed or the cognitive demand of the test.  
Despite prospective measurement’s limitation of examinees’ inadequate 
conceptualization of the construct being measured, researchers have options available to 
mitigate the effect of inexperience on prospective self-reports. One straightforward 
approach to providing examinees with contextual information is by displaying sample 
test items and/or informational cues prior to administration of prospective measures 
(Ackerman & Wolman, 2007; Aiken & West, 1990; Howard et al., 1979). In a replication 
study comparing prospective versus retrospective measurement, the accuracy and 
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stability of self-reported performance-related characteristics (i.e., self-efficacy, self-
concept) were substantially improved when explicit descriptions of tests were given 
instead of brief descriptions (Ackerman & Wolman, 2007). In a prospective measurement 
study, performance-related characteristics such as interest, perceived ability, and anxiety 
were more predictive of test performance after examinees had experience with the test 
(R2 = .53) than when examinees had no experience with the test (R2 = .21; Freund & 
Holling, 2011). Given these findings, detailed test instructions and an example item will 
be provided to the examinees to buffer the effect of experience limitation on 
prospectively measured perceived importance and intended effort. 
Implications of retrospective versus prospective measurement. To briefly 
review, the current practice of retrospectively measuring perceived test importance and 
examinee effort may result in contaminated perceived importance and examinee effort 
scores due to attributional bias. If so, we would expect to see different average levels of 
self-reported perceived importance and examinee effort from before to after the test. 
However, it is unknown whether the rank-order of perceived importance and intended 
effort scores measured before the test are different from the rank-order of perceived 
importance and expended effort scores measured after the test. If the rank-order of those 
scores are the same from before to after the test, then the relationship between perceived 
importance, examinee effort, and test performance will remain unchanged. Accordingly, 
the magnitude of the indirect effect will remain unchanged.  
Given the typical practice of retrospective measurement of importance and effort, 
researchers are unable to determine if examinees’ perceived importance or intended effort 
measured before the test are predictive of test performance. If examinees attribute the 
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cause of their test performance to perceived importance or expended effort, then the 
relationships between importance, effort, and test performance are a function of test 
performance causing their responses to the importance and effort measures. Thus, these 
relationships may be larger than the relationships when importance and effort are 
measured prospectively. With the typical retrospective measurement practice, researchers 
are unable to determine if motivation interventions aimed at influencing examinees’ 
pretest perceived importance are in fact influencing examinees pretest perceived 
importance (e.g., Finney, Sundre, et al., 2016). If perceived importance scores collected 
after the test are influenced by test performance, then the effect of motivation 
interventions on perceived importance is unknown, which may explain the differential 
results from these interventions (e.g., Finney, Sundre, et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2015). 
Researchers will also be able to determine if examinees responding to prospective 
measures of perceived importance and intended effort will exhibit behavior aligning with 
their intended effort (behavioral commitment) and thus result in more accurate estimates 
of examinee ability.   
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Chapter III 
Methods 
Participants  
Data for the current study were collected at a mid-sized, mid-Atlantic university 
that utilizes a large-scale, institutional accountability assessment program (“assessment 
day”). Test scores from assessment day are used for state and national accountability 
reporting. Moreover, assessment results are used to inform evidence-based changes to 
academic programming with the intent of increasing student learning. The tests 
administered during assessment day are low-stakes to the students in that there are no 
personal consequences for performance on the tests. For example, test results do not 
count toward course grades or graduation.  
All students at the university engage in assessment day prior to the first day of 
class. Based on their student identification numbers, students are randomly assigned to 
testing rooms where they complete noncognitive and cognitive tests. The samples for this 
study are random and do represent the university population in terms of gender, ethnicity, 
age, and SAT verbal and math scores (see Table 3). For the current study, in fall, 2016, a 
random sample of first-year students were assigned to one of two testing rooms for the 
combined and prospective conditions. To obtain the sample size necessary for data 
analyses across three conditions, retrospective data were collected from a random sample 
of first-year students assigned to one of three testing rooms during fall, 2015. With the 
exception of the experimental manipulation of measurement condition, all procedures, 
proctor training, measures, and test instructions were equivalent during both assessment 
days.  
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The initial sample consisted of 1518 first-year students: n = 697 in the 
retrospective condition, n = 474 in the combined condition, and n = 347 in the 
prospective condition. However, the effective sample size was reduced to 1145 for three 
reasons. First, 5.67% of the examinees did not have complete data on the NW9 and SOS 
measures, resulting in 1432 students with complete data. Second, because unbalanced 
sample sizes across conditions can lead to lack of power to detect model noninvariance 
(Chen, 2007), a random sample of 400 examinees were selected from the retrospective 
condition to balance the sample sizes across conditions. Third, prior to conducting data 
analyses, data were screened for univariate and multivariate outliers using SPSS 23, SAS 
9.4, and LISREL 9.20 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2015). Univariate outliers were identified by 
examining boxplots for extreme scores greater than or less than two standard deviations 
from the mean across each variable. Multivariate outliers were identified by computing 
Mahalanobis distances, the distance of a set of scores for a case from the multivariate 
centroid. A break in the Mahalanobis distance values indicates possible multivariate 
outliers. Cases identified as both univariate and multivariate outliers were examined to 
assess for invalid responses. Two participants from the combined condition and seven 
participants from the prospective condition were identified as providing nonsensical 
response sets (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) and were removed from the dataset.  
The effective sample sizes per condition were n = 400 in the retrospective 
condition, n = 437 in the combined condition, and n = 308 in the prospective condition. 
The demographics characteristics by condition were relatively consistent across 
conditions and representative of the university’s student population (see Table 3).  
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Measures 
Quantitative and scientific reasoning. Performance was assessed using the 
Natural World Test, version 9 (NW9; Sundre, Thelk, & Wigtil, 2008; Sundre & Thelk, 
2010). This test was developed by math and science faculty to assess quantitative and 
scientific reasoning student-learning objectives from the university’s general education 
program. The NW9 is a multiple-choice test consisting of 66 dichotomously-scored items 
that takes students approximately one hour to complete. The items were summed to 
create one total score.  
In previous administrations of the NW9, examinees, on average, correctly 
responded to approximately 70% of the items and approximately 95% of examinees 
scored between 46% and 89% on the NW9 after filtering out test scores from amotivated 
examinees. Thus, given the length and typical scores on the test, the NW9 tends to be 
relatively difficult for first-year examinees. Internal consistency estimates of the NW9 
scores for the current sample were adequate across conditions (see Table 4), which is 
consistent with previous research utilizing the NW9 (Finney, Sundre et al., 2016).   
Test importance and examinee effort. The Student Opinion Scale (SOS) was 
developed to operationalize the task value and motivation components from EV theory 
(Eccles et al., 1983). The SOS consists of two subscales: 5 items measuring perceived 
test importance and 5 items measuring expended effort. Examinees respond to items 
using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”). Two 
items from each subscale are negatively worded and must be reverse scored prior to 
summing to create subscale scores. The two subscale scores can range from 5 to 25 with 
higher scores representing higher levels of importance and effort.  
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The SOS was originally created to assess perceived importance and examinee 
effort at the end of a testing session (Sundre & Moore, 2002; Thelk et al., 2009). The 
SOS has been adapted to assess test-specific perceived importance and examinee effort 
after test completion (see Appendix A for the retrospective SOS; Finney, Mathers, & 
Myers, 2016). The properties of the SOS scores when gathered after a testing session or 
specific test have been studied extensively in low-stakes testing contexts (see Sessoms & 
Finney, 2015). The two-factor structure of the test session-specific SOS has been 
demonstrated across first-year and upper-class students, gender, and testing medium (i.e., 
paper-and-pencil and computer-based; Thelk et al., 2009). The two-factor structure of the 
test-specific SOS has been demonstrated across test-instruction conditions designed to 
increase the relevance of the test to examinees (Finney, Mathers, & Myers, 2016). 
Internal consistency of both forms of the SOS has ranged between .79 and .89. Validity 
evidence has been found in the form of the relationship with test performance (r = .34; 
Thelk et al., 2009) and RTE (r = .54; Wise & Kong, 2005).  
Because the SOS items were written to be administered retrospectively (e.g., “I 
gave my best effort on this test”), perceived importance and examinee effort items were 
modified to be administered before test completion (see Appendix B and C for 
prospective items). Perceived importance items were easily modified and the meaning of 
the items remained the same from before to after test completion. For example, the item 
“Doing well on this test was important to me” was changed to “Doing well on this test is 
important to me;” thus, both versions of the item represent perceived importance of the 
test. However, modifying examinee expended effort items necessitated change in the 
meaning of the item from expended to intended effort. For example, the item “I gave my 
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best effort on this test” clearly reflects past behavior, whereas the modified version of the 
item “I will give my best effort on this test” clearly reflects future behavior. Development 
of prospective items focused on maintaining nearly identical wording between 
prospective and retrospective versions. I performed multiple think-alouds to ensure the 
intended meaning and readability of the prospective items were adequate. Internal 
consistency estimates for the current sample were adequate for both measures of 
perceived importance and examinee effort across conditions (see Table 4).  
Procedures 
At the beginning of the testing session across all three conditions, examinees were 
shown an instructional video explaining the purpose of accountability testing. After the 
instructional video, trained proctors read scripted messages to prepare the examinees for 
the testing session. The proctors remained conspicuous throughout the session, monitored 
the room for amotivated or disruptive behavior, and answered examinees’ questions.  
Retrospective condition. In the retrospective condition, proctors read aloud the 
standardized test instructions for the NW9 and the retrospective test-specific SOS (see 
Appendix D). Examinees then completed the NW9 test followed by the retrospective test-
specific SOS. Examinees had one hour to complete the NW9 test and retrospective SOS. 
Combined condition. In the combined and prospective conditions, examinees 
were asked to provide prospective ratings of intended effort and/or perceived importance. 
Because it may be difficult for examinees to conceptualize their perceived importance or 
intended effort without contextual information about the test they are about to complete, 
test instructions from the retrospective condition were supplemented with a detailed 
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description of the NW9. An example item representative of the type and difficulty of the 
NW9 items was included in the test instructions and on the prospective SOS. 
In the combined condition, proctors read aloud the standardized test instructions 
for the NW9 and prospective SOS (see Appendix E). Given examinees needed to provide 
prospective ratings of test importance, proctors projected the example NW9 item at the 
front of the room prior to students completing the SOS. Proctors paused while reading the 
test instructions to allow examinees to read and formulate an answer to the example item. 
Examinees then completed the prospective perceived importance measure (see Appendix 
B). While completed scantrons were collected, the lead proctor read the NW9 test 
instructions aloud to the examinees (see Appendix F). Examinees then completed the 
NW9 test followed by the retrospective test-specific SOS within one hour.  
Prospective condition. In the prospective condition, proctors read aloud the 
standardized test instructions for the NW9 and prospective SOS (see Appendix G). 
Proctors projected the example NW9 item at the front of the room prior to students 
completing the prospective SOS. After pausing to allow examinees to read and formulate 
an answer to the example item, examinees were provided the correct answer by the 
proctor. Examinees then completed the prospective perceived importance and intended 
effort measure (see Appendix C). While scantrons were collected, the lead proctor read 
the NW9 test instructions aloud (see Appendix F). Examinees then completed the NW9 
test followed by the retrospective test-specific SOS within one hour.  
Analytic Approach  
Model-data fit. Several latent variable models were specified to answer the 
research questions (see Table 2). Alignment between these hypothesized models and the 
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data was evaluated via global and local ﬁt indices. Global ﬁt indices describe overall 
model-data ﬁt, whereas local ﬁt indices indicate speciﬁc areas of model-data misﬁt. The 
2 test, the comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) global fit indices were 
used. The 2 goodness-of-fit test is an absolute fit index that tests the discrepancy 
between observed and model-implied covariance matrices and means. Because the 2 test 
evaluates the strict hypothesis of perfect fit, the 2 test was supplemented with 
approximate model-data fit indices intended to assess fit on a continuum.  
The CFI provides an estimate of fit of the specified model relative to a baseline 
model that specifies all variables are uncorrelated and means are freely estimated. Low 
CFI values may be due to weak correlations among the variables, because the baseline 
model can fit these data well. CFI values range from 0 to 1, with larger values indicating 
better model-data ﬁt. The CFI tends to be sensitive to misspecified factor pattern 
coefficients (Hu & Bentler, 1998). The RMSEA provides an estimate of misfit due to 
model misspecification controlling for sampling error. It can be interpreted as the amount 
of misfit per degree of freedom. RMSEA values range from 0 to 1, with smaller values 
indicating better model-data ﬁt. The RMSEA tends to be sensitive to misspecified factor 
pattern coefficients. The SRMR is essentially the average difference between the 
observed and the model-implied relationships on a correlation metric. The SRMR tends 
to be sensitive to misspecified latent factor correlations. SRMR values range from 0 to 1, 
with smaller values indicating better model-data ﬁt.  
Suggested fit index values indicating good model fit (approximately, CFI ≥ .95, 
RMSEA ≤ .06, and SRMR ≤ .08) were considered (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Yu & Muthén, 
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2002). However, fit indices are intended to be used to assess model-data fit on a 
continuum, not to make dichotomous decisions about model-data fit (Marsh, Hau, & 
Wen, 2004). Accordingly, global fit indices were supplemented with evaluation of local 
misfit to guide evaluation of model-data fit. Local misfit was assessed by examining 
correlation residuals, which are the differences between observed correlations and model-
implied correlations. Correlation residual values greater than |.15| suggested misfit and 
prompted reevaluation of the model. When modeling means, local misfit was assessed by 
examining unstandardized mean residuals, which are the differences between observed 
means and model-implied means.  
Nested model comparisons. Nested model comparisons were conducted by 
estimating the more complex (less constrained) model and the simpler (more constrained) 
model. The difference in 2 test values (∆2) and degrees of freedom (∆df) were 
computed. The ∆2 values were compared against critical values from 2 distributions 
with ∆df. A significant ∆2 test indicated the more constrained model fit significantly 
worse than the less constrained model. Given the ∆2 test is sensitive to large sample 
sizes (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002), practical significance of the difference between nested 
models was assessed by evaluating the change in CFI (∆CFI). ∆CFI > .01 indicated the 
more constrained model fit practically significantly worse than the less constrained model 
(Chen, 2007; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Because the ∆CFI and the ∆2 test may provide 
conflicting information (French & Finch, 2006), correlation and mean residuals > |.15| 
were examined to supplement evaluation of model-data fit.     
Research questions 1 and 3. Recall, research questions one and three focus on 
latent mean differences in perceived importance and examinee effort scores across 
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conditions. Research question one examines mean differences between retrospectively 
gathered importance and effort across conditions whereas research question three 
examines mean differences between prospectively and retrospectively measured 
importance and effort across conditions. Prior to assessing cross-condition mean 
differences, measurement invariance was tested using a structured means model (SMM) 
to determine the cross-condition invariance of parameters (e.g., pattern coefficients).  
The first SMM test was configural invariance, which indicates if the same number 
of factors are present across conditions and if the same items are indicators for their 
respective factors across conditions. Two competing factor models were specified to 
determine if the interrelationships could be best represented by a one-factor model 
representing the broader construct of motivation or a correlated two-factor model of 
perceived importance and examinee effort.  
Single-condition one-factor and two-factor models were fit to the data from each 
condition to identify condition-specific sources of misfit. The latent factors were scaled 
by constraining the unstandardized factor pattern coefficient of one indicator to a value of 
one. This scaling technique set the metric of the latent factor to the metric of the 
respective item (i.e., 1 to 5) and was used for all subsequent CFA models4. Configural 
invariance was established if the same model fit the data adequately across data from 
independent conditions. Next, a multiple-condition configural model with no equality 
constraints was fit to data across all conditions to obtain baseline global fit indices. The 
                                                          
4 Importance item one and effort item two were chosen as the referent variables (unstandardized 
factor pattern coefficients constrained to one) for the two-factor models. Because these pattern 
coefficients are not estimated, it is important to verify the coefficients are, themselves, invariant 
across conditions. This was checked by setting the factor pattern coefficient associated with item 
one and item two to be invariant across conditions when each of the other items served as the 
referent variable in the metric and scalar invariance models (Rensvold & Cheung, 2001).   
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2 statistic and degrees of freedom of this multiple-condition model were the sum of the 
three individual 2 statistics and degrees of freedom of the models fit to each condition. 
Given adequate fit of the configural model, a metric invariance model was fit to 
the data. Testing metric invariance involved constraining the unstandardized factor 
pattern coefficients to be equal across the three independent conditions. Establishing 
metric invariance indicates the items are equally salient to their respective latent factors 
across conditions. At least partial, but preferably full, metric invariance is required prior 
to assessing the invariance of the completely mediated models across conditions.  
If the metric invariance model did not fit statistically significantly worse than the 
configural model (i.e., metric invariance is established), then scalar invariance is 
assessed. The scalar invariant model was estimated by constraining the unstandardized 
factor pattern coefficients and item intercepts to be equal across the three test instruction 
conditions. Establishing scalar invariance indicates average differences in observed score 
are attributable to different average levels of the respective latent factors; thus, latent 
factor means can be compared across conditions. At least partial, but preferably full, 
scalar invariance is required prior to examining latent mean differences.  
Given satisfactory fit of the scalar invariance model (i.e., scalar invariance is 
established), a scalar and measurement error invariant model was fit to the data. The 
measurement error invariance model was estimated by constraining the unstandardized 
factor pattern coefficients, item intercepts, and error variances to be equal across the three 
conditions. Given configural, metric, and scalar invariance, measurement error invariance 
indicates that any average differences in observed scores are not due to differences in 
measurement error across conditions. Thus, measurement error invariance is of practical 
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importance because it allows for comparisons of average observed score differences 
across conditions (Millsap & Meredith, 2007).5  
Latent mean differences in perceived importance and examinee effort across 
conditions were estimated in the scalar invariance model by constraining the 
retrospective condition’s latent mean to zero and estimating the combined and 
prospective condition’s latent mean differences from the retrospective condition. Given 
three conditions, the model was re-estimated to produce the latent mean difference 
between the combined and prospective conditions by constraining the latent mean of the 
combined condition to zero. The unstandardized latent mean difference is on the metric 
of the items (i.e., 1 to 5). Practical significance was assessed via a standardized latent 
mean effect size (latent d):  
Latent 
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


,     (1) 
where  is the unstandardized latent mean difference between two conditions and pooled 
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where n1 and n2 are the sample sizes from independent conditions and 1 and 2 are 
latent variances from conditions.6  
                                                          
5 Note, configural, metric, scalar, and measurement error invariance is a common assumption 
made in many statistical analyses of observed means (e.g., t-tests and analysis of variance).  
6 The formulas used to compute the standardized latent mean difference effect size are analogous 
to the formulas used to compute the standardized observed mean difference effect size.
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Research questions 2 and 4. Recall, research questions two and four focus on the 
stability and magnitude of the indirect effect of perceived importance on test performance 
via examinee effort across conditions. Research question two asks if the indirect effect of 
perceived importance on test performance via examinee effort is stable when modeling 
retrospectively measured importance and effort scores. In contrast, research question four 
asks if the indirect effect of importance on performance via effort is stable when 
modeling prospectively and retrospectively measured importance and effort scores. The 
indirect effect of perceived importance on test performance via examinee effort was 
assessed across independent conditions via multiple-condition moderated mediation 
analyses to answer both research questions.  
Given the number of parameters estimated in a SEM that incorporates the 
measurement models associated with the importance, effort, and performance along with 
the structural components of the model (direct effects and disturbance terms), coupled 
with the (small) within-condition sample size in the current study (n = 400, 437, and 
308), a single-indicator latent variable approach was used to mitigate the effects of 
random measurement error (Cheung & Lau, 2015; DeShon, 1998). The single-indicator 
latent variable approach involved the five steps (Cheung & Lau, 2015). First, composite 
scores of importance, effort, and NW9 were computed by summing the scored items. 
Second, the proportion of the composite scores’ variance attributed to measurement error 
was calculated by multiplying the proportion of error variability in the scores (1 - 
reliability estimate) by each composite variable’s respective variance ([1- rxx] * sx2). 
Third, the observed composite scores were used as single indicators of the respective 
latent variables (see Figure 9). Fourth, the paths from the latent factors to their respective 
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single indicators were fixed to one. Fifth, the proportions of reliable variance from step 
two for each composite score were fixed as the unstandardized error variance of the 
respective indicators. Thus, essentially error free composite variances were modeled.  
Because the conditions are categorical in nature, moderated mediation analyses 
was performed via the multiple-condition approach (Marsh, Wen, Hau, & Nagengast, 
2013) to assess the invariance of the indirect effect. The first step involved fitting the 
completely mediated model to the data within each independent condition. Given the 
completely mediated model fit the data adequately within each conditions, a multiple-
condition model fit to all three conditions with no constraints across conditions was 
estimated to obtain baseline fit indices. In step two, the two unstandardized path 
coefficients (I  E and E  P) were constrained to be equal across the three independent 
conditions. Given that constraining the two direct paths to be equal across the conditions 
did not result in significantly worse fit than the unconstrained model, the two 
unstandardized disturbance terms (i.e., unexplained variances associated with importance 
and effort) were constrained be equal across independent conditions. If the fully 
constrained (unstandardized path coefficient and disturbance term) model did not fit 
significantly worse than the constrained path coefficient model, then examinee effort and 
NW9 performance are explained equivalently well across conditions.  
Given the completely mediated models of perceived importance on test 
performance via examinee effort fit the data for each independent condition, the indirect 
effect was assessed for statistical and practical significance. Statistical significance of the 
indirect effect was tested via the distribution of the product method (Tofighi & 
MacKinnon, 2011). Practical significance of the indirect effect was assessed via the 
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following crude guidelines: .01, .09, and .25 for small, medium, and large effect sizes, 
respectively (Kenny, 2016; Kenny & Judd, 2014).  
Research question 5. Research question five focuses on latent mean change 
between prospectively measured perceived test importance and examinee effort scores 
and retrospectively measured importance and effort scores within the prospective 
condition. Prior to assessing repeated-measures latent mean differences, the longitudinal 
invariance of model parameters (e.g., factor pattern coefficients and item intercepts) was 
assessed using longitudinal mean and covariance structure analysis (LMACS).  
Configural invariance was assessed by fitting the theorized two-factor model to 
prospective importance and effort scores and to retrospective importance and effort 
scores independently. Configural invariance indicates no change in the number of factors 
or which items are indicators for each factor from before to after test completion.  
Given adequate model-data fit of the two-factor model across time points, a 
baseline configural model with no equality constraints was fit to importance and effort 
items from both time points simultaneously (i.e., 20 items) to obtain baseline global fit 
indices. Item error variances from time one and time two were allowed to covary (e.g., 
effort item 1 at time 1 and effort item 1 at time 2) to account for shared error variance 
between corresponding items across time points. The latent factors were scaled by 
constraining the unstandardized factor pattern coefficients of one indicator from each 
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factor to one across time. This scaling technique set the metric of the latent factor to the 
metric of the respective indicator.7  
Given adequate fit of the configural model (i.e., configural invariance), a metric 
invariance model was fit to the data. Testing metric invariance involves constraining the 
unstandardized factor pattern coefficients of corresponding indicators across time points 
to be equal. Establishing metric invariance indicates corresponding items are equally 
salient to their respective latent factors across time points. Given configural and metric 
invariance are established, rank-order stability (i.e., test-retest reliability) of scores across 
time points can be assessed via the latent correlation between prospective and 
retrospective scores. High correlations indicate examinees stay in the same relative rank-
order of scores across time points and low correlations indicate examinees change their 
relative rank-order of scores across time.  
If the metric invariance model did not fit statistically significantly worse than the 
configural model (i.e., metric invariance is established), then scalar invariance was 
assessed. The scalar invariance model was estimated by constraining the unstandardized 
pattern coefficients and item intercepts of corresponding indicators to be equal across 
time points. Establishing scalar invariance indicates average differences in observed 
scores across the two times are attributable to average differences in the respective latent 
factors across time; thus, average latent change in effort and importance were interpreted. 
                                                          
7 Importance item one and effort item two were chosen as the referent variables (unstandardized 
factor pattern coefficients constrained to one) for the two-factor model. Because these factor 
pattern coefficients are not estimated, it is important to verify the factor pattern coefficients are, 
themselves, invariant across time. This was checked by setting the factor pattern coefficient 
associated with item one and item two to be invariant across time when each of the other items 
served as the referent variable in the metric and scalar invariance models (Rensvold & Cheung, 
2001).  
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At least partial, but preferably full, scalar invariance was required prior to examining 
latent mean change. Practical significance of latent mean change was assessed via a 
standardized latent mean change effect size for longitudinal comparisons:  
(
Latent 
pooled
d
   


,    (3) 
where 1 and 2 are the unstandardized latent means from time one and time two. pooled 
is the pooled latent variance across time:  
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where n1 and n2 are the sample sizes from time one and time 2 two, 1 and 2 are latent 
variances from time one and time two, and 12 is the latent factor correlation between 
scores at time one and time two.8 
Research question 6. Research question six focuses on the relationship between 
change in examinee effort from before to after the test and test performance. Likewise, 
the change in perceived importance may also be related to test performance. Given 
longitudinal scalar invariance was established for importance and effort scores from the 
prospective condition, the LMACS model was reparameterized as a two time point latent 
                                                          
8 The formulas used to compute the standardized longitudinal latent mean difference effect size 
are analogous to the formulas used to compute the standardized observed mean difference effect 
size longitudinal comparisons. 
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growth model (LGM) in order to estimate individual differences in change scores and 
predict them from test performance.9  
Estimation of the two time-point latent growth model was accomplished by 
specifying a latent intercept factor and a latent slope factor (see Figure 10). The intercept 
factor mean and variance simply represent the mean and variance for prospective scores. 
The slope factor mean and variance represent the mean of the change scores (equal to the 
mean change from the LMACS model) and the individual differences in change over 
time, the main parameter of interest in this model. Given significant slope variance, I 
examined if test performance explained these individual differences in change in effort 
and importance ratings. Moreover, the covariance between the intercept and slope factors 
indicated if prospective scores related to individual differences in change scores. A 
single-indicator latent variable approach was used to estimate the relationship between 
performance (NW9 composite scores) and change in importance and effort. By 
simultaneously estimating the LGM for importance and effort (see Figure 10), I assessed 
if change in importance is related to change in effort, after controlling for performance.  
Research question 7. To assess if average levels of NW9 scores differed across 
conditions, a one-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted 
followed by Tukey’s HSD test for pairwise comparisons. Practical significance of 
differences in performance across conditions was assessed via standardized effect size 
indices (eta-squared and Cohen’s d) and unstandardized effect size (mean difference 
                                                          
9 The two time point LGM parameterization is an equivalent model (e.g., equivalent fit, degrees 
of freedom, and parameter estimates) to the LMACS model. However, the conditional LGM can 
accommodate latent predictors of change. Thus, the relationships between change in importance 
and change in effort and test performance are able to be assessed. Further, LGM parameterization 
allows for estimation of the relationship between the change in perceived importance and the 
change in examinee effort (i.e., simultaneous growth). 
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between conditions). Eta-squared (2) was used to assess the practical significance of the 
omnibus test and was interpreted as the proportion of variance explained in the NW9 
scores by condition. Cohen’s d was used to assess the practical significance of the simple 
main effects and was interpreted as the difference between mean NW9 scores between 
conditions in standard deviation units.  
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Chapter IV 
Results 
Retrospective Importance and Effort Analyses  
 Retrospective perceived importance and examinee effort scores were modeled 
across conditions to assess the effects of behavioral commitment via priming.  
Research question 1. On average, do examinees report different levels of 
retrospectively measured perceived test importance and examinee expended effort across 
measurement conditions? Recall, retrospective importance and effort scores from the 
combined and prospective conditions may be influenced by simply asking examinees to 
engage in rating their perceived importance and intended effort before test completion. 
Item-level statistics (means, variability, normality) and bivariate relationships are 
presented to foreshadow the fit of the competing models. Results of the measurement 
invariance tests followed by latent mean difference tests are then presented.  
Descriptive statistics. Frequency distributions of importance and effort responses 
indicated all response options (i.e., 1-5) were utilized by examinees for each item in each 
of the three conditions. Item means ranged between 3.15 and 4.18 across items and were 
similar across conditions, indicating respondents typically responded neutral to agree 
with the items (see Table 5). Standard deviations ranged between 0.73 and 1.08 across 
items and were similar across conditions, indicating no floor or ceiling effects associated 
with each item. Item-level skewness and kurtosis values across conditions were less than 
|1.01| and |2.10|. Assessing multivariate non-normality, Mardia’s normalized multivariate 
kurtosis values of 18.11, 27.44, and 22.69 for retrospective, combined, and prospective 
conditions, respectively indicated some multivariate non-normality.   
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Estimation. The SMM used to test measurement invariance and latent mean 
differences in importance and effort scores across conditions requires the selection of an 
appropriate estimation technique. When employing a normal-theory estimator, such as 
ML, categorical or non-normal data can result in biased parameter estimates, standard 
errors, approximate fit indices, and 2 statistic. Examinees’ responses to the importance 
and effort items are ordinal in nature (Likert scale); however, treating responses with five 
or more ordered categories as continuous tends to result in accurate parameter estimates 
(Finney & DiStefano, 2013). Thus, item responses were treated as continuous. Univariate 
skewness and kurtosis values less than |2| and |7|, respectively, can be considered 
sufficiently univariately normal and have little effect on standard errors and fit indices 
(Finney, DiStefano, & Kopp, 2016). Mardia’s normalized multivariate kurtosis values 
larger than 20 may be problematic (Peter Bentler, 1998, post on SEMNET). However, 
Mardia’s multivariate kurtosis values have no clear cutoff indicating multivariate non-
normality. Given the continuous nature of the item responses and small values of 
univariate skewness and kurtosis, all analyses employed ML estimation.  
Inter-item correlations were examined to foreshadow the fit of the one- and two-
factor models (see Table 5). In general, importance items were more strongly related to 
each other than to effort items and effort items were more strongly related to each other 
than to importance items across conditions. The pattern of inter-item correlations appears 
to align with a two-factor model and suggests gross misfit of the one-factor model. 
Moreover, the inter-item correlations appear to be relatively equivalent across conditions, 
suggesting metric invariance across conditions is plausible. Importance item three (“I am 
not curious about how I did on this test relative to others.”) tended to relate more strongly 
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to importance items four (“I am not concerned about the score I receive on this test.”) and 
eight (“I would like to know how well I did on these tests.”) and less strongly to 
importance item five (“This was an important test to me.”) than to other importance items 
across conditions. This pattern of correlations associated with item three suggests item 
three may be problematic when fitting the two-factor model to scores across conditions. 
Measurement invariance across conditions. As foreshadowed by the pattern of 
inter-item correlations, global model-data fit indices indicated gross misfit of the one-
factor model within each condition (see Table 6). Moreover, several correlation residuals 
greater than |.15| indicated the one-factor model did not represent the factor structure of 
the retrospective importance and effort scores.  
Although model-data fit of the two-factor model was better than the one-factor 
model, global fit indices suggested areas of misfit (see Table 6). Moreover, examination 
of correlations residuals indicated non-ignorable local misfit. As foreshadowed by the 
inter-item correlations associated with importance item three, a large, positive correlation 
residual was associated with the relationship between importance items three and four 
across retrospective, combined, and prospective conditions (.20, .17, .16). The model 
underestimated the relationship between importance items three and four. Moreover, the 
correlation residual between importance items three and eight (.18) indicated the model 
underestimated the relationship in the prospective condition. The shared variance 
between importance items three and four after controlling for the importance factor (i.e., 
correlation residual) may be due to proximity of items or negative wording effects 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff, 2012). Shared variance between importance items 
three and eight, after controlling for the importance factor, may be due to item wording 
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redundancy (Podsakoff et al., 2012). This shared variance between importance items 
three and eight has been found in previous studies (Thelk et al., 2009).  
To account for the shared variance, the two-factor model was estimated with error 
covariances between importance item three and importance items four and eight. As 
expected, the two-factor model with two error covariances fit the importance and effort 
scores significantly better than the two-factor model without error covariances (see Table 
6). The error covariances between items three and eight were statistically significant and 
moderate in size across conditions (residual correlations = .38, 23, 49) as were the 
residual correlations for items three and four (.30, .23, .26). 
Even after this modification, the correlation residual between importance item 
eight and effort item ten revealed the model underestimated this relationship in the 
retrospective and combined conditions (.16 and .16). Further, a correlation residual of .16 
was found between importance items four and eight in the prospective condition. Given 
99% of the correlation residuals were less than |.10| and global model-data fit indices 
were adequate within each condition, the two-factor model with error covariances 
between importance item three and importance items four and eight model (i.e., model 2-
factor with I3, I4, & I8 model in Table 6) was championed.  
Given adequate model-data fit of the two-factor model with the two error 
covariances, the factor correlation, factor pattern coefficients, variance explained by each 
factor in the set of items, and reliability estimates were examined. The factor correlation 
indicated the importance factor and effort factors are moderately related across 
retrospective, combined, and prospective conditions (.65, .69, and .65), respectively. The 
unstandardized factor pattern coefficients were relatively equivalent across conditions. 
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The standardized factor pattern coefficients associated with the importance factor tended 
to be small (< .70), with the exception of item one (> .80; see Table 7 for unstandardized 
and standardized factor pattern coefficients). The importance factor explained, on 
average, 37%, 41%, and 47% of the variance in the items for the retrospective, combined, 
and prospective conditions, respectively. Thus, measurement error accounts for greater 
than 50% of the variance in the importance items. The effort factor explained an average 
of 54%, 56%, and 54% of the variance in the items for the retrospective, combined, and 
prospective conditions, respectively. Estimates of reliability of the subscale scores 
indicated reliability was adequate across conditions (see Table 4).  
A multiple-condition configural two-factor model with error covariances was 
estimated to obtain baseline fit indices. Given configural invariance was supported, 
metric invariance was tested. As foreshadowed by the similar unstandardized pattern 
coefficients across conditions, the metric invariant model with error covariances fixed to 
be equal across conditions fit the retrospective importance and effort scores well and did 
not fit statistically significantly worse than the configural model (see Table 6).  
Given metric invariance was supported, measurement error invariance was 
examined. The measurement error invariant model fit well, but did fit the scores 
statistically significantly worse than the metric invariant model (see Table 6). However, 
the measurement error invariant model did not fit practically significantly worse than the 
metric invariant model, as indicated by the negligible ∆CFI. Moreover, the number and 
magnitude of correlation residuals did not change from the metric and scalar invariant 
model. Thus, measurement error invariance was supported.  
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 Given metric invariance was supported, scalar invariance was examined. The 
scalar invariance model fit the retrospective importance and effort scores well, but did fit 
statistically significantly worse than the metric invariance model (see Table 6). Thus, 
local misfit was closely examined. All importance and effort items had nonsignificant 
standardized mean residuals and the largest unstandardized mean residual was |.15|. This 
mean residual was associated with importance item three. The observed means for 
importance item three for retrospective, combined, and prospective conditions were 3.37, 
3.58, and 3.57, whereas, the model-implied means were 3.54, 3.50, and 3.54. Note the 
observed and model-implied means in the combined and prospective conditions are 
similar, whereas the model predicted the retrospective mean to be larger than observed. 
That is, because the factor pattern coefficients were equivalent across conditions and 
there were no latent mean differences across groups (as described below), the model 
over-estimated item three’s mean in the retrospective condition to reflect the model-
implied similarity in item-level means across conditions.  
Although the mean residual (3/100 of the 5-point scale) appears to be negligible, a 
partial invariant model was tested by freely estimating importance item three’s intercept. 
As expected, the partial invariance model fit statistically significantly better than the full 
scalar invariance model. Moreover, the largest unstandardized mean residual reduced to 
|.08| from |.15| in the full scalar invariance model. Given the results from the scalar and 
partial scalar models, latent mean differences were estimated with and without equality 
constraints on importance item three’s intercepts to fully evaluate the impact of the scalar 
noninvariant item on the magnitude of the latent mean differences across conditions. 
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Latent mean differences. When estimating the full scalar invariance model, the 
retrospective condition perceived importance latent mean was not statistically 
significantly different than the combined ( = -0.09, t = 1.54, p > .01) or prospective ( = 
0.01, t = 0.16, p > .01) conditions. The combined condition latent mean was not 
statistically significantly different than the prospective condition ( = 0.10, t = 1.53, p > 
.01). Moreover, the standardized latent mean difference in importance scores between the 
retrospective condition and the combined (d = 0.12) and prospective (d = 0.01) conditions 
and between the combined and prospective conditions (d = 0.12) were not practically 
significant. That is, the retrospective condition’s average latent importance score is 0.12 
standard deviation units smaller than the average score from the combined condition.10  
When estimating the partial scalar invariance model with no equality constraint 
on importance item three’s intercept across conditions, the latent mean differences were 
essentially equivalent to those of the full scalar invariant model. The latent differences 
between the retrospective and combined ( = -0.09, t = 1.56, p > .01) and prospective ( 
= 0.01, t = 0.17, p > .01) conditions were not statistically significant. The combined 
condition latent mean was not statistically significantly different than the prospective 
condition ( = 0.10, t = 1.56, p > .01). The standardized latent mean difference between 
the retrospective and combined (d = 0.12) and prospective (d = 0.01) conditions and 
between the combined and prospective conditions (d = 0.13) were essentially equivalent 
                                                          
10 Practically similar results are obtained when computing the standardized effect size on 
observed composite importance scores between the retrospective condition and the combined (d = 
0.04) and prospective (d = 0.10) conditions and between the combined and prospective conditions 
(d = 0.06). The equivalency of latent and observed composite mean differences in importance 
scores is not surprising given the relatively high coefficient alpha values for the importance factor 
across conditions.  
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to the scalar invariance model with equality constraints on all item intercepts. Thus, the 
more parsimonious fully scalar invariant model was championed. Contrary to the 
hypothesis that average importance scores would be higher in the prospective condition 
due to the effect of behavioral commitment via priming, average importance scores were 
not statistically nor practically significantly different across conditions. 
Similar results were found for average examinee effort across conditions. When 
estimating the full scalar invariant model, the retrospective condition latent mean was not 
statistically significantly different than the combined ( = -0.04, t = 0.78, p > .01) or 
prospective ( = 0.08, t = 1.44, p > .01) conditions.11 The combined condition latent 
mean was not statistically significantly different than the prospective condition ( = 0.12, 
t = 2.25, p > .01). The standardized latent mean difference in effort scores between the 
retrospective and combined (d = 0.06) and prospective (d = 0.11) conditions and between 
the combined and prospective conditions (d = 0.18) were not practically significant.12  
Research question 2. Is the indirect effect of retrospectively measured perceived 
test importance on test performance via retrospectively measured examinee effort 
affected by asking examinees to rate their importance and effort before test completion? 
Descriptive statistics are presented to foreshadow the fit of the mediation model. Then, 
                                                          
11 Changes to the partial scalar invariance model were limited to releasing the equality constraint 
on importance item three’s intercept. No changes were made to the effort factor or its indicators. 
Thus, all latent mean differences and standardized latent difference estimates were equivalent 
across the full scalar and partial scalar invariance models.  
12 Nearly equivalent results are obtained when computing the standardized effect size on 
observed composite effort scores between the retrospective condition and the combined (d = 
0.06) and prospective (d = 0.12) conditions and between the combined and prospective conditions 
(d = 0.17). The equivalency of latent and observed mean differences in effort scores is not 
surprising given the high coefficient alpha values for the effort factor across conditions.  
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the fit of the mediation model within each condition is presented. Finally, the test of the 
invariance of the indirect effect across conditions is presented.  
Descriptive statistics. Given support for measurement invariance across 
conditions, composite effort and importance scores were computed and mediation path 
models were estimated using single-indicator latent variables. Composite importance, 
effort, and NW9 were examined to determine how examinees responded on average and 
the variability in scores around these means (see Table 4). Aligning with the SMM results 
above, average importance and effort composite scores were essentially equivalent across 
conditions and indicated examinees tended to report, on average, moderate importance 
and effort. Given the importance and effort composite scores are on the same metric (i.e., 
5-25), note the relatively higher variability in importance scores. Further, this pattern of 
variability is essentially equivalent across conditions. NW9 composite scores and their 
variability were essentially equivalent across conditions. Consistent with previous 
findings, examinees, on average, correctly responded to approximately 68% of the NW9 
items. Univariate skewness and kurtosis values indicated the importance, effort, and 
NW9 composite scores were essentially univariately normally distributed (Finney, 
DiStefano, & Kopp, 2016). Normalized Mardia’s multivariate kurtosis coefficients of 
3.37, 3.17, and 2.33 for retrospective, combined, and prospective conditions, 
respectively, suggested the importance, effort, and NW9 composite scores could be 
treated as essentially multivariately normally distributed and thus ML estimation was 
employed when estimating the mediation path model. 
Examination of intercorrelations among importance, effort, and NW9 composite 
scores foreshadows the fit of the partial and completely mediated models (see Table 4). 
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As expected, given the hypothesized indirect effect, the relationships between importance 
and effort scores and between effort and NW9 scores were stronger than the relationship 
between importance and NW9 scores across conditions. Thus, it is plausible that the 
completely mediated model will fit the composite scores within each condition. 
Moreover, the correlations between importance, effort, and NW9 scores are essentially 
equivalent across conditions. This finding, coupled with the similar variances for these 
variables, suggests the indirect effect may be invariant across conditions.   
Single-condition analyses. As foreshadowed by the intercorrelations among 
observed variables, complete mediation was supported within each of the three conditions 
(see Table 8). Thus, the relationship between importance and performance is solely 
accounted for by the indirect effect between importance and performance via effort.13  
The direct paths from importance to effort and effort to performance were 
statistically and practically significant (p < .01) across conditions (see top of Figure 9, 
retrospective SOS model). In the retrospective condition, the standardized direct effect 
between perceived importance and effort and effort and test performance is interpreted as 
for every standard deviation unit change in importance, effort increases by .62 standard 
deviation units and for every standard deviation unit change in effort, test performance 
increases by .46 standard deviation units. The variance explained in effort by importance 
(1 - standardized disturbance term) was 39%, 45%, and 34% across retrospective, 
combined, and prospective conditions, respectively. The variance explained in test 
performance by effort was 22%, 17%, and 15% across retrospective, combined, and 
                                                          
13 The nonsignificant 2 value associated with the completely mediated model indicates the 
partial meditation model, which is just-identified, cannot fit significantly better than the 
completely mediated model. 
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prospective conditions, respectively. The essentially equivalent unstandardized direct 
paths and unexplained variances (disturbance terms) across conditions suggest these 
parameter estimates may be invariant across conditions. 
The indirect effects of perceived importance on test performance via examinee 
effort were statistically significant for the retrospective (unstandardized = 0.637, 99% CI 
[0.400, 0.914], standardized = .287), combined (unstandardized = 0.666, 99% CI [0.422, 
0.943], standardized = .280), and prospective (unstandardized = 0.450, 99% CI [0.230, 
0.711], standardized = .223) conditions. The standardized indirect effect can be 
interpreted as for every standard deviation unit change in perceived importance, test 
performance increases by .29 standard deviations in the retrospective condition. As 
indicated by the standardized indirect effects, the practical significance was moderate to 
large in magnitude across conditions (Kenny, 2016; Kenny & Judd, 2014). 
Multiple-condition analyses. Invariance of the parameters estimated in the 
completely mediated model (i.e., direct effects, variances, and unexplained variances) 
were examined across conditions. First, a multiple-condition, unconstrained, completely 
mediated model was estimated using retrospective importance and effort composite 
scores and NW9 scores from the three conditions to obtain baseline global fit indices (see 
Table 8, unconstrained model). Next a multiple-condition, completely mediated model 
was estimated constraining the unstandardized direct paths from perceived importance to 
examinee effort and examinee effort to test performance to be equivalent across 
conditions (see Table 8, constrained direct paths). The constrained unstandardized direct 
paths model fit well and did not fit significantly worse than the unconstrained multiple-
condition model. Finally, in addition to the constrained unstandardized direct paths, the 
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variance of perceived importance and the two unstandardized disturbance variances were 
constrained to be equal across conditions (see Table 8, completely constrained). The 
completely constrained model fit well and did not fit significantly worse than the 
constrained direct paths multiple-condition model. Thus, condition did not moderate the 
interrelationships between perceived importance, examinee effort, and test performance 
or their variances. In short, the simple act of indicating one’s perceived test importance 
and intended effort prior to the test did not influence the interrelationships between 
retrospectively gathered importance and effort scores, and NW9 scores.  
When constrained across conditions, the direct paths from perceived importance 
to examinee effort (b = 0.697, p < .01, β = .627) and from examinee effort to test 
performance (b = 0.846, p < .01, β = .424) were statistically and practically significant. 
When constrained across conditions, the indirect effect of perceived importance on test 
performance via examinee effort was statistically and practically significant 
(unstandardized indirect effect = 0.590, 99% CI [0.450, 0.742], standardized indirect 
effect = .266). When constrained across conditions, the variance explained in effort by 
importance was 40% and the variance explained in performance by effort was 17%. 
Summary of Retrospective Importance and Effort Analyses. No mean 
differences in perceived importance and examinee effort scores were found across 
conditions. Further, the interrelationships between perceived importance, examinee 
effort, and test performance, their variances, and unexplained variances were not 
moderated by test condition. Asking examinees to report their perceived importance and 
intended effort before test completion does not appear to have an effect on average 
importance, effort, or test scores nor their interrelationships. Thus, there is no evidence 
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that behavioral commitment via priming positively impacts importance and effort scores 
or the interrelationships between importance, effort, and test scores.  
The results thus far have not helped elucidate if examinees attribute the cause of 
their test performance to reported importance and effort. Answering the remaining 
research questions may help determine if examinees engage in attributional bias by 
reporting low expended effort to justify their performance on the test.  
Prospective and Retrospective Importance and Effort Analyses  
Recall, research questions three and four utilize a combination of retrospective 
and prospective importance and effort scores across conditions. Retrospective scores 
within the retrospective condition will be free from any influence of priming; thus, there 
is no possibility of behavioral commitment. However, these scores may reflect post-test 
attributions of test performance rather than true perceptions of importance and effort. 
Prospective importance and effort scores in the prospective condition should reflect true 
perceptions of importance and intended effort and will be free from any contamination 
due to attributional bias. Moreover, prospective ratings may induce behavioral 
commitment and influence test performance. Answering these questions may begin to 
uncover the effects of behavioral commitment and attributional bias (see Table 2).  
Research question 3. Do examinees reporting retrospective perceived importance 
and expended effort have lower scores, on average, than examinees reporting prospective 
importance and intended effort for the same test? Whereas results from research question 
one indicated presence or absence of behavioral priming had no effect on retrospective 
importance and effort scores, this comparison will indicate if prospective importance and 
effort scores differ, on average, from retrospective scores. 
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Descriptive statistics. Frequency distributions of importance and effort scores 
indicated all response options (i.e., 1 through 5) were utilized by examinees for each item 
across conditions. Item means ranged between 3.15 and 4.36 across conditions, indicating 
respondents tended to respond neutral to agree to the items (see Table 9). Standard 
deviations ranged between 0.72 and 1.07 across conditions. Item-level skewness and 
kurtosis values were less than |1.60| and |4.34|. Mardia’s normalized multivariate kurtosis 
values of 18.11, 25.66, and 32.77 for retrospective, combined, and prospective conditions 
indicated some multivariate non-normality. Given the small univariate skewness and 
kurtosis values, ML estimation was used for the following analyses. 
Inter-item correlations were examined to foreshadow the fit of the one- and two-
factor models. Importance items were generally more strongly related to each other than 
to effort items and effort items were more strongly related to each other than to 
importance items across conditions. The pattern of inter-item correlations appears to align 
with adequate fit of the two-factor and gross misfit of the one-factor model. Inter-item 
correlations appear to be relatively equivalent across conditions, however, effort item 
seven in the prospective condition (“After taking this test, I expect I could have worked 
harder on it.”) has relatively small correlations with the importance items. This suggests 
possible metric noninvariance across conditions. As reported above, importance item 
three tended to relate more strongly to importance items four and eight and less strongly 
to importance item five than to other importance items across conditions. This pattern of 
correlations associated with item three suggests item three may be problematic when 
fitting the two-factor model to scores across conditions. 
104 
 
 
    
 
Measurement invariance across conditions. As found in the retrospective CFA 
analyses and foreshadowed by the pattern of inter-item correlations, model-data fit 
indices indicated gross misfit of the one-factor model fit to retrospective importance and 
effort scores within the retrospective condition, prospective importance and retrospective 
effort scores within the combined condition, and prospective importance and effort scores 
within the prospective condition (see Table 10). As foreshadowed by relatively larger 
inter-item correlations associated with importance item three, large, positive correlation 
residuals indicated the model underestimated the relationship importance items three and 
four across conditions (.20, .17, .16) and underestimated the relationship between 
importance items three and eight in the prospective condition (.15).  
To account for the shared variance, the two-factor model was estimated with error 
covariances between importance item three and importance items four and eight. As 
expected, the two-factor model with two error covariances fit the importance and effort 
scores significantly better than the two-factor model without error covariances (see Table 
10). The residual correlations between items three and eight were statistically significant 
and moderate in size across conditions (.38, 22, 47) as were the residual correlations for 
items three and four (.30, .21, .24). Within the retrospective condition, a correlation 
residual between importance item eight and effort item ten (.16) indicated the model 
underestimated this relationship and within the prospective condition, a correlation 
residual between effort item seven and importance item one (-.15) indicated the model 
overestimated this relationship. Given 99% of the correlation residuals were less than 
|.10| and global model-data fit indices were adequate within each condition, the two-
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factor model with error covariances between importance item three and importance items 
four and eight model was determined to fit the data well.  
Given adequate model-data fit of the two-factor model with two error 
covariances, the factor correlation, factor pattern coefficients, variance explained, and 
reliability estimates were examined. The correlation between importance and effort 
factors measured after test completion within the retrospective condition (r = .69) was 
similar in magnitude to the correlation between the importance and effort factors 
measured prior to test completion within the prospective condition (r = .65). The 
correlation between the importance factor measured before test completion and the effort 
factor measured after test completion in the combined condition (r = .51) was relatively 
smaller in magnitude. The standardized factor pattern coefficients associated with the 
importance factor were generally small (< .70), with the exception of item one (> .80; see 
Table 11 for unstandardized and standardized factor pattern coefficients). The importance 
factor explained, on average, 37%, 38%, and 40% of the variance in the items for the 
retrospective, combined, and prospective conditions, respectively. Thus, measurement 
error accounts for greater than 50% of the variance in the importance items. The effort 
factor explained an average of 54%, 56%, and 50% of the variance in the items for the 
retrospective, combined, and prospective conditions, respectively. Estimates of reliability 
of both subscale scores indicated reliability was adequate across conditions (see Table 4). 
With the exception of the factor pattern coefficient associated with effort item seven in 
the prospective condition, the unstandardized factor pattern coefficients were relatively 
equivalent across conditions, which foreshadows measurement invariance discussed now. 
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A multiple-condition configural two-factor model with error covariances was 
estimated to obtain baseline global-fit indices. Given configural invariance was 
supported, metric invariance was tested. As foreshadowed by the smaller unstandardized 
factor pattern coefficient associated with effort item seven in the prospective condition, 
the metric invariant model with error covariances fit statistically and practically 
significantly worse than the configural model (see Table 10). Large correlation residuals 
(-.24 and -.17) associated with effort item seven and importance item one and four, 
respectively, indicated the model overestimated the relationships. This is not surprising, 
given the near zero correlations associated with item seven and the importance items.  
Given metric noninvariance, a partial metric invariance model was examined by 
freely estimating the unstandardized factor pattern coefficient associated with effort item 
seven in the prospective condition. The partial metric invariance model did not fit the 
data statistically significantly worse than the configural model. Two correlations 
residuals remained, one between effort item seven and importance item one (-.16) and 
one between importance item eight and effort item ten (.19).  
Given 99% of the correlation residuals were less than |.10| and global model-data 
fit indices were adequate, a partial scalar invariance model with no constraints on effort 
item seven’s unstandardized factor pattern coefficient or intercept in the prospective 
condition was estimated. The partial scalar invariant model fit the data well, but fit 
statistically significantly worse than the partial metric invariant model (see Table 9). All 
importance and effort items had nonsignificant standardized mean residuals and the 
largest unstandardized mean residual was |.06|. Given the mean residual was 1/100 of the 
5-point response scale, the mean residual appears to be negligible.  
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Latent mean differences. Given partial scalar invariance, latent mean differences 
were estimated. Average retrospective importance scores from the retrospective condition 
were not statistically significantly different than average prospective importance scores 
from the combined ( = 0.03, t = 0.49, p > .01) or prospective conditions ( = 0.07, t = 
1.27, p > .01). The combined condition latent mean was not statistically significantly 
different than the prospective condition latent mean ( = 0.10, t = 1.70, p > .01). 
Moreover, the standardized latent mean difference in importance scores between the 
retrospective and combined (d = 0.04) and prospective (d = 0.11) conditions and between 
the combined and prospective conditions (d = 0.15) were not practically significant.14 
With respect to examinee effort scores, prospective intended effort scores from 
the prospective condition were statistically significantly higher than retrospective 
expended effort scores from the retrospective ( = 0.28, t = 5.60, p < .01) and combined 
( = 0.31, t = 6.52, p < .01) conditions. Moreover, the standardized latent mean 
differences indicated the prospective condition latent prospective effort scores were 
approximately one-half of a standard deviation larger than the retrospective effort scores 
from the retrospective (d = 0.45) and combined (d = 0.51) conditions. The retrospective 
                                                          
14 Practically similar results are obtained when computing the standardized effect size on 
observed composite importance scores between the retrospective condition and the combined (d = 
0.02) and prospective (d = 0.08) conditions and between the combined and prospective conditions 
(d = 0.06). The equivalency of latent and observed composite mean differences in importance 
scores is not surprising given the relatively high coefficient alpha values for the importance factor 
across conditions.  
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condition latent mean was not statistically or practically significantly different than the 
combined condition ( = 0.04, t = 0.78, p > .01; d = 0.06).15  
The results partially support the hypothesis that average prospective importance 
and effort scores would be higher in the prospective condition. Recall, results of research 
question one indicated no differences in average retrospective importance and effort 
scores across conditions after asking examinees to engage in reporting their perceived 
importance and intended effort. In contrast, results associated with question three indicate 
prospective effort scores are higher than retrospective effort scores across conditions. 
Thus, retrospective effort scores may be affected by attributional bias, but, importantly 
these results indicate completion of the test negatively influences ratings of effort. Next, I 
will examine if the interrelationships between importance, effort, and performance also 
depend on whether examinees experience of the test or not.  
Research question 4. Does the theoretically and empirically suggested indirect 
effect of perceived test importance on test performance via examinee effort differ 
depending on if examinees report importance and effort prospectively versus 
retrospectively? Whereas research question two indicated the indirect effect estimated 
from retrospective importance and effort scores was not influenced by merely asking 
examinees to engage in prospective ratings of importance and effort, this comparison will 
indicate if the indirect effect depends on when importance and effort are measured 
relative to test completion. Descriptive statistics are presented to foreshadow the fit of the 
                                                          
15 Nearly equivalent results are obtained when computing the standardized effect size between 
observed prospective effort scores in the prospective condition and retrospective effort scores in 
the retrospective (d = 0.39) and combined (d = 0.45) conditions and between retrospective effort 
scores in the retrospective and combined (d = 0.06) conditions. The equivalency of latent and 
observed mean differences in effort scores is not surprising given the high coefficient alpha 
values for the effort factor across conditions.  
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mediation model. Then, the fit of the mediation model within each condition is presented. 
Finally, the invariance test of the indirect effect across conditions is presented. 
Descriptive statistics. Given support for measurement invariance across 
conditions, effort and importance scores were computed and mediation path models were 
estimated using single-indicator latent variables (see Table 4). As indicated by the SMM 
results, average importance scores were essentially equivalent across conditions. 
However, prospective effort scores were higher than retrospective scores. Importance and 
effort scores indicated examinees tended to report, on average, moderate importance and 
effort. Importance scores had similar variability across conditions (SDs = 3.23, 3.33, 
3.30). Interestingly, prospective effort scores in the prospective condition had less 
variability (SD = 2.87) than retrospective effort scores in the retrospective and combined 
conditions (SDs = 3.61, 3.58).16 Total NW9 scores and their variability were essentially 
equivalent across conditions. Univariate skewness and kurtosis values indicated the 
importance, effort, and NW9 composite scores were essentially univariately normally 
distributed. Normalized Mardia’s multivariate kurtosis coefficients of 3.37, 4.49, and 
2.67 for retrospective, combined, and prospective conditions, respectively, suggested data 
could be treated as essentially multivariately normally distributed and thus ML estimation 
was employed when estimating the mediation path model. 
                                                          
16 A formal test of the equivalence of the variance in effort scores was performed by estimating a 
multiple-condition 2-factor CFA metric invariance model with error covariances (RQ 4). 
Constraining the effort factor variance to be equal across conditions resulted in statistically 
significantly worse fit than constraining the effort factor variance to be equal in the retrospective 
and combined conditions (retrospective effort scores) and freely estimating it in the prospective 
condition (prospective effort scores), 2(1) = 12.54. Thus, the variance in prospective effort 
scores was statistically significantly less than the variance in retrospective effort scores. 
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Examination of importance, effort, and NW9 intercorrelations foreshadows the fit 
of the completely mediated models within each condition (see Table 4). As expected, the 
relationships between importance and effort scores and effort and NW9 were stronger 
than the relationship between importance and NW9 scores within each condition. Thus, it 
is plausible that the completely mediated model will fit the scores within each condition.  
Single-condition analyses. As foreshadowed by the intercorrelations, complete 
mediation was supported across the three conditions (see Table 12). The direct paths from 
importance to effort and effort to performance were statistically (p < .01) and practically 
significant across conditions (see Figure 9). The variance explained in examinee effort by 
importance was 39%, 28%, and 27% across retrospective, combined, and prospective 
conditions, respectively. The variance explained in test performance by effort was 22%, 
18%, and 7% across retrospective, combined, and prospective conditions, respectively.  
Recall the indirect effect of retrospective importance on performance via 
retrospective effort was statistically significant for the retrospective condition 
(unstandardized = 0.637, 99% CI [0.400, 0.914], standardized = .287). The indirect effect 
of prospective importance on performance via retrospective effort was significant for the 
combined condition (unstandardized = 0.534, 99% CI [0.325, 0.783], standardized = 
.224). The indirect effect of prospective importance on performance via prospective 
effort was significant for the prospective condition (unstandardized = 0.338, 99% CI 
[0.096, 0.617], standardized = .156). As indicated by the standardized indirect effects, the 
practical significance ranged from large to medium in magnitude across conditions. 
These differences in the standardized indirect effect reflect the significantly smaller 
variance in prospective effort scores in the prospective condition than in the retrospective 
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and combined conditions. Moreover, the smaller variance in prospective effort scores 
leads to a smaller correlation between effort and NW9 scores in the prospective condition 
than in the retrospective and combined conditions (see Table 4). This difference in 
unexplained effort variance in the prospective condition suggests possible noninvariance.   
Multiple-condition analyses. Invariance of the parameters estimated in the 
completely mediated model were examined across conditions. First, a multiple-condition, 
unconstrained, completely mediated model was estimated to obtain baseline fit indices 
using: retrospective importance and effort scores from the retrospective condition, 
prospective importance and retrospective effort scores from the combined condition, and 
prospective importance and effort scores from the prospective condition (see Table 12, 
unconstrained model). A multiple-condition, completely mediated model was then 
estimated constraining the unstandardized direct paths from importance to effort and 
effort to performance to be equivalent across conditions (see Table 12, constrained direct 
paths). The constrained unstandardized direct paths model fit well and did not fit 
significantly worse than the unconstrained model. Next, in addition to the constrained 
unstandardized direct paths, the variance of importance and the two unstandardized 
disturbance variances were constrained to be equal across conditions (see Table 12, 
completely constrained). The completely constrained model fit the data adequately, but 
did fit significantly worse than the constrained direct paths multiple-condition model.  
Recall the prospective effort variance was significantly smaller than the 
retrospective variance. Thus, given importance has an equal unstandardized effect on 
effort across conditions, the unexplained variance (disturbance) has to differ across 
conditions. That is, there is less effort variance to be explained, therefore less 
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unexplained variance. Given effort’s relatively smaller unstandardized disturbance 
variance in the prospective condition (see bottom of Figure 9), a multiple-condition 
model was estimated allowing effort’s disturbance variance to be freely estimated for the 
prospective condition. The partially constrained model allowing effort’s disturbance to be 
freely estimated in the prospective condition fit the data well and did not fit significantly 
worse than the constrained direct paths multiple-condition model. Thus, condition did not 
moderate the unstandardized relationships between importance, effort, and performance, 
but did moderate the variance explained in effort in the prospective condition.  
When constrained across conditions, the direct paths from importance to effort (b 
= 0.624, p < .01, β = .541) and from effort to performance (b = 0.820, p < .01, β = .414) 
were statistically and practically significant. When constrained across conditions, the 
indirect effect of importance on performance via effort was statistically and practically 
significant (unstandardized indirect effect = 0.512, 99% CI [0.380, 0.657], standardized 
indirect effect = .224). Although the unstandardized indirect effect is invariant across 
conditions, the relatively smaller effort variance in the prospective condition results in an 
overestimation of the standardized indirect effect in the prospective condition when 
estimating the partially constrained model. When unstandardized direct paths and 
variances (effort’s disturbance freely estimated in prospective condition) were 
constrained across conditions, the variance explained in effort was 29% in the 
retrospective and combined conditions and 44% in the prospective condition. The 
variance explained in performance by effort was 17% in the retrospective and combined 
conditions and 12% in the prospective conditions. 
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Summary of Prospective and Retrospective Importance and Effort Analyses. 
Examinees did not report different levels of prospective and retrospective perceived 
importance across conditions, yet examinees tended to report lower retrospective effort 
than prospective effort. The unstandardized interrelationships between perceived 
importance, examinee effort, and test performance were not moderated by the timing of 
measurement of importance and effort. However, given the variance in effort not 
explained by importance was smaller in the prospective condition, the standardized 
interrelationships between importance, effort, and performance differed depending on 
when effort was measured relative to test completion. Thus, when examinee effort is 
measured relative to test completion appears to influence average levels of effort and its 
standardized interrelationships with importance and performance.  
Changes in Test Importance and Effort Scores 
Change in perceived importance and effort from before to after test completion 
was modeled using prospective and retrospective importance and effort scores collected 
from examinees in the prospective condition. Latent mean change in importance and 
effort scores from before to after test completion was estimated after establishing 
longitudinal measurement invariance (research question 5). Given individual differences 
in change in importance and change in effort, I examined if test performance predicted 
change in examinees’ reported importance and effort (research question 6).  
Research question 5. Do examinees completing both prospective and 
retrospective measures report different levels of prospective perceived importance and 
examinee effort, on average, than retrospective importance and effort? Examinees may 
make post-test attributions (e.g., low expended effort, disinterest in test) to explain their 
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test performance. Consequently, lower retrospective importance and effort scores may 
result in substantially more examinees being removed when employing motivation 
filtering procedures than when using prospectively measured importance and effort 
scores. Likewise, a simple description of the level of examinee motivation may be 
dramatically different when the description is based on average prospective versus 
retrospective importance and effort scores.  
Recall the two-factor model with error covariances between importance items 
three and four and three and eight was fit individually to prospective importance and 
effort scores (research question 3) and retrospective importance and effort scores 
(research question 1) within the prospective condition (see Tables 6 and 10). To assess 
change in ratings from before to after the test, this two-factor model was now fit 
simultaneously to prospective and retrospective importance and effort scores within the 
prospective condition utilizing LMACS analysis (see Table 13). Corresponding item-
level error covariances were modeled across the two time points, and importance items 
three, four, and eight were allowed to covary within as well as across time. The 
configural model fit the data well globally (see Table 14). Examination of correlations 
residuals revealed the model overestimated the correlation (|.15|) between prospective 
importance item one (“Doing well on this test is important to me.”) and prospective effort 
item seven (“After taking this test, I expect could have worked harder on it.”). Given 
adequate model-data fit of the configural model, the unstandardized factor pattern 
coefficients were examined (see Table 15). With the exception of importance item eight, 
the unstandardized factor pattern coefficients were roughly equivalent across time points.  
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As foreshadowed by examination of the unstandardized factor pattern 
coefficients, the metric invariance model did not fit the scores well globally or locally 
(see Table 14). Examination of correlation residuals revealed five residuals greater than 
|.15| and one correlation residual of |.20|, three of which were associated with importance 
item eight. Given the large correlation residuals and discrepancy in unstandardized factor 
pattern coefficients across time associated with importance item eight, a partial metric 
invariance model was estimated freeing the equality constraint imposed on importance 
item eight’s unstandardized factor pattern coefficient. The partial metric model fit the 
data significantly better globally and locally. Examination of correlation residuals 
revealed two residuals greater than |.15|. The pattern of correlation residuals did not 
indicate an apparent reason for metric noninvariance; thus, each item was tested for 
noninvariance by individually releasing each item’s factor pattern coefficient equality 
constraint. None of the remaining items were associated with significant misfit when the 
item’s factor pattern coefficient equality constraint was released across time, in addition, 
no large residuals appeared when applying the constraint.  
 Given partial metric invariance was supported, partial scalar invariance was 
examined. The partial scalar invariant model with no factor loading or intercept equality 
constraints on importance item eight fit the data well globally and locally. Given the 
partial scalar invariance model fit statistically significantly worse than the partial metric 
invariance model, local misfit was assessed. All importance and effort items had 
nonsignificant standardized mean residuals and the largest unstandardized mean residual 
was |.10|. Given the metric of the items (1 to 5), the size of the mean residual is 
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negligible. Thus, partial scalar invariance was supported and latent mean change in effort 
and importance was estimated.  
Latent mean change. The average prospectively measured perceived importance 
latent score was not statistically significantly different than the average retrospectively 
measured importance latent score ( = -0.03, t = 1.07, p > .01). Moreover, the 
standardized latent mean change in importance (d = 0.13) was not practically significant. 
On average, latent importance scores decreased 0.13 standard deviation units from before 
to after test completion.17 Average prospectively measured examinee effort was 
statistically and practically significantly higher than the average retrospectively measured 
examinee effort ( = 0.21, t = 6.00, p < .01). On average, latent examinee effort scores 
decreased 0.41 standard deviation units from before to after test completion.18  
Thus, contrary to my prediction, importance scores did not change from before to 
after test completion. However, aligning with my prediction, retrospectively measured 
effort scores were statistically and practically significantly lower than prospectively 
measured effort scores, suggesting that examinees may attribute the cause of their test 
performance to lack of expended effort.  
Latent score stability. Stability of importance and effort scores over time was 
assessed (test-retest reliability). The latent correlation between prospective and 
                                                          
17 Practically similar results were obtained when computing the standardized effect size between 
observed composite prospective and retrospective importance scores (d = 0.03). The equivalency 
of latent and observed composite mean differences in importance scores over time is not 
surprising given the relatively high coefficient alpha values for the importance factor over time.  
 
18 Practically similar results were obtained when computing the standardized effect size between 
observed composite prospective and retrospective effort scores (d = 0.32). The equivalency of 
latent and observed composite mean differences in effort scores over time is not surprising given 
the relatively high coefficient alpha values for the effort factor over time.  
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retrospective perceived importance scores was .90, which indicates examinees tend to 
stay in the same relative rank-order from before to after test completion. The latent 
correlation between prospective and retrospective examinee effort scores was .67, which 
indicates examines tend to change relative rank-order from before to after test 
completion. Given the variability in the way examinees change their ratings over time, I 
will next examine this variability in change in effort and if this change can be predicted 
by test performance.   
Research question 6. Is change in importance or effort related to performance on 
the test? Attributional bias may serve as a self-protective mechanism to a greater degree 
for examinees who perform poorly on the test than for examinees who perform well on 
the test. Thus, examinees who perform poorly may tend to decrease their reported 
importance and effort from before to after test completion to a greater extent than 
examinees who perform well on the test.  
The LMACS model was reparameterized as a simultaneous growth model to 
obtain the variance in importance and effort latent change scores. Given the variability in 
latent importance and effort change scores was significantly different from zero (0.11 and 
0.26), a conditional simultaneous growth model with a time-invariant latent test 
performance (NW9) predictor was estimated to potentially explain this variability (see 
Figure 10). Global fit indices indicated the model fit the data adequately; thus, parameter 
estimates were examined.  
  Test performance did not statistically significantly predict change in importance 
(see Figure 11; b = 0.02, p > .01; R2 < .01), or change in effort (see Figure 12; b = 0.15, p 
> .01; R2 = .03). Thus, examinees who performed poorer on the test did not change their 
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importance or effort ratings differently than examinees who performed better on the test. 
Test performance statistically significantly predicted baseline (prospective) effort scores 
(b = 0.21, p < .01; R2 = .05). This relationship can be interpreted as, for every 10 unit 
(correct item) increase in test performance, examinees increased their effort ratings (1-5 
scale) by an average of 0.21 units.19 Test performance did not statistically significantly 
predict prospective importance scores (b = 0.14, p > .01; R2 = .02). 
Contrary to my hypothesis, change in importance and effort scores is not related 
to test performance. However, change in importance had a moderate to strong 
relationship with change in effort, even after controlling for test performance (partial r = 
.66). There was a nonsignificant decrease in average importance ratings over time (Mslope 
= -0.03) and a significant decrease in effort ratings (Mslope = -0.21). Thus, a positive 
relationship between change importance and effort can be interpreted as examinees’ 
importance ratings decreased over time, their effort ratings decreased over time.  
Test Performance Differences: Research question 7.  
Does test performance differ, on average, as a function of measurement 
condition? A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the 
relationship between test scores and condition (retrospective, combined, and prospective). 
The test scores were statistically significantly different across conditions, F(2, 1142) = 
6.40, p = .002. However, only 1% of the variance in test scores (2 = .01) could be 
accounted for by condition. Tukey HSD post hoc analyses were conducted to evaluate 
mean differences across pairs of conditions. The average total test score in the 
                                                          
19 Estimation problems arose due to differences in the metric of NW9 composite scores (0-66) 
and importance and effort item scores (1-5). Therefore, the model was estimated after the total 
NW9 composite scores were scaled by a factor of 10 (0-6.6).  
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prospective condition was statistically significantly higher than the average score in the 
retrospective condition, t(706) = 3.46, p = .002 (see Table 4 for means and standard 
deviations). Average prospective condition test scores were 0.26 standard deviations 
higher than retrospective condition test scores (d = 0.26, using the pooled standard 
deviation). The arguably negligible unstandardized effect size of an approximately two 
point difference in observed average test scores between these two conditions further 
indicates the small effect. Average test scores in the combined condition were not 
statistically or practically significantly different than average test scores in the 
retrospective, t(835) = 2.42, p = .042, d = 0.17, or prospective conditions, t(743) = 1.29, p 
= .401, d = 0.10. Thus, the hypothesis that test performance in the prospective condition 
would be higher than scores in the retrospective and combined conditions was supported, 
yet, the effect of condition on test performance was small. Given prior math ability—as 
measured by SAT math scores—was essentially equivalent across conditions, behavioral 
priming may have a small effect on examinees’ test performance.  
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Chapter V 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to empirically examine the differential effects of 
measuring perceived importance and examinee effort before and after test completion. 
The results in light of previous research and implications are discussed below. 
Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research are then discussed. 
No Impact of Behavioral Commitment on Retrospective Importance and Effort  
Measurement invariance and no average differences across conditions. On 
average, do examinees report different levels of retrospectively measured perceived test 
importance and expended effort across conditions that primed or did not prime behavioral 
commitment? Prior to evaluating average differences of importance and effort scores 
across conditions, measurement invariance (i.e., configural, metric, scalar, and 
measurement error invariance) was established for the scores across conditions. The SOS 
appears to be measuring the same construct in the same way across three independent 
conditions. Importantly, this study is the first to evaluate the measurement error 
invariance of the SOS. Measurement error invariance is of practical importance because 
it allows for one to make comparisons of observed score differences across groups 
(Millsap & Meredith, 2007). The measurement error invariance of the retrospective SOS 
coupled with the practically equivalent latent and observed mean differences of 
retrospective importance and effort scores found in this study provide further justification 
for researchers and testing practitioners to utilize and compare observed SOS scores. 
These measurement invariance results add to previous research on the test-specific 
retrospective SOS (e.g., Finney, Mathers, & Myers, 2016).  
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Contrary to my hypothesis, there were no statistically or practically significant 
differences in average levels of retrospective importance or effort scores across the three 
measurement conditions. Recall, examinees in the retrospective condition were not asked 
to engage in reporting their perceived importance or intended effort before test 
completion. Thus, these retrospective importance and effort scores are theoretically free 
of the effects of behavioral commitment. Comparing scores from the retrospective 
condition to the other conditions allows for an explicit test of the effect of the presence or 
absence of behavioral priming on average retrospective importance and effort scores and 
their variability. Given average levels and variability in importance and effort scores 
were essentially equivalent across conditions, behavioral commitment did not appear to 
have any influence on or mitigate a possible effect of attributional bias on average ratings 
of retrospective importance or effort. These results imply examinees may attribute the 
cause of their performance equivalently in the presence and absence of behavioral 
priming. Thus, contrary to previous research, reporting behavioral intentions before the 
test did not appear to influence later behavior or attitudes as operationalized by self-
reported expended effort and perceived test importance (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2000).  
The implications of these results for testing practice are clear. Unfortunately, 
developing potential motivation interventions aimed at increasing effort put forth on a 
test via priming mechanisms may not have the desired result of increasing the level of 
retrospective ratings of expended effort and thus increasing the level of test performance. 
Although examinees asked to report their perceived importance and intended effort 
before the test did not did not differ in their reported levels of expended effort from 
examinees who only reported effort after the test, it may be prudent for researchers to 
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explore other behavioral priming interventions that may be more salient to examinees, 
which may in turn have a stronger impact on examinee behavior. For example, rather 
than having examinees state their intentions by responding to vague statements (e.g., “I 
will give my best effort on this test”), having examinees more explicitly state the how, 
when, or why they intend to reach their goal (e.g., “Because this test is important, I am 
going to try hard on every question;” Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). 
No difference in indirect effect across conditions. Is the indirect effect of 
retrospectively measured perceived test importance on test performance via 
retrospectively measured examinee effort affected by asking examinees to rate their 
perceived importance and intended effort before test completion? As hypothesized, the 
completely mediated model fit the scores within each condition. However, contrary to my 
hypothesis, the magnitude of the unstandardized and standardized indirect effects was 
essentially equivalent across conditions and was similar in magnitude to the indirect 
effect found in previous studies (e.g., Cole et al., 2008; Penk & Schipolowski, 2015).  
This finding extends previous research uncovering the stability of the indirect 
effect of importance on performance across college students taking math and science tests 
(e.g., Cole et al., 2008; Penk & Schipolowski, 2015; Zilberberg et al., 2014) and across 
test instruction conditions (e.g., Myers et al., 2016). Given the extent to which examinees 
perceive low-stakes tests as important directly influences effort put forth on tests, which, 
in turn, directly influences test performance remains unchanged in the presence or 
absence of behavioral priming, EV theory remains a useful framework to explain the 
variability in motivation and variability in test scores in low-stakes testing contexts (Wise 
& DeMars, 2005; Wolf & Smith, 1995). Considering the Standards’ recommendation to 
123 
 
 
    
 
interpret test scores in light of information that may result in inaccurate interpretations of 
test scores (AERA, APA, & NCME, 2014), it is imperative that researchers consider 
importance and effort when examining factors that may influence test performance on 
low-stakes tests. Another implication of this finding is that behavioral priming may not 
be an effective motivation intervention for increasing test performance via increasing 
retrospectively reported test importance and expended effort. That is, asking examinees 
to report their perceived importance and intended effort before the test does not increase 
average retrospective importance and effort, nor does it increase the strength of the 
relationships between retrospective importance, effort, and test performance.  
Differences in Prospectively and Retrospectively Measured Effort  
Measurement invariance and differences in effort across conditions. Do 
examinees reporting retrospective importance and effort have lower scores, on average, 
than examinees reporting prospective importance and effort for the same test? Prior to 
evaluating average differences of importance and effort ratings across conditions, 
measurement invariance was established for prospective and retrospective scores across 
conditions. The test-specific prospective SOS functioned well in terms of structure, 
reliability, and scaling relative to the test-specific retrospective SOS. These results have 
an important implication for practice. Given its psychometric properties, the prospective 
SOS provides researchers and testing practitioners a viable option for measuring 
importance and effort prior to test completion. Moreover, invariance in the scaling of the 
prospective and retrospective measures enables comparisons of prospective and 
retrospective importance and effort scores. One caveat is that future research should 
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evaluate the functioning of effort item seven from the prospective SOS. If noninvariance 
of effort item seven scores replicates, revision of the item may be necessary. 
As hypothesized, average levels of prospective effort scores from the prospective 
condition were statistically and practically significantly higher than retrospective effort 
scores from the retrospective and combined conditions. However, there were no 
significant differences in average levels of importance scores across conditions. The 
finding of lower average retrospective effort ratings is not surprising given effort is a 
common attribution of performance in academic settings (Dong et al., 2013; Perry et al., 
2008); thus, these findings support this research showing this effect.  
Given prospective and retrospective importance scores are essentially 
interchangeable with respect to average levels and their interrelationships with effort and 
test performance, a practical implication of no difference in prospective and retrospective 
importance scores is that researchers need not be concerned with when importance data is 
collected relative to test completion. Thus, testing practitioners can collect importance 
data when it is most convenient.  
In contrast, significant implications associated with measurement of examinee 
effort arise. First, broadly speaking, it does matter when examinee effort is measured 
relative to test completion. More specifically, depending on when effort data is collected, 
researchers and testing practitioners may arrive at different substantive conclusions when 
employing motivation filtering techniques (e.g., Swerdzewski et al., 2011). Specifically, 
assuming the same cut point is used regardless of when effort scores are collected, 
filtering examinee data using prospective effort scores would result in removal of fewer 
examinees from the data set, some of which may not have put forth effort when 
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completing the test. As a result, test scores may be negatively biased (Wise et al., 2006). 
Thus, given the high-stakes nature of inferences institutions make from low-stakes test 
scores, one cannot infer that intended effort equates to expended effort. In fact, these 
results indicate intended effort may be an overestimate of expended effort, which should 
be mentioned by testing practitioners when interpreting test scores.  
Smaller standardized indirect effect modeling prospective importance and 
effort. Does the theoretically and empirically suggested indirect effect of perceived 
importance on test performance via examinee effort differ depending on if examinees 
report importance and effort prospectively versus retrospectively? As hypothesized, the 
completely mediated model fit the scores within each condition. The unstandardized 
indirect effect was statistically equivalent when modeling prospective scores and 
retrospective scores. With respect to the equivalent unstandardized indirect effect, this 
finding extends previous research (e.g., Penk & Schipolowski, 2015) by demonstrating 
the unstandardized indirect effect is stable when importance and effort are measured 
prospectively and retrospectively. A major implication of this finding concerns the 
reporting and interpretation of the indirect effect. Researchers and testing practitioners 
may use prospective and retrospective importance and effort scores interchangeably when 
one is concerned with the unstandardized indirect effect. 
However, prospective and retrospective importance and effort scores are not 
interchangeable when one is concerned with the standardized indirect effect. The 
difference in the magnitude of the standardized indirect effect when using prospective 
effort scores (.16) versus retrospective scores (.29) is not ignorable. This difference can 
be explained as follows. As expected, retrospectively rated effort scores (SD = 3.60) were 
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more variable than prospectively rated effort scores (SD = 2.87). Given the 
unstandardized relationship between importance and effort was statistically equivalent 
across conditions, importance explains essentially equivalent amounts of variance in both 
prospective and retrospective effort. As such, equal variance explained in prospective and 
retrospective effort scores coupled with less total variance in prospective versus 
retrospective scores necessitates less unexplained variance in prospective effort scores 
and more unexplained variance in retrospective effort scores. The increase in variability 
in retrospective effort scores could be a function of variables in addition to importance 
influencing retrospective effort scores and thus the inclusion of those variables in a model 
would explain this additional variability. On the other hand, the increase in variability in 
retrospective effort scores could be random measurement error and if so, the unexplained 
variance would remain unexplained with the inclusion of additional variables. 
As illustrated by Pedhazur (1997), and consistent with these findings, holding all 
else equal, decreased variability in a predictor (i.e., prospective effort in this case) results 
in an attenuated standardized effect on the outcome (i.e., test performance) and a smaller 
proportion of variance explained in the outcome (i.e., R2). This finding becomes 
perplexing when considered in terms of motivation interventions. The smaller 
standardized indirect effect for the prospective condition may lead one to believe the 
manipulation of intended effort via importance may be less beneficial than for the 
retrospective condition. However, the difference in variability of prospective effort scores 
(smaller) compared to retrospective effort scores (larger) must be taken into account 
when interpreting this standardized indirect effect.  
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Changes in Effort Scores Due to Experiencing the Test 
Lower retrospective effort than prospective effort. Do examinees completing 
both prospective and retrospective measures report different levels of prospective 
perceived importance and examinee effort, on average, than retrospective importance and 
effort? Contrary to my hypothesis, average prospective and retrospective importance 
scores were not significantly different. Thus, researchers and testing practitioners need 
not be concerned about when importance data is collected relative to test completion. In 
contrast, consistent with the findings of lower average retrospective than prospective 
effort scores from the cross-condition comparison (research question 3), examinees tend 
to report lower average retrospective effort than prospective effort. Accordingly, it 
clearly matters when examinee effort data is collected relative to test completion.   
This conclusion has serious implications for researchers and testing practitioners 
who make decisions based on effort scores. For example, researchers applying motivation 
filtering techniques have filtered out examinee data associated with SOS effort scores less 
than thirteen (Liu et al., 2015; Rios et al., 2014; Wise & Kong, 2005), fourteen (Hathcoat, 
et al., 2015), and fifteen (Swerdzewski et al., 2011; Wise et al., 2006). As discussed 
above, motivation filtering based on higher average prospective effort scores may result 
in removal of less examinee data and, therefore, may negatively bias test scores (Wise et 
al., 2006). Thus, different conclusions will be made depending on when effort is 
measured relative to test completion. A possible explanation as to why effort decreases 
after the test is because examinees may tend to overestimate their ability when reporting 
intended effort before the test. Recall, EV theory posits expectancy of success on a task 
influences effort put forth on a task. As such, examinees’ intended effort ratings may be a 
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proxy for their expectancy of success on the test. After experiencing the rigor of the test, 
examinees may tend to decrease the effort they put forth on the test. Thus, it may be that 
examinees truly decrease their expended effort throughout the test.  
Another serious implication for testing practitioners is the lack of stability of 
effort scores from before to after the test. Given examinees tend to change relative rank-
order of effort scores from before to after test completion, motivation filtering may result 
in different examinees filtered out of the data set depending on when effort is measured 
relative to test completion. Thus, testing practitioners cannot be sure if examinees 
removed from the data set are truly amotivated or if examinees are being removed for 
factors unrelated to examinee motivation.  
It is also important to consider the differences in variability associated with 
prospective and retrospective effort scores. Recall, intended effort scores measured 
before the test had significantly less variability than expended effort scores measured 
after the test. The relatively smaller amount of variability in intended effort may be 
because intended effort is more representative of examinees’ true effort (i.e., less 
measurement error), whereas the larger amount of variability in retrospective effort 
scores may be a sign of increased random and systematic measurement error. 
Nonetheless, given the relationship is stronger between test performance and 
retrospective scores than prospective scores, it may be that retrospective scores are more 
aligned with examinees’ true effort put forth on the test than prospective scores.  
No effect of test performance on change in importance or effort. Are changes 
in perceived importance and examinee effort related to performance on the quantitative 
and scientific reasoning test? Recall, I hypothesized that examinees who perform 
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relatively poorly on the test may be more susceptible to the effect of attributional bias on 
retrospective importance and effort scores (Perry et al., 2008), whereas this bias may be 
nil for examinees who perform relatively well. Contrary to my hypothesis, test 
performance was not significantly related to change in importance or effort over time.  
It is important to note the nonsignificant relationship between test performance 
and change in effort does not indicate test performance is not related to effort at a single 
time point. Instead, the nonsignificant relationship indicates the rate of change does not 
depend on test performance. In other words, change in effort (average decrease of effort 
ratings) is essentially the same across all levels of test performance. Thus, contrary to the 
assertion that examinees make self-protective post-test attributions to explain their test 
performance (e.g., Dong et al., 2013; Pekrun, et al., 2004; Perry et al., 2008), examinees 
who performed poorly did not attribute their performance to expended effort 
differentially than examinees who did not perform poorly.   
These findings have several implications for researchers and test practitioners. 
Given change in importance and effort scores is not related to test performance, we can 
be reassured that retrospective ratings are not biased due to self-protective attributions of 
test performance. However, given differences in average levels of effort, variability of 
effort ratings from before to after the test, and lack of stability of these ratings, further 
research is needed to examine the cause of this variability. One such factor that may 
explain this variability in change in effort is expectancy of success. Although actual test 
performance was not related to change in importance or effort scores, perhaps examinees’ 
perceptions of competence can explain this variability in change in effort ratings. 
Examinees’ perceptions of their test performance may not be aligned with their actual test 
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performance. It may be that examinees who tend to decrease their effort ratings from 
before to after the test perceived their performance to be poorer and examinees who tend 
to rate their effort equivalently from before to after the test perceived their performance 
to be better. Thus, future research should evaluate if examinees’ perceptions of success 
account for the variability in change in effort.  
Small Difference in Test Performance across Conditions 
Does average test performance differ as a function of measurement condition? 
Recall, examinees in the retrospective condition were not asked to engage in reporting 
perceived importance or intended effort, examinees in the combined condition were 
asked to engage in reporting importance, and examinees in the prospective condition 
were asked to engage in reporting importance and effort prior to test completion. 
Consistent with previous behavioral commitment research (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2000; 
Higgins, 1997), priming students by asking them to engage in reporting their intended 
effort before the test had a small, but arguably practically significant impact on test 
performance. Interestingly, the effect of priming examinees does not affect average levels 
of importance or effort or the indirect effect across conditions, yet priming is affecting 
average levels of test performance. Thus, priming examinees is affecting test 
performance via some mechanism (e.g., mediator) other than perceived importance and 
examinee effort. 
These findings have important implications for test practitioners. Given the 
arguably small unstandardized effect size (approximately 2 points), it is important to 
interpret these results in light of previous research on the same test. Previous longitudinal 
studies utilizing students from the same university, the same test (i.e., NW9), and the 
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same test administration procedures have found nearly equivalent increases in test scores 
after examinees completed 45 to 70 credit hours (Finney, Sundre et al., 2016; Hathcoat et 
al., 2015). Considering examinees in the current study had essentially equivalent prior 
ability (i.e., SAT math and verbal), the simple act of reporting intended effort before the 
test resulted in a nearly equivalent increase in test scores as the learning gain associated 
with students who completed 45-70 credit hours. Thus, the two point increase in test 
scores may be important to faculty members who make decisions based on these scores. 
Another important implication for researchers and testing practitioners is 
associated with motivation interventions. Some motivation interventions have failed to 
increase performance when offering monetary incentives (Baumert & Demmrich, 2001; 
O’Neil et al., 2005) and when manipulating test instructions (Finney, Sundre et al., 2016), 
while manipulation of test instructions in other studies has resulted in increased average 
test scores similar in magnitude to the current study (d = 0.26 vs. d = 0.31-0.41); Liu et 
al., 2012) and larger than the current study (d = 0.26 vs. d = 0.63; Liu et al., 2015). Given 
the obvious disadvantages of offering monetary incentives and the possibility of test 
anxiety negatively influencing test performance associated with manipulation of test 
instructions (Mathers et al., 2016), simply measuring intended effort before the test may 
be a cheap and moderately effective method of increasing test performance.  
Summary of Findings 
Based on this one study examining first-year college students who completed a 
quantitative and scientific reasoning test, priming students by asking them to report their 
perceived importance and intended effort prior to the test may be useful to testing 
practitioners. The findings from the current study indicated that priming did not influence 
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average ratings of importance and effort measured after test completion or the 
interrelationships between importance, effort, and test performance. However, examinees 
who rated importance and effort before the test had, on average, two-point higher test 
scores, which is approximately equivalent to the learning gains found in students who 
have completed 45-70 credit hours. The two-point difference may result in a more 
accurate representation of examinee ability and could have implications for more 
accurate course placement decisions (i.e., math or foreign language placement testing). 
Thus, based on the current study, testing practitioners should consider simply measuring 
perceived test importance and intended effort prior to tests to obtain more accurate 
estimates of examinee ability. 
The current study’s findings suggest prospective and retrospective ratings of 
importance and effort may be interchangeable with respect to the unstandardized 
interrelationships between importance, effort, and performance. However, researchers 
should be wary when making decisions based on standardized indirect effects associated 
with prospective effort ratings. Moreover, effort ratings tended to decrease from before to 
after experiencing the quantitative and scientific reasoning test. Thus, testing practitioners 
basing decisions on examinee effort ratings should strongly consider other measures of 
examinee effort such as RTE.  
Limitations and Future Studies  
The current study has several limitations that could not be accounted for. First, 
this study was conducted using a single sample of incoming first-year college students 
who were administered a quantitative and scientific reasoning test. Given decreases in 
average reported importance and effort over time (Finney, Sundre et al., 2016; Sessoms 
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& Finney, 2015), it is reasonable to expect results different from those found in the 
current study. Moreover, previous research has shown that change in effort was different 
across different types of tests (Barry & Finney, 2016). Thus, it is strongly recommended 
that researchers replicate and extend the current study to samples of upper-class students, 
to different academic subjects, and to samples outside of the university.  
An important limitation, and unanswered question, of the current study concerns 
the measurement of effort. Given retrospective effort ratings were found to be lower than 
prospective ratings via cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses, researchers and testing 
practitioners must make a decision with respect to when to measure effort. It may be that 
retrospective effort scores are more accurate given examinees have experienced the test 
(Freund & Holling, 2011). If researchers are solely interested in predicting test scores, 
retrospective effort scores may be the better option as they are more predictive of test 
performance. However, if researchers are interested in motivation filtering techniques, an 
alternative measure of examinee effort such as RTE may be a better option. Recall, RTE 
is a noninvasive measure of effort that does not rely on examinee self-reports. Future 
research should examine the validity of self-reported effort scores by collecting RTE, 
prospective, and retrospective effort data within a testing session. The relatively small 
correlation between RTE and retrospective effort scores (r = .25; Wise & Kong, 2005) 
suggests retrospective effort scores may not be representative of true expended effort. A 
larger correlation between RTE and prospective effort scores would suggest retrospective 
scores may be contaminated by construct-irrelevant variance and, therefore, prospective 
scores may better represent examinee effort.  
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Importantly, examinees reported, on average, lower effort after the test than 
before the test. Moreover, examinees did not change similarly over time, as indicated by 
the lack of stability in effort scores over time. Future research studies should focus on 
explaining these individual differences in change in effort over time. In the current study, 
test performance was the only predictor of change of effort examined, but only accounted 
for 3% of the variance in change in effort. Other predictors that may account for the 
variation in change in effort over time should be explored. One such predictor is 
conscientiousness. Previous research examining conscientiousness in low-stakes testing 
is inconclusive: conscientiousness has been related to effort at a single time point (e.g., 
Barry & Finney, 2016), not related to effort or performance (e.g., Myers et al., 2016), and 
negligibly related to performance (e.g., Finney, Sundre et al., 2016). It may be that 
examinees higher in conscientiousness provide accurate, and essentially equivalent, 
ratings of effort over time. Whereas, examinees lower in conscientiousness may decrease 
their ratings of effort over time to a greater degree than other examinees. In addition, 
Barry and Finney found agreeableness to be significantly related to change in effort 
across multiple different tests within a testing session.  
Another limitation to the current study is the assumption that examinees 
accurately judge their own test performance. Recall, attributional bias may serve as a 
self-protective mechanism to a greater degree for examinees who perform poorly on the 
test than for examinees who perform better on the test. As mentioned above, if examinees 
perceptions of their performance is misaligned with their actual performance, the 
relationship between test performance and change in importance and effort may be nil. 
Although previous research has repeatedly shown that ability is not related to effort at a 
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given time point (Wise & Smith, 2016), future research should examine if change in 
effort is related to an independent measure of ability (e.g., SAT math) or examinees’ 
perceptions of their performance.  
Although the prospective and retrospective SOS performed well in this study, the 
SOS is not without faults. Prospective effort item seven was noninvariant over time. 
Error covariances were needed to account for shared variance likely due to negative 
wording effects and item wording redundancy. In addition, there may be other sources of 
construct-irrelevant variance associated with SOS scores. For example, it is questionable 
whether importance item three “I am not curious about how I did on this test relative to 
others” is a valid measure of perceived test importance. An examinee scoring high on this 
item seems to be more concerned with their performance in comparison to other 
examinees. Thus, item three appears to be representative of the performance approach 
achievement goal orientation (e.g., “It is important for me to do well compared to other 
students;” Finney, Pieper, & Barron, 2004). Additionally, consideration should be given 
to the phrasing of items on the SOS. Research suggests items in the form of questions 
(e.g., “How much effort will you put forth on this test?”) tend to provide for more 
thoughtful responses than items in the form of statements (e.g., SOS item: “I will give my 
best effort on this test;” Petty, Rennier, & Cacioppo, 1987).  
Given these issues, the SOS may not be the best measure of motivation in low-
stakes testing contexts. A new measure of examinee motivation for low-stakes testing 
could address the aforementioned issues and incorporate the expectancy component of 
EV theory. Moreover, researchers should consider the recently revised version of EV 
theory, expectancy-value-cost (EVC) model which has emerged as a promising 
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framework used to explain examinee motivation. Previously, cost was considered a 
subcomponent of value. However, recent research suggests cost is a separate component 
negatively related to expectancy and value (Barron & Hulleman, 2015; Flake, Barron, 
Hulleman, McCoach, & Welsh, 2015). This revised conceptualization of cost is defined 
as the effort necessary to complete a task, affective demand associated with exerting 
effort on the task, and loss of ability to engage in other activities (Flake et al., 2015). For 
example, as examinees experience the test, their perceptions or realizations of the effort 
necessary to complete the test and corresponding affective demand may cause overall 
levels of cost to increase and, therefore, expended effort to decrease. Thus, cost may help 
explain why effort decreases over time. In sum, a new measure of examinee motivation 
may address current issues with the SOS and incorporate potentially relevant components 
of expectancy and cost.  
An important limitation to the current study concerns the temporal ordering of 
importance, effort, and performance. Testing of mediation hypotheses with cross-
sectional data (research question 2) only provides accurate parameter estimates when 
very strict assumptions are met (Cole & Maxwell, 2003). Moreover, using retrospective 
scores as proxies for variables of interest (e.g., importance and effort) theoretically 
occurring at an earlier time tends to result in biased estimates of the indirect effect (Cole 
& Maxwell, 2003). The mediated effect of prospective importance on performance via 
prospective effort (research question 4) was much closer to meeting the assumption of 
temporal ordering of the variables. However, importance and effort were collected 
simultaneously; thus, limiting the inferences that can be made from these results. The 
process of mediation is inherently longitudinal (I  E  P); thus, future research should 
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examine the indirect effect via a longitudinal mediation model in the latent growth curve 
modeling (LGM) framework. The LGM framework allows for modeling of individual 
differences in change over time and, importantly, allows for the modeling of predictors of 
these individual differences.  
Conclusion  
Although low-stakes tests used in this study and others may be low-stakes in 
nature to examinees, these tests are not low-stakes to educational institutions. 
Universities use these accountability test scores for accreditation purposes, to assess 
curriculum effectiveness, and to inform evidence-based changes to academic 
programming. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that these test scores are accurate 
reflections of student ability. Unfortunately, the perplexing problem associated with 
biased estimates of ability due to low and amotivated students persists. I argue that one 
appealing option testing practitioners may utilize to obtain more accurate estimates of 
ability is via priming examinees by measuring examinee motivation prior to the test. 
Another option testing practitioners currently utilize to account for amotivated examinees 
is motivation filtering techniques. However, given average levels of reported effort tend 
to decrease after examinees experience the test, I strongly recommend testing 
practitioners obtain other measures of examinee effort prior to utilizing such techniques.  
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Table 1.          
Third Variable Functions, Example Hypotheses, Path Diagrams, and Examples of Data Characteristics 
     Relationships 
Third 
Variable (Z) 
Example Hypotheses Model 
Occurrence 
of Z  
 c c’ ab a b 
 yx yx.z ab zx yz yz.x 
Complete 
Mediator 
Does X affect Y indirectly 
via Z?  
Between X 
and Y 
 .16 .00 .16 .40 .40 -- 
Partial 
Mediator 
Does X affect Y directly and 
indirectly via Z? 
 
Between X 
and Y 
 .36 .24 .12 .40 .40 .30 
Suppressor 
Is X more predictive of Y 
when Z is modeled? 
 
Between X 
and Y 
Classical .00 -.16 .16 .40 -- .40 
Negative .20 -.30 .50 .71 -- .71 
Covariate 
After controlling for Z, is X 
related to Y? 
 
Before or 
coinciding 
with X 
 .40 .40 -- .00 -- .40 
Confounder 
Is the relationship between 
X and Y spurious? 
 
Before or 
coinciding 
with X 
 ryx ryx.z     
 .16 .00 -- .40 .40 -- 
  
 
  yx      
Moderator 
Does the effect of X on Y 
depend on Z? 
Before or 
coinciding 
with X 
+ 1 SDz .40 -- 
-- .20 .20 -- 
- 1 SDz .25 -- 
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Note. Path coefficient c represents the total effect of X on Y and c’ represents the direct effect of X on Y for the mediation and 
suppression examples. The product of a and b (ab) represents the indirect effect of X on Y via Z. Path coefficients a represent the 
relationship between X and Z and b represent the relationship between Z and Y. Path coefficient b can be represented by the regression 
equation yz for complete mediation or yz.x for partial mediation. Path coefficient values are intended to provide a conceptual 
understanding of how interrelationships between X, Z, and Y might look depending on the function of the third variables. Mediation 
distinguishing characteristic is Z occurs between X and Y. With respect to partial mediation, although the b path coefficient would be 
represented by yz.x, the value for yz was included to illustrate that both X and Z contribute uniquely to the prediction of Y. 
Suppression distinguishing characteristics are (1) the direct effects are stronger than the total effects (X-Y) and (2) Z occurs between X 
and Y. Covariates are typically not manipulable and used for statistical control, distinguishing characteristics of covariates are (1) Z 
occurs before or coincides with X and (2) the X-Z relationship is not substantial. Confounder presumes a completely spurious effect 
(ryx.z = .00) where Z completely accounts for the bivariate X-Y relationship (ryx = .16). Importantly, the relationships between the 
variables (represented by a, b, c, c’, and ab) for confounders and mediators are mathematically identical, the distinguishing 
characteristics are (1) the direction of the X-Z arrow and (2) Z occurs before or coincides with X. Moderation distinguishing 
characteristics are (1) Z occurs before or coincides with X and (2) the X-Z path coefficient changes at different levels of Z (e.g., ± 1 
SDz). With respect to the values for the X-Z and Z-Y relationships, it is only necessary that X-Z and Z-Y are related.  
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 Table 2 
Research Questions, Hypotheses, Data Analyses, and Measures 
 
Measures  
Prospective Retrospective   
Research Questions Analyses Expected Results 
Perceived 
Importance 
Intended 
Effort 
Perceived 
Importance 
Expended 
Effort 
Quantitative 
& Scientific 
Reasoning 
Results 
can be 
found in 
Table X 
1. On average, do examinees 
report different levels of 
retrospectively measured 
perceived test importance and 
examinee expended effort 
across measurement 
conditions? 
Structural 
Means 
Modeling 
(SMM) 
using only 
retrospective 
scores 
Priming examinees may 
invoke behavioral 
commitment (i.e., 
increase test scores) and 
importance and effort 
scores may be 
contaminated by 
attributional bias. Thus, 
I expect average levels 
of retrospective 
importance and effort 
will be higher in the 
prospective condition. 
     6 
        Retrospective Condition     X X   
        Combined Condition     X X   
        Prospective Condition     X X   
2. Is the indirect effect of 
retrospectively measured 
perceived test importance on 
test performance via 
retrospectively measured 
examinee effort affected by 
asking examinees to rate their 
Moderated 
Mediation 
Analysis 
using only 
retrospective 
scores 
I expect the completely 
mediated model will fit 
the data across the three 
conditions. However, 
behavioral commitment 
may mitigate the effects 
of attributional bias in 
     8 
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perceived importance and 
intended effort before test 
completion? 
the prospective 
condition. Thus, I 
expect the magnitude of 
the indirect effect 
estimated using 
retrospective scores will 
be smaller in the 
prospective condition. 
        Retrospective Condition     X X X  
        Combined Condition     X X X  
        Prospective Condition     X X X  
3. Do examinees reporting 
retrospective perceived 
importance and examinee effort 
have lower scores, on average, 
than examinees reporting 
prospective importance and 
effort for the same test? 
Structural 
Means 
Modeling 
(SMM) 
using 
retrospective 
and 
prospective 
scores 
I expect average levels 
of prospectively 
measured perceived 
importance and 
examinee effort scores 
in the prospective 
condition will be higher 
than importance and 
effort scores from the 
retrospective condition. 
     10 
        Retrospective Condition     X X   
        Combined Condition   X   X   
        Prospective Condition   X X     
4. Does the theoretically and 
empirically suggested indirect 
effect of perceived importance 
on test performance via 
examinee effort differ across 
the three measurement 
conditions? 
Moderated 
Mediation 
Analysis 
using 
retrospective 
and 
Examinees make self-
protective attributions 
to explain their test 
performance. Thus, I 
expect the standardized 
indirect effect in the 
prospective condition 
     12 
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prospective 
scores 
will be smaller in 
magnitude than the 
indirect effect in the 
retrospective condition. 
        Retrospective Condition     X X X  
        Combined Condition   X   X X  
        Prospective Condition   X X   X  
5. Do examinees who complete 
both prospective and 
retrospective measures report 
different levels of prospective 
perceived importance and 
examinee effort than 
retrospective perceived 
importance and examinee 
effort? 
Longitudinal 
Mean and 
Covariance 
Structure 
Analysis 
(LMACS) 
Examinees may make 
post-test attributions to 
explain their test 
performance. Further, 
examinees may exhibit 
behavior in accordance 
with their behavioral 
intentions. As a result, 
prospective importance 
and effort scores, on 
average, may not differ 
from retrospective 
scores. I expect average 
levels of importance 
and effort scores will be 
essentially equivalent 
over time. 
     14 
     Prospective Condition   X X X X   
6. Are perceived importance 
and examinee effort change 
scores related to performance 
on the quantitative and 
scientific reasoning test? 
Latent 
Growth 
Model 
(LGM) 
Attributional bias may 
serve as a self-
protective mechanism 
to a greater degree for 
examinees who perform 
     Figure 10 
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poorly on the test than 
for examinees who 
perform well. Thus, I 
expect larger 
differences in 
importance and effort 
scores for examinees 
who perform poorly 
than for the examinees 
who perform well. 
   X X X X   
7. Does test performance differ, 
on average, as a function of 
measurement condition? 
Analysis of 
Variance 
(ANOVA) 
Given students tend to 
exhibit behavior in 
accordance with their 
behavioral intentions 
and assuming 
examinees report higher 
levels of prospective 
perceived importance 
and intended effort, I 
expect average test 
scores will be higher in 
the prospective 
condition. 
      
        Retrospective Condition       X  
        Combined Condition       X  
        Prospective Condition       X  
Note. The information in this table aligns the current studies’ research questions with the hypotheses and data analyses, and scores used with those analyses. 
The data used in the analyses is indicated by the X in the box corresponding with the measurement condition. 
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Table 3  
Demographics by Measurement Condition  
 Condition  
 Retrospective Combined Prospective Total 
Gender     
   Female 61.25% 60.05% 63.96% 61.52% 
   Male 38.75% 39.95% 36.04% 38.48% 
Ethnicity     
   White 84.00% 88.22% 87.01% 86.42% 
   Asian 9.00% 6.70% 7.47% 7.71% 
   Hispanic 5.50% 5.77% 6.17% 5.78% 
   Black 5.50% 5.31% 5.52% 5.43% 
   American Indian  1.50% 0.69% 1.95% 1.31% 
   Pacific Islander 0.75% 0.69% 0.65% 0.70% 
   Not specified 3.00% 1.39% 1.95% 2.10% 
Mean Age (years) 18.46 18.46 18.46 18.46 
SAT Math 571.48 559.37 569.19 566.33 
SAT Verb 567.59 560.47 564.31 564.03 
N 400 437 308 1145 
Note. Students could self-identify in more than one ethnicity category. 
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Table 4  
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Quantitative and Scientific Reasoning 
(NW9) and Retrospective and Prospective Perceived Test Importance and Examinee 
Effort Scores by Measurement Condition 
  Retrospective Prospective 
 NW9 Importance Effort Importance Effort 
Retrospective Condition (n = 400) 
NW9 .761 -- -- -- -- 
Retrospective Importance .185 .732 -- -- -- 
Retrospective Effort .376 .491 .846 -- -- 
Prospective Importance -- -- -- -- -- 
Prospective Effort -- -- -- -- -- 
Mean 44.150 17.605 19.200 -- -- 
SD 7.011 3.226 3.607 -- -- 
Skew -0.266 0.155 -0.542 -- -- 
Kurtosis 0.089 -0.026 0.076 -- -- 
Combined Condition (n =439)     
NW9 .799 -- -- -- -- 
Retrospective Importance .200 .763 -- -- -- 
Retrospective Effort .347 .544 .854 -- -- 
Prospective Importance .184 .697 .422 .741 -- 
Prospective Effort -- -- -- -- -- 
Mean 45.366 17.739 19.002 17.670 -- 
SD 7.642 3.287 3.578 3.332 -- 
Skew -0.457 -0.291 -0.496 -0.508 -- 
Kurtosis 0.586 0.516 0.175 0.845 -- 
Prospective Condition (n = 308)     
NW9 .771 -- -- -- -- 
Retrospective Importance .127 .813 -- -- -- 
Retrospective Effort .314 .480 .836 -- -- 
Prospective Importance .161 .786 .381 .762 -- 
Prospective Effort .196 .402 .580 .473 .804 
Mean 46.065 17.945 19.604 17.877 20.494 
SD 7.091 3.456 3.235 3.302 2.872 
Skew -0.303 -0.178 -0.478 -0.257 -0.760 
Kurtosis -0.239 -0.259 0.364 -0.066 1.159 
Note. Values on the diagonal represent coefficient . NW9 scores range from 0 to 66. 
Perceived importance and examinee effort scores range from 5 to 25, with higher 
scores reflecting higher levels of importance and effort.  
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Table 5 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Retrospective SOS by Measurement Condition 
Retrospective Condition (n = 400) 
 Item 
Item 1I 3I* 4I* 5I 8I 2E 6E 7E* 9E* 10E 
3I* .204 --         
4I* .334 .424 --        
5I .590 .214 .336 --       
8I .446 .414 .373 .298 --      
2E .436 .208 .227 .255 .445 --     
6E .445 .227 .199 .368 .455 .719 --    
7E* .240 .165 .114 .231 .266 .494 .577 --   
9E* .401 .219 .237 .308 .344 .592 .603 .554 --  
10E .311 .211 .170 .160 .384 .516 .474 .295 .488 -- 
Mean 3.828 3.373 3.348 3.175 3.883 4.175 4.000 3.178 3.810 4.038 
SD .812 1.082 .990 .895 .837 .822 .929 1.072 .986 .740 
Skew -.267 -.366 -.242 .239 -.395 -.987 -.868 -.150 -.669 -.657 
Kurt -.164 -.568 -.434 .057 -.271 1.122 .537 -.864 -.131 .789 
Combined Condition (n = 437) 
3I* .322 --         
4I* .466 .400 --        
5I .615 .132 .342 --       
8I .489 .370 .458 .355 --      
2E .493 .246 .272 .367 .388 --     
6E .534 .230 .264 .387 .415 .714 --    
7E* .383 .185 .212 .279 .258 .533 .618 --   
9E* .448 .247 .207 .326 .321 .616 .652 .605 --  
10E .399 .206 .192 .282 .376 .477 .424 .349 .424 -- 
Mean 3.659 3.584 3.384 3.229 3.883 4.108 3.982 3.153 3.792 3.968 
SD .878 .948 .955 .930 .874 .821 .911 1.057 .951 .729 
Skew -.401 -.768 -.469 -.126 -.889 -1.001 -.841 .019 -.764 -.880 
Kurt -.025 .442 -.131 -.084 1.185 1.389 .399 -.800 .260 1.890 
Prospective Condition (n = 308) 
3I* .339 --         
4I* .483 .485 --        
5I .683 .298 .467 --       
8I .514 .527 .514 .385 --      
2E .546 .250 .263 .347 .430 --     
6E .533 .254 .264 .402 .464 .759 --    
7E* .279 .189 .128 .256 .217 .419 .479 --   
9E* .371 .225 .193 .198 .318 .606 .601 .511 --  
10E .306 .231 .191 .191 .365 .525 .538 .286 .478 -- 
Mean 3.802 3.565 3.513 3.231 3.834 4.156 4.123 3.273 3.964 4.097 
SD .864 .995 .970 .889 .844 .771 .768 .997 .863 .751 
Skew -.370 -.521 -.382 .063 -.497 -.962 -.735 -.072 -.788 -.952 
Kurt -.322 -.185 -.411 -.156 .107 1.548 .661 -.816 .500 2.091 
Note. *Denotes items that are reversed prior to scoring. Respondents rate their agreement with 
the 10 items on a 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5) with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of reported effort and importance. I Denotes items from 
importance subscale. E Denotes items from effort subscale. Kurt = kurtosis.  
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Table 6  
Model Fit Indices for One-Factor, Two-Factor, and Multiple-Condition Invariance Testing of the Retrospective SOS Scores across 
Measurement Conditions 
Model χ2 df Δχ2 Δdf ΔCFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Correlation 
residuals > |.15| 
Mean residuals 
> |15| 
Retrospective               
  1-factor 339.302 35 -- -- -- .797 .147 .093 5 -- 
  2-factor 190.716 34 148.586* 1 .099 .896 .107 .063 1 -- 
  2-factor with   
     I3, I4, & I8 
131.591 32 59.125* 2 .017 .934 .088 .056 1 -- 
Combined          -- 
  1-factor 344.360 35 -- -- -- .825 .142 .087 5 -- 
  2-factor 137.077 34 202.451* 1 .116 .942 .083 .053 1 -- 
  2-factor with   
     I3, I4, & I8 
100.285 32 36.792* 2 .006 .961 .070 .046 1 -- 
Prospective           
  1-factor 385.774 35 -- -- -- .741 .180 .111 8 -- 
  2-factor 167.890 34 194.574* 1 .161 .901 .113 .064 2 -- 
  2-factor with   
     I3, I4, & I8 
111.642 32 56.248* 1 .023 .941 .089 .056 1 -- 
Invariance Testing        
  Configural 342.897 96 -- -- -- .970 .083 -- 3 -- 
  Metric 369.718 116 26.281 20 .001 .969 .076 -- 2 -- 
  Scalar  422.320 132 52.602* 16 .004 .965 .076 -- 2 1 
  Partial Scalar 410.612 130 11.563* 2 .000 .965 .076 -- 2 0 
  Measurement  
    Error 
473.414 152 103.696* 36 .008 .961 .075 -- 2 1 
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Note. *p < .01. 2 = maximum likelihood chi-square; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit 
index; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. Local misfit was assessed via examination of correlation and mean 
residuals > |.15| in magnitude. The 1-factor model estimates 20 parameters (1 factor variance, 9 factor pattern coefficients, and 10 
error variances) from 55 observations (10 variances and 45 covariances). The 2-factor model estimates 21 parameters (1 factor 
covariance, 2 factor variances, 8 factor pattern coefficients, and 10 error variances) from 55 observations. The 2-factor with I3, I4, 
& I8 model adds 2 error covariances (between importance items 3 and 4 and items 3 and 8; 23 parameters are estimated). In the 
configural model, 99 parameters (3 factor covariances, 6 factor variances, 24 factor pattern coefficients, 30 error variances, 30 
intercepts, and 6 error covariances) are estimated from 195 observations). In the metric invariance model, 20 fewer parameters are 
estimated than the configural model by constraining 8 factor pattern coefficients and 2 error covariances to be equal across 
conditions (79 total). In the scalar invariance model, 16 fewer parameters are estimated by constraining 8 intercepts to be equal 
across conditions (63 total). In the partial scalar invariance model, 2 additional parameters are estimated by releasing the equality 
constraint on importance item three’s intercept across groups. In the measurement error invariance model, 20 fewer parameters 
than the scalar model are estimated by constraining 10 error variances to be equal across conditions (43 total).   
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Table 7       
Unstandardized and (Standardized) Factor Pattern Coefficients for the Retrospective SOS Scores across Measurement Conditions 
 Retrospective Combined Prospective 
Item Importance Effort Importance Effort Importance Effort 
1. Doing well on this test was important to me.  
 
1.000 (.809)  1.000 (.879)  1.000 (.887)  
3. I am not curious about how I did on this test  
     relative to others.* 
0.518 (.317)  0.439 (.359)  0.536 (.420)  
4. I am not concerned about the score I receive on 
     this test.* 
0.694 (.460)  0.668 (.540)  0.737 (.582)  
5. This was an important test to me. 
 
0.907 (.665)  0.812 (.674)  0.861 (.742)  
8. I would like to know how well I did on this test. 
 
0.752 (.590)  0.669 (.590)  0.675 (.613)  
2. I engaged in good effort throughout this test. 
 
 1.000 (.824)  1.000 (.814)  1.000 (.858) 
6. I gave my best effort on this test. 
 
 1.173 (.857)  1.175 (.863)  1.024 (.881) 
7. While taking this test, I could have worked harder  
     on it.*  
 1.011 (.640)  1.109 (.702)  0.810 (.538) 
9. I did not give this test my full attention while 
     completing it.* 
 1.076 (.740)  1.096 (.771)  0.921 (.706) 
10. While taking this test I was able to persist to   
      completion of the task.  
 0.640 (.587)  0.590 (.541)  0.693 (.610) 
Note. *Items were reversed prior to scoring. All parameter estimates were statistically significant at p < .01. The metric of factors were 
established by fixing importance item 1 and effort item 2 factor loadings to one. The parameters are estimated from fitting a two-factor model 
with error covariances between importance items three and eight and importance items three and four to scores from each of the three 
conditions with no invariance constraints. The error covariances between importance item three and eight were statistically significant and 
moderate in size across conditions (residual correlations = .38, .23, .49) as were the residual correlations for item three and four (.30, .23, .26). 
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Table 8 
Fit Indices for Completely Mediated Model using Retrospective SOS Scores by 
Measurement Condition and Invariance Testing  
Model χ2 df Δχ2 Δdf ΔCFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Single-Condition       
    Retrospective     
         Condition 
0.657 1 -- -- -- 1.000 < .001 .012 
    Combined 
         Condition 
0.558 1 -- -- -- 1.000 < .001 .011 
    Prospective 
         Condition 
0.460 1 -- -- -- 1.000 < .001 .010 
Multiple-Condition       
    Unconstrained 2.177 3 -- -- -- 1.000 < .001 -- 
    Constrained  
         Direct Paths 
9.907 7 7.730 4 .006 .994 .033 -- 
    Completely  
         Constrained 
17.275 13 7.368 6 .003 .991 .029 -- 
Note. 2 = maximum likelihood chi-square; RMSEA = root mean square error of 
approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root mean square 
residual. 2 and degrees of freedom from the unconstrained multiple-condition model 
are the sum from the completely mediated models fit to each of the three conditions. 
The unconstrained model was estimated to obtain baseline CFI, and RMSEA values. 
The completely constrained model fixed the unstandardized direct paths, variance of 
importance, and disturbance variances (effort and performance) to be equivalent across 
conditions. *p < .01. 
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Table 9 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Combined SOS by Measurement Condition 
Retrospective Condition (n = 400) 
 Item 
Item 1I 3I* 4I* 5I 8I 2E 6E 7E* 9E* 10E 
3I* .204 --         
4I* .334 .424 --        
5I .590 .214 .336 --       
8I .446 .414 .373 .298 --      
2E .436 .208 .227 .255 .445 --     
6E .445 .227 .199 .368 .455 .719 --    
7E* .240 .165 .114 .231 .266 .494 .577 --   
9E* .401 .219 .237 .308 .344 .592 .603 .554 --  
10E .311 .211 .170 .160 .384 .516 .474 .295 .488 -- 
Mean 3.828 3.373 3.348 3.175 3.883 4.175 4.000 3.178 3.810 4.038 
SD .812 1.082 .990 .895 .837 .822 .929 1.072 .986 .740 
Skew -.267 -.366 -.242 .239 -.395 -.987 -.868 -.150 -.669 -.657 
Kurt -.164 -.568 -.434 .057 -.271 1.122 .537 -.864 -.131 .789 
Combined Condition (n = 437) 
3I* .229 --         
4I* .353 .382 --        
5I .558 .228 .383 --       
8I .494 .284 .350 .416 --      
2E .308 .209 .206 .314 .286 --     
6E .306 .197 .175 .314 .302 .714 --    
7E* .216 .200 .149 .254 .239 .533 .618 --   
9E* .261 .199 .180 .292 .239 .616 .652 .605 --  
10E .270 .168 .190 .247 .276 .477 .424 .349 .424 -- 
Mean 3.703 3.462 3.359 3.213 3.934 4.108 3.982 3.153 3.792 3.968 
SD .943 1.019 .963 .879 .947 .821 .911 1.057 .951 .729 
Skew -.679 -.629 -.339 -.042 -1.218 -1.001 -.841 .019 -.764 -.880 
Kurt .607 -.121 -.447 .148 1.799 1.389 .399 -.800 .260 1.890 
Prospective Condition (n = 308) 
3I* .265 --         
4I* .437 .444 --        
5I .542 .167 .416 --       
8I .415 .425 .454 .372 --      
2E .486 .203 .247 .347 .465 --     
6E .407 .160 .219 .373 .511 .677 --    
7E* .039 .059 .021 .128 .168 .272 .346 --   
9E* .312 .154 .223 .336 .392 .549 .632 .319 --  
10E .329 .178 .184 .319 .423 .485 .596 .287 .476 -- 
Mean 3.912 3.403 3.403 3.269 3.890 4.360 4.334 3.357 4.227 4.224 
SD .824 .995 1.011 .855 .914 .746 .728 .871 .762 .721 
Skew -.503 -.377 -.340 .081 -.863 -1.596 -1.069 -.315 -1.165 -.995 
Kurt .360 -.251 -.492 .165 .673 4.338 1.521 .019 2.229 2.137 
Note. *Denotes items that are reversed prior to scoring. Respondents rate their agreement with 
the 10 items on a 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5) with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of reported effort and importance. I Denotes items from 
importance subscale. E Denotes items from effort subscale. Kurt = kurtosis.   
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Table 10  
Model Fit Indices for One-Factor, Two-Factor, and Multiple-Condition Invariance Testing of the Prospective and Retrospective 
SOS Scores across Measurement Conditions 
Model χ2 df Δχ2 Δdf ΔCFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Correlation 
residuals > |.15| 
Mean residuals 
> |15| 
Retrospective               
  1-factor 339.302 35 -- -- -- .797 .147 .093 5 -- 
  2-factor 190.716 34 148.586* 1 .099 .896 .107 .063 1 -- 
  2-factor with   
     I3, I4, & I8 
131.591 32 59.125* 2 .017 .934 .088 .056 1 -- 
Combined          -- 
  1-factor 344.360 35 -- -- -- .825 .142 .087 5 -- 
  2-factor 137.077 34 202.451* 1 .116 .942 .083 .053 1 -- 
  2-factor with   
     I3, I4, & I8 
48.829 32 88.248* 2 .047 .989 .035 .036 0 -- 
Prospective           
  1-factor 385.774 35 -- -- -- .741 .180 .111 8 -- 
  2-factor 167.890 34 194.574* 1 .161 .901 .113 .064 2 -- 
  2-factor with   
     I3, I4, & I8 
88.819 32 79.071* 1 .023 .947 .076 .055 1 -- 
Invariance Testing        
  Configural 268.746 96 -- -- -- .975 .069 -- 2 -- 
  Metric 326.055 116 57.309* 20 .005 .970 .069 -- 3 -- 
  Partial Metric  304.153 115 35.407 19 .002 .973 .066 -- 2 -- 
  Partial Scalar 339.717 130 35.564* 15 .003 .970 .065 -- 2 0 
  Measurement  
    Error 
426.465 152 100.410* 36 .009 .961 .069 -- 24 0 
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Note. *p < .01. 2 = maximum likelihood chi-square; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit 
index; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. Local misfit was assessed via examination of correlation and mean 
residuals > |.15| in magnitude. The 1-factor model estimates 20 parameters (1 factor variance, 9 factor pattern coefficients, and 10 
error variances) from 55 observations (10 variances and 45 covariances). The 2-factor model estimates 21 parameters (1 factor 
covariance, 2 factor variances, 8 factor pattern coefficients, and 10 error variances) from 55 observations. The 2-factor with I3, I4, 
& I8 model adds 2 error covariances (between importance items 3 and 4 and items 3 and 8; 23 parameters are estimated). In the 
configural model, 99 parameters (3 factor covariances, 6 factor variances, 24 factor pattern coefficients, 30 error variances, 30 
intercepts, and 6 error covariances) are estimated from 195 observations). In the metric invariance model, 20 fewer parameters are 
estimated than the configural model by constraining 8 factor pattern coefficients and 2 error covariances to be equal across 
conditions (79 total). In the partial metric invariance model, 1 additional parameter was estimated by releasing the equality 
constraint on effort item 7’s factor pattern coefficient in the prospective condition. In the partial scalar invariance model, 15 fewer 
parameters are estimated by constraining 8 intercepts (except for effort item 7’s intercept was freely estimated in the prospective 
condition) to be equal across conditions. In the measurement error invariance model, 36 fewer parameters than the metric model 
are estimated by constraining 8 intercepts and 10 error variances to be equal across conditions (43 total).   
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Table 11       
Unstandardized and (Standardized) Factor Pattern Coefficients for the Prospective and Retrospective SOS Scores across Measurement 
Conditions 
 Retrospective Combined Prospective 
Item Importance Effort Importance Effort Importance Effort 
1. Doing well on this test was important to me.  
 
1.000 (.809)  1.000 (.756)  1.000 (.719)  
3. I am not curious about how I did on this test 
relative to others.* 
0.518 (.317)  0.478 (.335)  0.558 (.335)  
4. I am not concerned about the score I receive on 
this test.* 
0.694 (.460)  0.681 (.504)  0.996 (.584)  
5. This was an important test to me. 
 
0.907 (.665)  0.888 (.720)  0.970 (.672)  
8. I would like to know how well I did on this test. 
 
0.752 (.590)  0.844 (.635)  1.025 (.665)  
2. I engaged in good effort throughout this test. 
 
 1.000 (.824)  1.000 (.814)  1.000 (.771) 
6. I gave my best effort on this test. 
 
 1.173 (.857)  1.167 (.857)  1.110 (.878) 
7. While taking this test, I could have worked harder 
on it.*  
 1.011 (.640)  1.120 (.708)  0.577 (.382) 
9. I did not give this test my full attention while 
completing it.* 
 1.076 (.740)  1.103 (.776)  0.950 (.718) 
10. While taking this test I was able to persist to 
completion of the task.  
 0.640 (.587)  0.585 (.537)  0.838 (.669) 
Note. *Items were reversed prior to scoring. All parameter estimates were statistically significant at p < .01. The metric of factors were 
established by fixing importance item 1 and effort item 2 factor loadings to one. The parameters are estimated from fitting a two-factor model 
with error covariances between importance items three and eight and importance items three and four to scores from each of the three 
conditions with no invariance constraints. The error covariances between importance item three and eight were statistically significant and 
moderate in size across conditions (residual correlations = .38, .22, .47) as were the residual correlations for item three and four (.30, .21, .24). 
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Table 12 
Fit Indices for Completely Mediated Model using Prospective and Retrospective SOS 
Scores by Measurement Condition and Invariance Testing  
Model χ2 df Δχ2 Δdf ΔCFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Single-Condition       
    Retrospective     
         Condition 
0.097 1 -- -- -- 1.000 < .001 .012 
    Combined 
         Condition 
0. 097 1 -- -- -- 1.000 < .001 .005 
    Prospective 
         Condition 
0.846 1 -- -- -- 1.000 < .001 .017 
Multiple-Condition      
    Unconstrained 1.597 3 -- -- -- 1.000 < .001 -- 
    Constrained  
         Direct Paths 
8.456 7 6.859 4 .004 .996 .023 -- 
    Completely  
         Constrained 
33.344 13 24.888* 6 .048 .948 .064 -- 
    Constrained1  
         Paths and  
         Disturbance 
13.074 12 4.618 5 .001 .997 .015 -- 
Note. Retrospective condition = retrospective importance and effort scores. Combined 
condition = prospective importance and retrospective effort scores. Prospective 
condition = prospective importance and effort scores.  2 = maximum likelihood chi-
square; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit 
index; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. 2 and degrees of freedom 
from the unconstrained multiple-condition model are the sum from the completely 
mediated models fit to each of the three conditions. The unconstrained model was 
estimated to obtain baseline CFI, and RMSEA values. The completely constrained 
model fixed the unstandardized direct paths, variance of importance, and disturbance 
variances (effort and performance) to be equivalent across conditions. 1 Efforts’ 
disturbance variance in the prospective condition was allowed to freely vary and this 
model was compared to the constrained direct paths model. *p < .01. 
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Table 13 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Retrospective and Prospective Importance and Effort Scores from the Prospective Measurement Condition 
 Item 
 Prospective Retrospective 
Item 1I1 3I1* 4I1* 5I1 8I1 2E1 6E1 7E1* 9E1* 10E1 1I2 3I2* 4I2* 5I2 8I2 2E2 6E2 7E2* 9E2* 10E2 
1I1  --                    
3I1* .27 --                   
4I1* .44 .44 --                  
5I1 .54 .17 .42 --                 
8I1 .42 .43 .45 .37 --                
2E1 .49 .20 .25 .35 .46 --               
6E1 .41 .16 .22 .37 .51 .68 --              
7E1* .04 .06 .02 .13 .17 .27 .35 --             
9E1* .31 .15 .22 .34 .39 .55 .63 .32 --            
10E1 .33 .18 .18 .32 .42 .49 .60 .29 .48 --           
1I2  .61 .25 .45 .62 .48 .36 .43 .14 .35 .27 --          
3I2* .26 .50 .44 .23 .44 .16 .17 .09 .07 .20 .34 --         
4I2* .39 .35 .58 .43 .46 .25 .26 .03 .17 .27 .48 .49 --        
5I2 .43 .23 .39 .68 .38 .32 .40 .15 .32 .26 .68 .30 .47 --       
8I2 .29 .42 .43 .37 .64 .31 .36 .13 .28 .30 .51 .53 .51 .39 --      
2E2 .36 .17 .23 .31 .39 .49 .52 .26 .43 .41 .55 .25 .26 .35 .43 --     
6E2 .32 .16 .18 .34 .36 .46 .53 .29 .39 .41 .53 .25 .26 .40 .46 .76 --    
7E2* .17 .13 .09 .20 .12 .27 .25 .36 .25 .15 .28 .19 .13 .26 .22 .42 .48 --   
9E2* .27 .19 .18 .17 .24 .33 .35 .24 .35 .29 .37 .23 .19 .20 .32 .61 .60 .51 --  
10E2 .22 .09 .16 .23 .28 .34 .38 .23 .33 .42 .31 .23 .19 .19 .37 .53 .54 .29 .48 -- 
Mean 3.91 3.40 3.40 3.27 3.89 4.36 4.33 3.36 4.23 4.22 3.80 3.57 3.51 3.23 3.83 4.16 4.12 3.27 3.96 4.10 
SD 0.82 1.00 1.01 0.86 0.91 0.75 0.73 0.87 0.76 0.72 0.86 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.84 0.77 0.77 1.00 0.86 0.75 
Skew -0.50 -0.38 -0.34 0.08 -0.86 -1.60 -1.07 -0.32 -1.17 -1.00 -0.37 -0.52 -0.38 0.06 -0.50 -0.96 -0.74 -0.07 -0.79 -0.95 
Kurt 0.36 -0.25 -0.49 0.17 0.67 4.34 1.52 0.02 2.23 2.14 -0.32 -0.19 -0.41 -0.16 0.11 1.55 0.66 -0.82 0.50 2.09 
Note. *Denotes items that are reversed prior to scoring. Respondents rate their agreement with the 10 items on a 5-point Likert scale from Strongly 
Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5) with higher scores indicating higher levels of reported effort and importance. Subscripts denote importance (I) and 
effort (E) subscales and prospective (1) and retrospective (2) items. Prospective items were completed prior to the test, whereas retrospective items were 
completed by the same examinees after the test.  
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Table 14  
Longitudinal Invariance Testing of Retrospective and Prospective Importance and Effort Scores from the Prospective 
Condition 
 
Model χ2 df Δχ2 Δdf ΔCFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Correlation 
residuals  
> |.15| 
Mean 
residuals 
> |.15| 
Configural - error covariances 303.130 146 -- -- -- .949 .059 .051 1 -- 
Metric 330.354 154 27.224* 8 .006 .943 .061 .061 5 -- 
Partial Metric – I8 free 319.482 153 10.872 1 .003 .946 .059 .057 2 -- 
Partial Scalar – I8 free 343.753 160 24.271 7 .006 .940 .061 .058 2 0 
LGM  343.753 160 24.271 7 .006 .940 .061 .058 2 0 
Conditional LGM  373.750 176 29.997 16 .004 .936 .060 .058 -- -- 
Note. *p < .01. 2 = maximum likelihood chi-square; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit 
index; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. Local misfit was assessed via correlation and mean residuals > |.15| in 
magnitude. In the configural model with error variances, 84 parameters (4 factor variances, 6 factor covariances, 16 factor pattern 
coefficients, 20 error variances, 18 error covariances, and 20 means) were estimated from 230 observations (20 variances, 190 
covariances, and 20 means). In addition to the 10 error covariances across time points (e.g., prospective importance item 1 and 
retrospective importance item 1), 8 error covariances between prospective and retrospective importance items 3 and 4 and 
prospective and retrospective items 3 and 8 were estimated to account for shared variance after controlling for the importance 
factors. In the metric invariance model, 8 factor pattern coefficients were constrained to be equal across time points (76 estimated 
parameters). The partial metric invariance model frees the equality constraint on importance item 8’s factor loading (77 estimated 
parameters). In the partial scalar invariance model with no equality constraint on importance item 8’s factor loading and intercept, 7 
fewer parameters were estimated after constraining 7 intercepts. As noted in the text, the partial scalar model with importance item 
eight freely estimated is an equivalent model to the LGM model with the equality constraints.  
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Table 15      
Unstandardized and (Standardized) Factor Pattern Coefficients from Longitudinal Analysis of Prospective and Retrospective SOS 
Scores from the Prospective Measurement Condition 
  Prospective Retrospective 
Item  Importance Effort Importance Effort 
1. Doing well on this test is important to me. 1.000 (.697)    
1. Doing well on this test was important to me.    1.000 (.889)  
3. I am not curious about how I will do on this test relative to others.* 0.579 (.339)    
3. I am not curious about how I did on this test relative to others.*   0.537 (.424)  
4. I am not concerned about the score I will receive on this test.* 0.986 (.564)    
4. I am not concerned about the score I receive on this test.*   0.734 (.585)  
5. This is an important test to me. 1.048 (.710)    
5. This was an important test to me.   0.834 (.729)  
8. I would like to know how well I do on this test. 1.052 (.658)    
8. I would like to know how well I did on this test.   0.687 (.622)  
2. I will engage in good effort throughout this test.  1.000 (.774)   
2. I engaged in good effort throughout this test.    1.000 (.861) 
6. I will give my best effort on this test.  1.100 (.872)   
6. I gave my best effort on this test.    1.020 (.881) 
7. After taking this test, I expect I could have worked harder on it.*  0.607 (.400)   
7. While taking this test, I could have worked harder on it.*     0.783 (.524) 
9. I will not give this test my full attention while completing it.*  0.955 (.721)   
9. I did not give this test my full attention while completing it.*    0.912 (.701) 
10. While taking this test, I will persist to completion of the task.  0.831 (.667)   
10. While taking this test I was able to persist to completion of the task.     0.691 (.612) 
Note. *Denotes items that are reversed prior to scoring. The prospective item wording is presented first followed by the corresponding 
retrospective item. All parameter estimates were statistically significant at p < .01. A two-factor model with error covariances between 
importance items 3 and 4 and items 3 and 8 was fit to longitudinal data collected before and after test completion.  
159 
 
 
    
 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of EV theory (top), EV theory applied to low-stakes testing 
(middle) and EV theory as conceptualized in the current study (bottom). In the top model, 
notice the general conceptualization of EV theory suggests expectancy of success and 
task value indirectly affect task performance via motivation. EV theory applied to low-
stakes testing specifies expectancy of success and perceived importance indirectly affect 
test performance via examinee effort. Because expectancy of success may not be relevant 
in low-stakes testing contexts, the bottom model specifies perceived test importance 
indirectly affects test performance via examinee effort. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of measurement conditions with example items. The model in the retrospective condition (top) illustrates 
modeling retrospectively measured perceived test importance and expended effort. The model in the combined condition (middle) 
illustrates modeling prospectively measured perceived test importance and retrospectively measured expended effort. The model in the 
prospective condition (bottom) illustrates prospective measurement of perceived test importance and intended effort. (i.e., aligning 
with the theoretically suggested temporal relationship between the variables).
Retrospective Condition 
Combined Condition 
Prospective Condition 
Perceived Importance: 
“This was an important test to 
me.”  
Expended Effort: 
“I gave my best effort on this 
test.”  
Test Performance: 
Quantitative & Scientific 
Reasoning Test 
Perceived Importance: 
“This is an important test to 
me.”  
Expended Effort: 
“I gave my best effort on this 
test.”  
Test Performance: 
Quantitative & Scientific 
Reasoning Test 
Perceived Importance: 
“This is an important test to 
me.”  
Intended Effort: 
“I will give my best effort on 
this test.”  
Test Performance: 
Quantitative & Scientific 
Reasoning Test 
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Figure 3. Illustration of the relationship between political media and political 
engagement. This model suggests political media indirectly affects political engagement 
(1) via online discussion and (2) via interpersonal discussion and political knowledge. 
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Figure 4. Illustration of parameter symbols and regression formulas for partial and 
complete mediation. The top two path models illustrate a bivariate relationship (top) with 
total effect of X on Y (i.e., c) and the second model illustrates the addition of a third 
variable functioning as a mediator where the X-Z, Z-Y, and X-Y controlling for Z 
relationships are represented by a, b, and c’, respectively. The bottom two path models 
illustrate regression formulas representing symbols a, b, and c’ from the second path 
model. The regression formulas used in the third model assume partial mediation where 
the c’ parameter (direct effect; yx.z) is estimated and the b parameter is estimated 
controlling for X (yz.x). In contrast, if complete mediation is assumed (e.g., SEM model-
fit approach) the estimation of the b parameter does not control for X (yz) and the c’ 
parameter (direct effect) is not estimated. 
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Figure 5. Illustration of complete and partial mediation. The top model illustrates 
complete mediation where the sum of the indirect effect (ab = .16) and the direct effect 
(c’ = 0) equal the total effect (c = .16). Equivalently, the difference between the total 
effect (c = .16) and the indirect effect (ab = .16) equals the direct effect (c’ = .00). Notice, 
in complete mediation, the direct effect (c’ = .00) is not significantly different from zero. 
Thus, all of the effect of X on Y is through Z. In contrast, the bottom model illustrates 
partial mediation where the total effect (c = .36) minus the indirect effect (ab = .12) 
equals the direct effect (c’ = .24). Thus, in addition to the indirect effect, a direct path 
from X to Y is necessary to account for the bivariate relationship between X and Y (c = 
.36).   
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Figure 6. Illustration of ordinal (top) and disordinal (bottom) moderation effects. 
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Figure 7. Illustration of classical and negative suppression models. The classical 
suppression model (top) illustrates how a nil total effect (i.e., c = .00) can be decomposed 
into a nonzero indirect effect (ab =.16) and direct effect (c’ = -.16). The negative 
suppression model (bottom) illustrates how the observed bivariate relationship (rxy = .20) 
is in the opposite direction as the direct effect beta weight (c’ = .52). 
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Figure 8. Comparison of complete mediation and complete confounding models. Notice 
the complete mediation (top) and confounding (bottom) models are equivalent (e.g., 
identical parameter estimates and nil direct effect), with the exception of the direction of 
the arrow between X and Z. Despite the identical model-data fit, the top model (complete 
mediation) suggests X indirectly causes Y via Z, whereas the confounding model suggests 
that Z is a cause of both X and Y. 
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Retrospective SOS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prospective/Retrospective SOS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Completed mediated models modeling retrospective SOS scores and combined 
prospective/retrospective SOS scores. Unstandardized and (standardized) parameter 
estimates for retrospective (top), combined (middle), and prospective (bottom) 
conditions. All parameter estimates were statistically significant at p < .01. Single-
indicator latent variables were modeled by setting the composite variable’s error variance 
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to the proportion of the composite’s variance due to measurement error ([1-rxx]*sx2). 
Thus, leaving the essentially measurement error free variance to be modeled. The 
proportion of variance explained in the latent variables can be interpreted as (1 – 
standardized disturbance term). For example, the proportion of variance explained in test 
performance in the retrospective condition is .215 (1-.785). Thus, 21.5% of the variance 
in test performance can be explained by examinee effort in the retrospective condition. 
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Figure 10. Conditional LGM: Predicting change in importance and effort from test scores. 
Model-data fit was adequate: 2 = 373.75, p < .01, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .06, and SRMR = 
.06. Values in intercept factors represent mean (M) and unexplained variance (s2) of baseline 
(prospective) scores. Values in slope factors represent average rate of change (M) and 
unexplained variance (s2) of change scores. Values in box = unstandardized and 
(standardized) direct paths. Curved and double-headed paths = correlations. Unstandardized 
pattern coefficients from intercept factors to prospective (time 1) and retrospective (time 2) 
factors were fixed to 1. Unstandardized pattern coefficients from slope factors to prospective 
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and retrospective factors were fixed to 0 and 1, respectively. Covariances between 
prospective and retrospective importance and effort factors and disturbance terms were 
omitted from the figure for clarity. *p < .01, indicates value is statistically significantly 
different from zero. The latent importance (M = 3.858) and effort (M = 4.362) intercept 
factors equal the prospective importance and effort latent means for examinees with average 
test performance, as estimated in the LMACS model. Moreover, latent importance (M = -
0.033) and effort (M = -0.207) slope factors equal the latent change in importance and effort 
for examinees with average performance, as estimated in the LMACS model. Note, NW9 
composite scores were scaled by a factor of 10; thus, the unstandardized direct paths are 
interpreted as follows. For every 10 unit increase in test performance, examinees tended to 
increase effort ratings by 0.213 units. The intercept and slope factor correlations can be 
interpreted as follows. After controlling for performance, the relationship between 
prospective importance and effort was significant (partial r = .695) and the relationship 
between prospective effort and change in effort was significant (partial r = -.307). Given 
the negative effort slope (M = -0.207), examinees who reported higher intended effort 
before the test tended to decrease their effort ratings over time and examinees who 
reported lower effort before the test tended to increase their effort ratings over time. 
Interestingly, after controlling for performance, prospective importance is not related to 
change in importance (partial r = .105). Moreover, the relationships between prospective 
importance and change in effort (partial r = -.128) and prospective effort and change in 
importance (partial r = -.077) were nonsignificant after controlling for performance.  
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Figure 11. Plot of importance change scores as a function of test performance. Change 
scores were calculated by subtracting retrospective importance scores from prospective 
importance scores. Thus, importance change scores greater than zero reflect a decrease in 
ratings of importance from before to after test completion. 
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Figure 12. Plot of effort change scores as a function of test performance. Change scores 
were calculated by subtracting retrospective effort scores from prospective effort scores. 
Thus, effort change scores greater than zero reflect a decrease in effort ratings from 
before to after test completion. Notice, the plot suggests that examinees who performed 
poorer on the test tended to decrease their effort ratings from before to after the test to a 
greater degree than examinees who performed better on the test.    
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Appendix A 
 
Natural World-Student Opinion Scale 
 
Please think about the test that you just completed. Mark the answer that best represents 
how you feel about each of the statements below.  
 
A = Strongly Disagree  
B = Disagree  
C = Neutral  
D = Agree  
E = Strongly Agree  
 
1. Doing well on this test was important to me.  
2. I engaged in good effort throughout this test.  
3. I am not curious about how I did on this test relative to others.  
4. I am not concerned about the score I receive on this test.  
5. This was an important test to me.  
6. I gave my best effort on this test.  
7. While taking this test, I could have worked harder on it.  
8. I would like to know how well I did on this test.  
9. I did not give this test my full attention while completing it.  
10. While taking this test, I was able to persist to completion of the task.  
11. While taking this test, I thought about how poorly I was doing.  
12. While taking this test, I thought about items on other parts of this test I could not answer.  
13. While taking this test, I had an uneasy upset feeling.  
14. While taking this test, I thought of the consequences of performing poorly.  
15. While taking this test, I felt my heart beating fast.  
16. While taking this test, I felt so tense that my stomach was upset.  
17. While taking this test, I felt that I did not do as well as I could have.  
18. While taking this test, I felt nervous.  
19. I do not feel very confident about my performance on this test.  
20. While taking this test, I felt panicky.  
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Appendix B 
 
ONWA 
Opinions of the Natural World Scale 
 
Before we begin, here is an example item from the Natural World Test.  
 
Please think about the quantitative and scientific reasoning test that you are about to 
complete.  Mark the answer that best represents how you feel about each of the 
statements below. 
 
  A = Strongly Disagree   
 B = Disagree     
 C = Neutral 
 D = Agree 
 E = Strongly Agree 
 
1. Doing well on this test is important to me.  
2. I am not curious about how I will do on this test relative to others.  
3. I am not concerned about the score I will receive on this test.  
4. This is an important test to me.  
5. I would like to know how well I do on this test.  
 
 
  
Example Item: 
Goldstar Inc. claims that its SAT preparation course is superior to the course 
offered by Premiere Inc.  A study conducted by Goldstar compared SAT scores 
from 500 students who took Goldstar’s course and 500 students who took 
Premiere’s course.  Their study concluded that students who took Goldstar’s 
course scored significantly higher than students who took Premiere’s course.  Is 
Goldstar justified in its claim that its SAT preparation course is superior to 
Premiere’s course? 
x. The evidence strongly supports this claim. 
y. The evidence contradicts this claim. 
z. The evidence is not sufficient to support or contradict this claim. 
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Appendix C 
 
ONWB 
Opinions of the Natural World Scale 
 
Before we begin, here is an example item from the Natural World Test.  
 
Please think about the quantitative and scientific reasoning test that you are about to 
complete.  Mark the answer that best represents how you feel about each of the 
statements below. 
 
  A = Strongly Disagree   
 B = Disagree     
 C = Neutral 
 D = Agree 
 E = Strongly Agree 
 
1. Doing well on this test is important to me.  
2. I will engage in good effort throughout this test. 
3. I am not curious about how I will do on this test relative to others.  
4. I am not concerned about the score I will receive on this test.  
5. This is an important test to me.  
6. I will give my best effort on this test.  
7. After taking this test, I expect I could have worked harder on it.  
8. I would like to know how well I do on this test.  
9. I will not give this test my full attention while completing it.  
10. While taking this test, I will persist to completion of the task. 
Example Item: 
Goldstar Inc. claims that its SAT preparation course is superior to the course 
offered by Premiere Inc.  A study conducted by Goldstar compared SAT scores 
from 500 students who took Goldstar’s course and 500 students who took 
Premiere’s course.  Their study concluded that students who took Goldstar’s 
course scored significantly higher than students who took Premiere’s course.  Is 
Goldstar justified in its claim that its SAT preparation course is superior to 
Premiere’s course? 
x. The evidence strongly supports this claim. 
y. The evidence contradicts this claim. 
z. The evidence is not sufficient to support or contradict this claim. 
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Appendix D 
 
Assessment Day Fall, 2015 NW9 and Retrospective SOS Test Instructions 
[Proctors – students can use scrap paper for this test. Please pass out scrap paper if you 
have not already done so.] 
Please make sure you have correctly filled in your name and JACard number on the 
scantron form and that NW-9+SOS is written in the top right corner of the scantron form. 
The Natural World test is designed to assess your quantitative and scientific reasoning. At 
JMU we define these as thinking processes for obtaining and evaluating knowledge of the 
natural world. This instrument was developed at JMU with faculty who teach in Cluster 
Three of JMU’s award winning General Education program. The results are used to 
inform and improve our General Education program. 
You will have 60 minutes to complete this test. Please do not write on the test; answer all 
questions on the scantron provided. You will have scrap paper to help you; if you need 
more, just raise your hand. Read all test directions carefully, and answer the items to the 
best of your ability.   
We are pleased to let you know that you will be able to find out, via MyMadison, 
how you scored on the quantitative and scientific reasoning measures and what your 
scores can tell you about these reasoning skills. Later in the semester, you will 
receive an email providing you with instructions for accessing your scores and the 
interpretive information. 
When you become eligible for assessment again as a sophomore or junior, we will 
make every effort to make sure that you are assigned to take this instrument again 
so you can compare those scores with the ones you earn today. It is the hope of JMU 
faculty that we will see a lot of growth and development. We are pleased to offer this 
feedback to you. 
You will be told when there are 10 and 5 minutes remaining.  Take your time.  When you 
have completed all of the items, please wait quietly until the other students have finished. 
Thank you in advance for your effort and concentration on this important test. 
You may begin. 
[Remind students when they have 10 and 5 minutes remaining. After the students have 
completed the NW9, collect the test forms, scantrons, and scrap paper and put them in 
the designated envelopes within your bin.]  
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Appendix E 
 
Assessment Day Fall, 2016 Prospective Importance Instructions 
 [Proctors – students can use scrap paper for this test. Please pass out scrap paper if you 
have not already done so.] 
You will use two scantrons for this portion of the testing session.  Please make sure you 
have correctly filled in your name and JACard number on both scantron forms and that 
ONWA is written in the top right corner of one scantron form and NW9SOS is written in 
the top right corner of the other scantron form. 
The Natural World test is designed to assess your quantitative and scientific reasoning. At 
JMU we define these as thinking processes for obtaining and evaluating knowledge of the 
natural world. This instrument was developed at JMU with faculty who teach in Cluster 
Three of JMU’s award winning General Education program. The results are used to 
inform and improve our General Education program. 
We are pleased to let you know that you will be able to find out, via MyMadison, 
how you scored on the quantitative and scientific reasoning measures and what your 
scores can tell you about these reasoning skills. Later in the semester, you will 
receive an email providing you with instructions for accessing your scores and the 
interpretive information.  
When you become eligible for assessment again as a sophomore or junior, we will 
make every effort to make sure that you are assigned to take this instrument again 
so you can compare those scores with the ones you earn today. It is the hope of JMU 
faculty that we will see a lot of growth and development. We are pleased to offer this 
feedback to you. 
The Natural World test is a 60-minute, 66-item multiple-choice test designed to assess 
your knowledge of natural sciences, specifically your quantitative and scientific 
reasoning skills.  These skills include use of mathematical analyses, formulation and 
evaluation of scientific hypotheses, knowledge of basic and applied research, 
interpretation of graphical data, and evaluation of the credibility of scientific information.   
Please take a moment to review an example item from this test displayed on the screen at 
the front of the room and on the top of the blue Opinions of the Natural World Scale in 
front of you: 
[Please allow students 30 seconds to read the following item then read the question 
aloud.] 
Goldstar Inc. claims that its SAT preparation course is superior to the course offered 
by Premiere Inc.  A study conducted by Goldstar compared SAT scores from 500 
students who took Goldstar’s course and 500 students who took Premiere’s course.  
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Their study concluded that students who took Goldstar’s course scored significantly 
higher than students who took Premiere’s course.  Is Goldstar justified in its claim that 
its SAT preparation course is superior to Premiere’s course? 
[ x. The evidence strongly supports this claim.] 
[ y. The evidence contradicts this claim.] 
[ z. The evidence is not sufficient to support or contradict this claim.] 
This example item is representative of the types of items you will encounter on the 
Natural World test.  In case you are curious, the answer to the example item is z, but 
again, this is just a sample of the items you are about to encounter.   
Before you take the quantitative and scientific reasoning test, we ask that you complete 
the blue Opinions of the Natural World Scale.  It is a 5-item assessment used to 
measure your opinions with respect to the quantitative and scientific reasoning test you 
are about to complete.  Please do not write on the blue sheet; answer all items as honestly 
as possible on the scantron labeled ONWA.  You will have 2 minutes to complete this 
scale. 
When you have completed all of the items, please wait quietly until the other students 
have finished.  Thank you in advance for your effort and concentration on this important 
test. 
You may begin. 
[After ONWA time has expired, ask them to pass their ONWA test forms and completed 
scantrons to the aisle to collect. After assuring the students completed the correct 
scantron, please place them in the designated envelopes within your bin.] 
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Appendix F 
 
Assessment Day Fall, 2016 NW9 and Retrospective SOS Test Instructions 
[Proctors – students can use scrap paper for this test. Please pass out scrap paper if you 
have not already done so.] 
Please make sure you have correctly filled in your name and JACard number on the 
scantron form and that NW9SOS is written in the top right corner of the scantron form. 
You will now have 60 minutes to complete the Natural World test. Please do not write on 
the test; answer all questions on the scantron labeled NW9SOS. You will have scrap 
paper to help you; if you need more, just raise your hand. Read all test directions 
carefully, and answer the items to the best of your ability.   
You will be told when there are 10 and 5 minutes remaining.  Take your time.  When you 
have completed all of the items, please wait quietly until the other students have finished. 
Thank you in advance for your effort and concentration on this important test. 
You may begin. 
[Remind students when they have 10 and 5 minutes remaining. After NW9 time has 
expired, collect the test forms, scantrons, and scrap paper.  After assuring the students 
completed the correct scantron, please place them in the designated envelopes within 
your bin.] 
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Appendix G 
 
Assessment Day Fall, 2016 Prospective Importance and Effort Instructions 
[Proctors – students can use scrap paper for this test. Please pass out scrap paper if you 
have not already done so.] 
You will use two scantrons for this portion of the testing session.  Please make sure you 
have correctly filled in your name and JACard number on both scantron forms and that 
ONWB is written in the top right corner of one scantron form and NW9SOS is written in 
the top right corner of the other scantron form. 
The Natural World test is designed to assess your quantitative and scientific reasoning. At 
JMU we define these as thinking processes for obtaining and evaluating knowledge of the 
natural world. This instrument was developed at JMU with faculty who teach in Cluster 
Three of JMU’s award winning General Education program. The results are used to 
inform and improve our General Education program. 
We are pleased to let you know that you will be able to find out, via MyMadison, 
how you scored on the quantitative and scientific reasoning measures and what your 
scores can tell you about these reasoning skills. Later in the semester, you will 
receive an email providing you with instructions for accessing your scores and the 
interpretive information.  
When you become eligible for assessment again as a sophomore or junior, we will 
make every effort to make sure that you are assigned to take this instrument again 
so you can compare those scores with the ones you earn today. It is the hope of JMU 
faculty that we will see a lot of growth and development. We are pleased to offer this 
feedback to you. 
The Natural World test is a 60-minute, 66-item multiple-choice test designed to assess 
your knowledge of natural sciences, specifically your quantitative and scientific 
reasoning skills.  These skills include use of mathematical analyses, formulation and 
evaluation of scientific hypotheses, knowledge of basic and applied research, 
interpretation of graphical data, and evaluation of the credibility of scientific information.   
Please take a moment to review an example item from this test displayed on the screen at 
the front of the room and on the top of the peach Opinions of the Natural World Scale 
in front of you: 
[Please allow students 30 seconds to read the following item then read the question 
aloud.] 
Goldstar Inc. claims that its SAT preparation course is superior to the course offered 
by Premiere Inc.  A study conducted by Goldstar compared SAT scores from 500 
students who took Goldstar’s course and 500 students who took Premiere’s course.  
Their study concluded that students who took Goldstar’s course scored significantly 
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higher than students who took Premiere’s course.  Is Goldstar justified in its claim that 
its SAT preparation course is superior to Premiere’s course? 
[ x. The evidence strongly supports this claim.] 
[ y. The evidence contradicts this claim.] 
[ z. The evidence is not sufficient to support or contradict this claim.] 
This example item is representative of the types of items you will encounter on the 
Natural World test.  In case you are curious, the answer to the example item is z, but 
again, this is just a sample of the items you are about to encounter.   
Before you take the quantitative and scientific reasoning test, we ask that you complete 
the peach Opinions of the Natural World Scale.  It is a 10-item assessment used to 
measure your opinions with respect to the quantitative and scientific reasoning test you 
are about to complete.  Please do not write on the peach sheet; answer all items as 
honestly as possible on the scantron labeled ONWB.  You will have 2 minutes to 
complete this scale. 
When you have completed all of the items, please wait quietly until the other students 
have finished.  Thank you in advance for your effort and concentration on this important 
test. 
You may begin. 
[After ONWB time has expired, ask them to pass their ONWB test forms and completed 
scantrons to the aisle to collect. After assuring the students completed the correct 
scantron, please place them in the designated envelopes within your bin.] 
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